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CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN URBAN RENEWAL  
AND  
CITY PLANNING

by



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A THESIS  
SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES  
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The undersigned certify that they have read, and  
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## ABSTRACT

This thesis is an examination of a series of case studies which involve citizen participation in renewal and planning activities. These case studies are examined in terms of a series of hypotheses, which are mainly concerned with the level and results of citizen participation in the planning process. Also implications of some of the findings of this study are raised that pertain to the more general literature on political participation and democratic theory.

The evidence made available by these case studies leads to several conclusions. The first conclusion is that there is little difference between the level of participation found among the middle class and the working class. Also that, although there is less participation by the poor, there is still much more than would be expected. Furthermore, the level of participation found in renewal and planning activities raises doubts about the validity of the pluralist theory of democracy. The second conclusion is that the middle class is the most "private regarding" of the three classes. The third conclusion is that the level of participation in the planning process appears to have little to do with the establishment of machinery to facilitate that participation. The fourth conclusion is that citizen participation in the planning process leads to planning that better serves the people.



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## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION

This thesis will examine the potential for and effectiveness of citizen participation in urban renewal and the city planning process within the United States. This will be done by an examination of a series of case studies pertaining to citizen participation. The term "citizen participation" here does not refer to participation by city-wide bodies of influentials, but rather participation by those citizens in the neighborhoods that are to be affected by the planning and renewal activities.

Martin Rein has written that there are four ideas through which the planners have attempted to justify and legitimize the city planning process and their involvement in it. These four ideas are: the "authority of expertise", which is divorced from the political processes; "the authority of the bureaucracy", which is subservient to the elected public officials; "the authority of professional values", by which Rein means trying to convert public bureaucracies to the values of social reform by working within them; and "the authority of the consumer" or citizen, which means that the planner should be responsive to the needs, desires and preferences of the consuming population (and implicitly this



population should be involved in the planning process).<sup>1</sup>

## I

The need to evaluate the effectiveness of, and potential for, citizen participation in urban renewal and city planning stems from the knowledge relating to the results of planning and renewal activities that were undertaken without the participation of those people who were going to be affected.

The imposition of renewal and planning activities from above has led to a situation in which over three billion dollars has been spent in efforts which have had the result of drastically reducing the stock of low-income housing. Over 1,665,000 people, of whom over sixty percent were Negro, Puerto Rican or members of some other minority group, were forced to move from their place of residence. Very often, the displaced families and individuals would be forced to move into housing that was worse than that which was demolished, and furthermore the rents were usually higher. Also small businessmen in the renewal areas would be forced out of business, with little compensation and little chance of relocating. In place of the demolished residences would come high-rise apartment blocks for the well-to-do. Only about six percent of urban renewal construction is devoted to public housing. Furthermore much of the housing that was destroyed were slums only by middle class standards, they really provided adequate housing for lower income groups. Also this housing



frequently housed cohesive ethnic communities, which were destroyed forever.<sup>2</sup>

## II

It may first be useful to look at some aspects of the literature on political participation, in order to gain some perspective on the particular subject of citizen participation in urban renewal and city planning. First I will summarize the relevant points of some writers who agree with or contribute to the elitist component of the "pluralist" theory of democracy.

Lester M. Milbraith, in Political Participation, attempts to summarize the existing knowledge concerning political participation. Milbraith has a narrow definition of political participation. By political participation he means mainly the holding of a public office, or activities involved with electing people to those offices. Demonstrations and any sort of disruptive activity are a priori excluded from his definition of political participation.

Milbraith states that high socio-economic status (SES), especially high education, is associated with a high degree of political participation, while working class people, by and large, do not become politically active.

He also states that high SES individuals are more likely to become engaged in politics because they have certain attitudes, knowledge and personality traits that facilitate





political participation. Among these factors are:

1. High SES persons, especially those who are well educated, are more likely to have efficacious feelings about politics than low SES persons and those who have efficacious feelings about politics are more likely to participate in politics than those who do not.

2. The greater the individual's knowledge about politics, the more likely is the individual to participate in politics. Individuals of high SES, especially those with high education, usually have a greater knowledge about politics than those people with a low SES.

3. Those who are cynical about or alienated from politics do not get involved in politics to the extent that those who are not cynical or alienated. High SES individuals, especially those with a good education, are less likely to be cynical about or alienated from the political process than low SES individuals.

4. Sociable individuals, by which Milbraith means those individuals who are at ease in and possess skills for social relationships, are more politically active than nonsociable individuals. Individuals brought up in an upper middle class or upper SES environment are more likely to develop the feelings of competence and self-confidence that facilitate social intercourse.

On the other hand, certain aspects of a working man's job make it hard for him to become politically active. Among



these aspects are a fixed work schedule, which does not give his free time to go to meetings; his job does not educate him in the type of verbal skills that equip him for political action, and the relevance of political decisions to his life are often ambiguous

As to participation by the poor, Milbraith's only comment is that it appears that individuals are unlikely to participate until they reach a certain income level.

Also, although Milbraith places the more important immediate causes of participation or nonparticipation with the individual, he does see certain institutional factors as determinants of the amount of participation. Milbraith states that voter turnout is likely to increase when the electorate perceives distinct alternatives, and/or the citizen perceives the government as responsive to his actions, and/or the election is a crisis election.

Robert A. Dahl, in his community power study of New Haven in Who Governs?, has some things to say about political participation.<sup>4</sup> Dahl, in his study, was concerned with who influenced significant decisions made by the New Haven city government. Therefore he is implicitly broadening his definition of political participation (although he does not specifically use this term) beyond Milbraith's definition. Whereas Milbraith used the term to refer to holding public office and activities involved in getting elected to public



offices, Dahl is concerned with the influence that citizens exercise on the decisions made by public officials.

In the three issue areas that Dahl studied, the fifty leaders, who had a significant effect on outcomes, all held white collar occupations. Also white collar jobs were held by seventy percent of the subleaders. Even though forty-five percent of the registered voters were wage earners, only nineteen percent of the subleaders within the two parties were drawn from wage earners. Also the wage earner votes, attempts to exert influence, and participates in election campaigns less frequently than his middle class counterpart.

In Who Governs? Dahl did not report that there was any influence exerted by the Negroes or the poor, nor did he mention any participation by them. This would indicate that there was not very much participation, nor influence, exerted by the Negroes or the poor in New Haven.

Furthermore, what Dahl found in New Haven was that most of the citizens rarely participated at all, and that a large percentage of the adult population did not even bother to vote.

Dahl presents four reasons why one class of citizens participate more, or use their political resources more, than another group of citizens. These reasons are:





(1) their political resources are greater in amount; (2) their expectations of success are higher; (3) the pay off they expect from using their resources for non-political resources is lower; or (4) the value they attach to the outcomes of political decisions is higher.<sup>5</sup>

In Voting by Bernard B. Berelson, Paul Z. Lazarsfield and William N. McPhee, the authors studied the voting habits of the residents of Elmira, New York.<sup>6</sup> They found that although the majority of adult residents voted, there was little true discussion of the issues or candidates, that the citizens were poorly informed about the campaign, that their motivation was weak or absent. The authors also found that the citizens did not act rationally when voting. By rational the authors here mean a weighing of alternatives, in the sense that one would weigh alternatives when buying a car or home. The authors state that this voting behavior is due to the fact that "most voters . . . are not in a position to foresee the distant and indirect consequences" of the election. The authors leave open the question as to why the voters are unable to foresee the consequences of the election.

Angus Campbell, in his article "The Passive Citizen", tries to explain the background causes of the passive citizen.<sup>8</sup> By the "passive citizen" he means the non-voter, thus he implicitly would define participation as voting.

Campbell states that the causes of non-voting are both within the individual and within the social structure. The causes of non-voting that Campbell sees within the



individual are a low measure of personal effectiveness, isolation from the larger society, alienation from the political spheres. Also satisfaction with the political system will make for passivity whereas short term dissatisfaction will lead to a higher rate of participation. But on the other hand, Campbell points out that long term dissatisfaction may lead to demoralization and apathy.

The factors in the environment that Campbell sees as causing non-voting are the "expected differential" and the "cost". The expected differentials that Campbell sees as causing non-voting are an unimportant office at stake, unresponsive political institutions, candidates who fail to offer significant alternatives and elections which are not close elections.

Scott Greer, in his article "Individual Participation in the Mass Society",<sup>9</sup> stated that the lack of political participation in American society is due to the fact that most Americans are descendants of illiterates and consequently have neither a tradition of participation nor an interest in it.

There are several generalizations that can be made about the works we just mentioned, the authors of whom developed or contributed to the elitest component of the "pluralist" theory of democracy. First they tend to have a narrow explicit or implicit definition of political participation. Participation, to most of these authors, consists largely of voting,



campaign activities and holding public office. Only Dahl extends his definition of political participation far enough to include private citizens influencing decisions made by elected public officials. None of these authors extended their definitions of participation far enough to include demonstrations or any sort of disruptive tactics. Second these authors found that there was a low rate of participation by the citizenry at large. Furthermore, the amount of participation varied greatly with social class. The authors uniformly found that the middle class participated more than the working class, and that participation by the poor was usually not even mentioned, which would seem to indicate that it was extremely low. Third, although these authors state that the low degree of participation is due both to factors within the individual citizen and the social structure, they emphasize the factors within the individual as being the main cause of the low degree of participation.

Here we will present some of the relevant criticisms of the aspects of the pluralist theory of democracy that were presented above. Jack L. Walker, in his article "A Critique of the Elitest Theory of Democracy", argues that although it is undoubtedly true that apathy is widespread, it is still critical that the reasons for its existence be examined.<sup>10</sup> Walker further suggests that the reason for apathy may not be in the individual, but "it may also have its roots in society's institutional structure, in the weakness or absence of



group stimulation or support, in the positive opposition of elements within the political system to wider participation.<sup>11</sup>

Robert J. Pranger in The Eclipse of Citizenship<sup>12</sup> puts forward the view that it is "local political culture, not universal human nature, (which) presents the great barrier to wider civic participation."<sup>13</sup> Pranger sees the political culture in effect sending out certain messages to the citizen about the nature and amount of participation that is possible in that political culture. Pranger further states that the messages that the contemporary political culture sends out tell the citizen that he is only of marginal importance to political decision-making and that the role of the citizen is a passive one. Then even if a citizen tries to participate in public matters he meets with frustration.

The Rulers and the Ruled by Robert E. Agger, Daniel Goldrich and Bert E. Swanson is a community power study which covers four communities over a period of ten years.<sup>14</sup> Their findings offer some empirical evidence to support Walker's suggestion that the low rate of political participation found in contemporary American society may be caused by the larger institutional setting rather than causes within the individual.

The authors nowhere explicitly define participation, but they do distinguish between participation that will have influence on decisional outcomes and participation that does not. For instance participation in the civic association





network will probably influence decisional outcomes and participation at a public hearing probably will not. With this in mind, Agger found that the upper middle and middle class participated in decision-making much more than the working class or the poor. Agger found that lower income whites and to a lesser extent blacks were left out of the actual decision-making processes of most of the communities he studied. This is due to the fact that the decision-making process, especially in its early stages, is carried on in the civic association network. This means that those organizations that are within the civic association network have direct access to the decision-making process. On the other hand, those organizations that are outside the civic association network are in fact outside the decision-making process. This includes precisely those groups which represent lower income whites and Negroes--the unions, liberal organizations, the Negro organizations and the radical right organizations.

Agger also made an attempt to explain the low level of participation at the local level. (Here Agger refers to participation in the broader sense and not just participation in the decision-making process.) The authors stated that the low level of participation can be caused by (1) the fear of illegitimate sanctions; (2) the absence of channels through which to influence the decision-making process; and (3) the lack of a competitive leadership that has ideologically significant differences at stake.



E.E. Schattschneider, in The Semi-Sovereign People, notes that about forty million out of an adult population of about one hundred million do not bother to vote in presidential elections. Furthermore, this forty million is by and large made up of the poorest and least well educated portions of American society.

Schattschneider argues that the reasons for non-voting can be "found in the way in which alternatives . . . are defined, the way in which issues get referred to the public, the scale of competition and organization and above all what issues are developed."<sup>16</sup>

Schattschneider points out that American national elections, unlike the British, are generally not fought over great issues. But even more important the issues over which American politics are fought and the alternatives which are presented have no relevance to the lives of the forty million non-voters. (Remember The Semi-Sovereign People was published in 1960.) The cleavages which divide American political life are cleavages within the sixty million voters; whereas the real cleavage within American society may be the cleavage between the voters and the non-voters. Also in American history every revolutionary change in American political history has been closely connected with an expansion of the electorate, and if the electorate is going to be further expanded, it will probably occur when the alternatives presented by the political system are expanded to include the non-voters' needs.



What all of these anti-pluralist writers (Walker, Pranger, Schattschneider and Agger, Swanson and Goldrich) have most in common is an emphasis on the institutional setting or factors in the larger society that may lead to the low level of participation in contemporary society.

Also although none of these authors, with the exception of Pranger, presented an explicit definition of participation in three out of the four works cited (Schattschneider being the exception), the authors are at least implicitly interested in a definition of political participation that goes beyond that given by the pluralist. The pluralist writers as we mentioned earlier all, with the exception of Dahl, restrict political participation to voting, campaign activities and holding public office.

Walker for one would expand the term to "taking part in the affairs of his society",<sup>15</sup> which certainly requires more of the citizen than voting for competing elites, who govern the affairs of his society. Also Walker would want to include within political participation the actions of social movements that arise from within the public at large. Although these movements often disrupt the normal political processes, they often act as levers for change. The elitest theorist usually ignores the role of such movements.

By participation, Pranger means the antithesis of what the pluralist means by participation. Pranger means



the citizen "actually enjoys power and creates a common-wealth. . . ."16

Agger, Swanson and Goldrich also use a broader concept of political participation. They are concerned with what groups exert influence and participate in the actual making of decisions.

Although Schattschneider does not explicitly define participation, he is interested only in voting.

### III

The debate over the ability and the advisability of citizen participation in the planning process has largely overlapped with the debate concerning the comprehensive planning versus neighborhood planning. By and large those people who advocate comprehensive planning are opposed to citizen participation, and those people who favor neighborhood planning support citizen participation. Comprehensive planning has largely been the way planning has been carried on in the past. Comprehensive planning has been done largely through use of the general plan. The general plan is based upon a set of goals, principles and policies for the development of the city as a whole. Implicit in comprehensive planning is the assumption that there is a single best solution that can be rationally arrived at, and a public interest for the city as a whole which is discoverable.

Proponents of comprehensive planning point out that





decisions have to be made which taken account of trends which affect the entire area.

Also J. Clarence Davies III argues that planning that is sanctioned by neighborhood groups have a limited interest that is not necessarily identical or even similar to that of the public interest of the city as a whole.<sup>19</sup> Also Langley Carleton Keyes Jr. points out that planning done at the neighborhood level may not only be not geared to the interests of the future of the city as a whole, but may not even be geared to the future residents of that neighborhood. Keyes points out that residents of the neighborhood at the time that the plan is negotiated may not be the same residents at the time the renewal plans are put into effect.<sup>20</sup>

The arguments against comprehensive planning are outlined by Hans B.C. Speigel and Stephen D. Mitterthal in Neighborhood Power and Control Implications for Urban Planning.<sup>21</sup> The arguments against comprehensive planning will be presented here.

1. Comprehensive planning has been designed so as to distribute resources to the middle class and away from the lower classes.<sup>22</sup>

2. Walter Thabit has argued that "most cities do not have articulated city-wide objectives in many important areas."<sup>23</sup>

3. Comprehensive planning tries to plan for a reality



that does not really exist, whereas the reality of urban life is really conflict and fragmentation of power.<sup>24</sup>

4. Comprehensive planning removes itself from public scrutiny and control by hiding from public view. This is done by burying individual decisions in long-range and area-wide goals through the use of technical language.<sup>25</sup>

The alternative that has emerged to comprehensive planning has been neighborhood planning. Marshall Kaplan has described the difference between comprehensive and neighborhood planning in the following manner:

Concern for the micro environment of specific neighborhoods, specific blocks, and specific people takes precedence over concern for all neighborhoods, all blocks and all people. Systematic, rational and comprehensive planning is treated correctly as impossible to achieve and replaced by a more incremental, functional process and product, one that opts for the certainty of immediate predictable results, rather than long-range speculative impact. Finally, rather than plan for, the planner is asked to plan with the recipients of his technical beneficence: rather than separate fact and value, the planner is asked to join the two.<sup>26</sup>

The case against citizen participation in urban renewal and city planning has been forcefully stated by James Q. Wilson. Wilson believes that the middle and upper classes are capable of participating in urban renewal and the city planning process, while the lower classes, by whom he means the working class and the poor, are not.

Such people are more likely to have a limited time perspective, a greater difficulty in abstracting from concrete experience, an unfamiliarity with and lack of confidence in city wide institutions.<sup>27</sup>



Wilson also finds that the lower classes are bound up with the day-to-day struggle of existence and consequently have a "private regarding" ethos. And if they become active in urban renewal at all it will only be in response to a perceived threat but never to conceive and implement a comprehensive program for the benefit of the entire community.

Harold Goldblatt also raises a number of objections to citizen participation in the planning process: (1) the mobilization of citizen participation in the planning process may unleash forces which are antagonistic to the city's renewal efforts; (2) citizen participation in the form of neighborhood groups can not take into account the interests of the city as a whole; (3) those citizens who participate are likely to be only a small proportion of the neighborhood, and will probably not include the poorest and the least educated; (4) local citizens are not capable of improving the physical aspects of their neighborhood; (5) when neighborhood bodies are given the de facto power to create plans for their neighborhood they are without the power of government to enforce the product of their deliberations; and (6) the use of citizen participation prolongs the planning process to the point where it may endanger the success of the proposed renewal.<sup>28</sup>

The advocacy of citizen participation in the planning process is closely connected with the attack on comprehensive planning. The connection between the two comes from the



fact that the advocacy of citizen participation is a recognition of the fact that there is more than one feasible solution to any one problem, and that therefore the range of alternatives, and the goals and values upon which they are premised, are a matter for public discussion and debate. In other words, the argument is that planning and renewal activities are political problems rather than technical ones. Furthermore, comprehensive planning deals with large tracts of land, and with issues the consequences of which are hard for the citizen to foresee, and thus is not as easily accessible to citizen participation. On the other hand, neighborhood planning deals with the microcosm where the issues and results of the planning activity are more easily perceived by the citizen. Consequently neighborhood planning is an appropriate vehicle for citizen participation.

Within the debate found in planning literature, comprehensive planning without citizen participation has been pitted against neighborhood planning with citizen participation. However, there does not seem to be any logical reason why there could not be citizen participation in comprehensive planning, although the participation would be of much different sort than participation in neighborhood planning.

Paul Davidoff, in his article "Advocacy and Pluralism in Planning" argues that in a democracy the proper course of public action is a matter of choice and not of fact, and this







should include planning activities as much as other areas. Davidoff urges that urban planners become aware of the reality that society is made up of diverse interest groups and that planners should encourage the participation of these diverse interest groups in the planning process, but especially of those groups that have not been represented in the past. In order that these groups be able to participate fully in the planning process, planners should serve as advocates for citizens groups. The role of the advocate planner would be to aid his client group by assisting them in clarifying their ideas and giving expression to them. Davidoff calls his concept of planning "plural planning" and he sees a number of advantages arising from it. The first advantage would be that the public would be better informed about the alternatives that exist in planning and renewal activities. The second advantage is that with the existence of alternative plans the public agency would have to compete for public support for their own plans. Consequently they would have to develop better plans. The third advantage is that the critics of the public agency would have to go beyond just criticism and come up with feasible alternatives.<sup>29</sup>

As can be seen the debate over citizen participation in the planning process has similarities to the debate between pluralist and anti-pluralist in political science, although the terminology has changed. In planning literature "pluralism" has been connected with the idea that planning decisions are



decisions of a political rather than a technical nature. Consequently all the interested groups that are affected by the decision should be involved in the making of the decision. And in order to involve all affected interest groups, those groups that have been excluded from the decision-making process, specifically the poor and working class, will have to be involved. But what is centrally at issue in both the debate in political science and in city planning is the desirability and possibility of participation in the political processes of the ordinary citizen.

#### IV

This thesis will attempt to evaluate the effectiveness of and potential for citizen participation in urban renewal and city planning by the examination of a series of case studies in terms of several hypotheses.

The phenomena found in these case studies have been found to be too complex and too varied to fit neatly into a typology. But the case studies will be looked at with two variables, in particular, kept in mind: (1) in what way is the participation taking place (pressure group, sharing of power, actual decision-making power), and (2) what social class do the groups and individuals participating come from. In presenting the cases there will be an attempt to roughly classify them according to these two variables.

In this thesis, the term participation will refer to three broad types of phenomenon. All of these types have in



common the fact that the residents took some action attempting to control the nature of their physical environment. The first type of participation would cover instances in which the residents attempted to influence the decisions of the public authorities. Residents have attempted to influence the decisions of the public authorities through the formation of pressure groups, attendance at public hearings or city council meetings, attitude surveys which attempt to ascertain the resident's views, the presentation of an alternative plan and the presentation of research that would either support the residents aims or refute the public authorities claim.

The second type of participation covers those instances in which the residents worked with the public authorities or powerful private institutions in drawing up the renewal plans for their community.

The third type of participation encompasses those instances in which the residents took upon themselves the task of rehabilitating their neighborhoods. In order to do this the residents performed such tasks as rehabilitating their own homes, the actions necessary to ensure that loans would be available to rehabilitate their homes, alleys and yards were cleared of debris, and contractors were encouraged to build new homes in the community.

In the chapters that are to follow the varieties have been broken down into five categories. The first is the traditional



group, where the group is attempting to influence the sources of political power in the community. The second is the use of attitude surveys to attempt to find out what sort of planning the neighborhood wants. The attitude survey can function as a type of citizen participation when it is used to tap the residents' desires as to what sort of renewal planning they would like to see in their neighborhood. The third is a sharing of power between the city and a neighborhood group. The most typical form of the latter is where the city establishes an organization in the neighborhood or picks an already established group with which to bargain with when renewing the area. This is often an attempt at co-optation for the city's own goals. But in the process of doing this, it frequently turns into something more than co-optation. Often there occurs a real sharing of decision-making power between the city government and the neighborhood, even though the city retains the ultimate power to veto any plans that results from these negotiations. The fourth category of participation is urban renewal and city planning by powerful private institutions, with neighborhood groups negotiating with them. Here again the city retains the ultimate power to veto the plans. The fifth category of participation involves those instances where the final decision-making power rests with the neighborhood or where the citizens have acted independently of the government.

SES is broken down into three classes: the middle class, working class and the poor.







A social class is a "stratum of people of a similar social position".<sup>30</sup> The defining characteristics of a class include occupation income, education, values and systems of behavior. There is not a sharp delineation of class boundaries. Within a given class, a family or an individual may or may not possess all of the defining characteristics of that class. For these reasons, there is no fixed number of classes. Rather, there exists a continuum which can be divided into any number of classes that is convenient to the task at hand.<sup>31</sup> In this thesis the categories of middle class, working class and poor are used. The indicies used to categorize individuals into classes are occupation, income, education and life style. The term "life style" includes family structure, attitudes and systems of behavior.

Before presenting the indicies that characterize particular classes, some of the terms used will be defined. "Object-oriented" refers to individuals whose main concern is to achieve an object. This object can be a moral object, an economic object, an ideological object or a cultural object. "Personoriented" refers to individuals whose main concern is to be a member of a group, and to be noticed and liked by the members of a group whom one also notices and likes.<sup>32</sup> The term "routine seekers" refers to those people who attempt to establish a stable life style, within which high priority is placed on the emotional and economic security of the individual and his family is given high priority. "Action seekers", on



the other hand, refers to those people who spend their lives in search of excitement and thrills.<sup>33</sup>

### Middle Class

The middle class is a stratum of society whose occupations include the professions, middle level management and ownership of medium sized businesses. Gans has stated that the middle class looks upon work not just as a means of earning a livelihood, but also as a series of job advances which provide the individual with greater responsibility, job satisfaction and income. Furthermore the middle class often looks upon work as an avenue for individual fulfillment.<sup>34</sup>

The income of a middle class family is likely to be over \$12,000. a year.

The middle class individual will have at least a high school diploma, and very probably some university education or possibly one or more university degrees. Furthermore many members of the middle class regard education as an end in itself.

The nuclear family structure is one of the most characteristic features of middle class life.<sup>35</sup> Also the middle class tend to be object-oriented rather than person-oriented.<sup>36</sup>

### Working Class

The working class is composed of people who hold blue collar jobs, or white collar jobs involving the performance of subordinate and semiroutine functions.<sup>37</sup> Furthermore employment for the working class is rarely looked upon as an



avenue for self-expression. Rather it is simply a means to gain the income necessary to maintain and enhance life within the family circle. The family circle is made up of in-laws, siblings, cousins and close friends who are of the same age, sex, socio-economic level and cultural background, and who show common interests and values.<sup>39</sup>

The income of the working class family varies between \$6,000 and \$12,000 a year.

The working class individual generally has a high school degree or less, and at most has some post-secondary technical or trade school training. Education is looked upon as a means to find work, seldom as an end in itself.<sup>40</sup>

The working class family pattern is that of an extended family, and most of the individual's leisure time is spent within the family circle.<sup>41</sup> The working class life style tends to be person-centered and routine seeking.<sup>42</sup>

### Poor

The poor when they are employed generally hold jobs, that are unskilled, low paying and often temporary. Usually the lower class individual drifts from one job to another, and has little interest in his work.

The income of the poor is derived through welfare or the type of work previously mentioned. The definition, as to what constitutes a minimal family income is in dispute.



This dispute is due to the fact that what constitutes minimal family maintenance varies not from city to city but also more greatly between urban and rural areas. Also in dispute is what constitutes basic human need which must be met. However the Bureau of Labor Statistics has produced a minimum maintenance budget for an urban family of four. It varies from \$6,567 in Chicago to \$5,300 in Houston. Washington, D.C. was close to the average with \$6,147.43. This thesis will use \$6,000 as the income which constitutes a minimal family income. A somewhat less precise way of defining poverty was given by Michael Harrington who stated that the poor are those people, who are denied the minimal levels of health, housing, food and education that our present stage of scientific knowledge specified as necessary for life as it is now lived in the United States.<sup>44</sup>

The educational level of the lower class or poor individual is quite often less than a high school degree. Furthermore education is not looked upon as an end in itself, nor is it even regarded as a means to anything else.

The low income family is female-based, and the male is present only part of the time, if at all. Furthermore, when a family circle does exist it consists only of the female relatives.<sup>45</sup>

The life style of the poor male is action seeking, while that of the female is routine seeking.<sup>46</sup> But the most





characteristic feature of the life of the poor in the United States is that their place in society is such that they are internal exiles who, almost inevitably develop attitudes of defeat and pessimism.<sup>47</sup>

In the cases that will be discussed in the following chapters the social class of the neighborhood or individuals involved was often not explicitly mentioned or defined by the sources. However when this is the case, the mention of one of the class characteristics mentioned above was used to classify the social class of the neighborhood or the participants. These characteristics could include occupation, income, educational level or certain aspects of the life style of the people involved (for example, extended families).

As an example of the use of this technique let us look at Case 13, Charlestown.

The fact that there was a low rate of people on welfare and a high rate of home ownership, even though much of the housing was dilapidated, would both tend to indicate that Charlestown was indicated as a working class area. That these are taken to indicate working class status is due to the fact that a low rate of people on welfare and a high rate of home ownership indicates that Charlestown is not a poor or lower class area. And on the other hand the fact that much of the housing is in a dilapidated condition indicates that the income of the residents was somewhat limited, and this in turn indicates that Charlestown was not a middle class neighborhood.



There are some aspects of the life style of the residents of Charlestown that would indicate that it was a working class neighborhood. First of all extended families rather than nuclear families are common in Charlestown. Second the low crime rate would indicate a routine seeking rather than an action seeking life style.

The case studies will be examined in terms of six hypotheses. The first set of hypotheses (1.a, 1.b, and 1.c; 2.a, 2.g, and 2.c; and 3.a, 3.b, and 3.c) attempts to assess the capacity of the three classes to participate in urban renewal and the city planning process. These hypotheses are drawn from James Q. Wilson's argument, mentioned earlier, that the middle class can participate, but that the lower classes (by whom he means both the working class and the poor) are incapable of participating in renewal and planning activities. Wilson further argues that when the lower classes do participate it is only in response to threats, but never to implement a broad program for the sake of the entire community.<sup>48</sup> Wilson's typology will here be modified from middle class and lower class to middle class, working class and poor. This modification is necessary to take into account Langley Carleton Keyes Jr.'s position that the middle class and the working class, but not the poor, are capable of participating in renewal and planning activities.



Hypothesis 1.a - The middle class participates in urban renewal and the city planning process to a greater extent than either the working class or the poor.

Hypothesis 1.b - The middle class is the least likely of the three classes to participate in planning and renewal activities in response to a threat.

Hypothesis 1.c - The middle class is more likely than either the working class or the poor to participate in the planning and implementation of a broad or sophisticated program.

Hypothesis 2.a - The working class participates in urban renewal and the city planning process to a lesser extent than the middle class.<sup>49</sup>

Hypothesis 2.b - When the working class does participate in planning and renewal activities, it is more likely to be in response to a threat than is middle class participation.

Hypothesis 2.c - The working class is less likely than the middle class to participate in the planning and implementation of a broad or sophisticated program.

Hypothesis 3.a - The poor participate in urban renewal and the city planning process to a lesser extent than either the middle class or the working class.

Hypothesis 3.b - When the poor do participate in planning and renewal activities, it is more likely to be in response to a threat than is either middle class or working class participation.

Hypothesis 3.c - The poor are the least likely of the three classes to participate in a broad or sophisticated program.

The fourth hypothesis is ultimately drawn from Edward Banfield's and James Q. Wilson's distinction between the "public regarding ethos" of the middle class and the "private regarding ethos of the lower classes". Banfield and Wilson state that the middle class has a "public regarding ethos" which enables them to see the interests of the city as a whole and act on the basis of this public interest, rather than



partial or private interests. On the other hand, Banfield and Wilson state that the lower income groups have a "private regarding ethos", by which they mean that these groups only think in terms of the interests of themselves, their families, and their immediate groups.<sup>50</sup> This hypothesis will make use of Keyes' modification of the use of the terms "public regarding-private regarding". Keyes and this author use this dichotomy in the following way:

It is analytically helpful to think of the "public regarding-private regarding" dichotomy as a way of describing the attitudes of those in the local project area engaged in the renewal planning game. Thus a "public regarding" member of the team is one who thinks of the impact of residential renewal on the entire spectrum of interest groups present in the project area, while a "private regarding" member is one concerned with promoting the cause of only some of the interest groups in the area at the time of the renewal planning.<sup>51</sup>

One could identify a public regarding actor or group by their actions taken to protect the interests of all those groups or individuals presently within the renewal area. This would be done by attempting to prevent or reduce the amount of dislocation that could occur during the renewal plans. Also the "public regarding" groups or individual would attempt to see that adequate provisions were made, preferably within the neighborhood, for those who would be forced to relocate.

The "private regarding" group or individual, on the other hand, would promote the interests of one or more of the groups in the renewal area, at the expense of some or all of the groups. The "private regarding" actor or group is willing to allow some groups to be thrown out of the neighborhood by







the demolition of their homes, or increases in rents to the point where they are economically prohibitive for the present tenants. In fact the very aim of their activity is often to remove certain groups from their neighborhood. The second hypothesis will attempt to assess which social class groups tend to be "public regarding" and which tend to be "private regarding".

Hypothesis 4 - The middle class, when participating in urban renewal and city planning, are more "public regarding" than the working class or the poor.

The third hypothesis deals with the relationship between citizen participation and the presence or absence of governmental structures facilitating participation.

Hypothesis 5 - The amount and sophistication of citizen participation will increase as the governmental structures that facilitate this participation get closer to placing actual decision-making power in the hands of the citizenry.

The fourth hypothesis will attempt to evaluate the results of citizen participation in planning and renewal activities.

Hypothesis 6 - Urban renewal and city planning with citizen participation at the neighborhood level leads to urban renewal and city planning that is responsive to the needs, wants and customs of the neighborhood residents.

## V

A few words should be said about the methodology of case studies. Paul B. Foreman has described a case study as



"a depiction either of a phrase or the totality of relevant experience of some selected datum."<sup>52</sup>

In the literature dealing with case studies there are a number of reasons given for the usefulness of examining case studies. The reasons are: (1) the testing of hypotheses or generalizations;<sup>53</sup> (2) they suggest hypothesis or generalizations;<sup>54</sup> and (3) they make available a great deal of data that would otherwise be unavailable.<sup>55</sup>

Stein has written that when we read case studies we do not know the entire story. Rather, what we know is what the author perceived to be important. But this Stein states is not only the limitation of case studies, but of all written communication. Consequently, although case studies do not give us any sort of absolute truth, they do give us "a sufficiently practical recreation of reality to make analysis useful and meaningful."<sup>56</sup> Also it should be remembered, as R.G. Collingwood has pointed out, facts or evidence is not just sitting on trees waiting to be plucked, but rather that evidence exists only in relation to specific questions. Therefore one cannot go around collecting facts or evidence until he has first formulated his questions. Then factors or evidence are anything that is useful in answering his questions.<sup>57</sup>

In this thesis case studies will be used for all three of the reasons stated above. They will be used to test



hypotheses, to suggest new hypotheses, and they will be used because they make available a great deal of data pertaining to the subject matter of this thesis which would otherwise be unavailable.

In this thesis some cases will be used which may seem fragmentary or incomplete. The justification for using such cases is that even though they are fragmentary, they lend evidence for or against at least one of the hypotheses.



## FOOTNOTES, CHAPTER I

<sup>1</sup>Martin Rein, "Social Planning: The Search for Legitimacy", American Institute of Planners Journal, XXXV (July, 1969), 233-244.

<sup>2</sup>See Martin Anderson, The Federal Bulldozer (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1964); Scott Greer, Urban Renewal and American Cities (New York: The Bobbs Merrill Co. Inc., 1965); Herbert Gans, The Urban Villager (New York: The Free Press, 1962).

<sup>3</sup>Lester M. Milbraith, Political Participation (Chicago: Rand McNally and Co., 1965).

<sup>4</sup>Robert A. Dahl, Who Governs? (New Haven, 1961).

<sup>5</sup>Ibid., p. 282.

<sup>6</sup>Bernard R. Berelson, Paul Z. Lazarsfeld and William N. McPhee, Voting (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954).

<sup>7</sup>Ibid., p. 308.

<sup>8</sup>Angus Cambell, "The Passive Citizen", Acta Sociological, VI (fasc. 1-2), 9-19.

<sup>9</sup>Scott Greer, "Individual Participation in Mass Society", Approaches to the Study of Politics, ed. by Roland Young (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1958), pp. 23-42.

<sup>10</sup>Jack L. Walker, "A Critique of the Elitest Theory of Democracy", American Political Science Review, LX (June, 1966), 285-295.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid., p. 290.

<sup>12</sup>Robert J. Pranger, The Eclipse of Citizenship (Toronto: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1968).





<sup>13</sup>Ibid., p. 27.

<sup>14</sup>Robert E. Agger, Daniel Goldrich and Bert E. Swanson, The Rulers and the Ruled (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1964), pp. 648-687.

<sup>15</sup>E.E. Schattschneider, The Semisovereign People (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1960), pp. 97-113.

<sup>16</sup>Ibid., p. 10.

<sup>17</sup>Walker, "A Critique. . . .", p. 288.

<sup>18</sup>Pranger, The Eclipse of Citizenship, p. 2.

<sup>19</sup>J. Clarence Davies III, Neighborhood Groups and Urban Renewal (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966), pp. 209-210.

<sup>20</sup>Langley Carleton Keyes Jr., The Rehabilitation Planning Game (Boston: The MIT Press, 1969), p. 218.

<sup>21</sup>Hans B.C. Speigel and Stephen D. Mittenthal, Neighborhood Power and Control: Implications for Urban Planning (New York: Institute of Urban Environment, School of Architecture, Columbia University, 1968), pp. 119-123 and pp. 128-131.

<sup>22</sup>Ibid., p. 120; Marshall Kaplan, "The Role of the Urban in Urban Areas--Modest, Intuitive Claims for Advocacy", paper delivered to the National Conference on Social Welfare, May 27, 1968, p. 5 (Mimeographed).

<sup>23</sup>Ibid., p. 129.

<sup>24</sup>An interview with Marshall Kaplan, San Francisco, June 14, 1968, cited by Speigel and Mittenthal, Neighborhood Power and Control, p. 129.

<sup>25</sup>Speigel and Mittenthal, Neighborhood Power and Control, p. 130.

<sup>26</sup>Speigel and Mittenthal, Neighborhood Power and Control, p. 122; Kaplan, "The Role of the Planner in Urban Areas--Modest Intuitive Claims for Advocacy", p. 5.



<sup>27</sup>James Q. Wilson, "Planning and Politics: Citizen Participation in Urban Renewal", Citizen Participation in Urban Development, Vol. I, ed. by Hans B.C. Speigel (Washington: MTL Institute for Applied Behavioral Science, 1968), p. 50.

<sup>28</sup>Harold Golblatt, "Arguments For and Against Citizen Participation in Urban Renewal", Citizen Participation in Urban Development, Vol. I, pp. 30-42.

<sup>29</sup>Paul Davidoff, "Advocacy and Pluralism in Planning", Journal of the American Institute of Planners, XXXI (November, 1965), 331-338.

<sup>30</sup>Paul Horton and Charles L. Hunt, Sociology (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1964), p. 261.

<sup>31</sup>Ibid., pp. 261-262.

<sup>32</sup>Gans, The Urban Villager, pp. 89-90.

<sup>33</sup>Ibid., pp. 30-32.

<sup>34</sup>Ibid., pp. 247-248.

<sup>35</sup>Ibid., pp. 246-247.

<sup>36</sup>Ibid., pp. 258-260.

<sup>37</sup>Pitirim A. Sorokin, "What is a Social Class", Class, Status and Power, ed. by Reinhard Bendix and Seymour Martin Lipsett (The Free Press: Glencoe, Illinois, 1953), p. 90.

<sup>38</sup>Gans, The Urban Villager, p. 244.

<sup>39</sup>Ibid., p. 39.

<sup>40</sup>Ibid., p. 245.

<sup>41</sup>Ibid., p. 244; S.M. Miller and Frank Riessman, "The Working Class Subculture: A New View", Social Problems, 9 (Summer 1961), pp. 92.

<sup>42</sup>Miller and Riessman, "The Working Class. . . .", pp. 91 and 93; Gans, The Urban Villager, pp. 30 and 93.



<sup>43</sup>Michael Harrington, The Other America (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1962), p. 181.

<sup>44</sup>Ibid., p. 179.

<sup>45</sup>Gans, The Urban Villager, p. 245; Horton and Hunt, Sociology, p. 272; August B. Hollingshead, "Class Differences in Family Stability", Class, Status and Power, p. 291; Harrington, Poverty in America, p. 98.

<sup>46</sup>Gans, The Urban Villager, p. 246.

<sup>47</sup>Harrington, Poverty in America, p. 179.

<sup>48</sup>Wilson, "Planning and Politics. . . .", p. 50.

<sup>49</sup>Keyes, The Rehabilitation Planning Game, p. 212.

<sup>50</sup>Wilson, "Planning and Politics. . . .", p. 50; Edward Banfield and James Q. Wilson, City Politics (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965), pp. 139-140.

<sup>51</sup>Keyes, The Rehabilitation Planning Game, p. 212.

<sup>52</sup>Paul B. Foreman, "The Theory of Case Studies", Social Forces, XXVI (May, 1948), 408.

<sup>53</sup>Harold Stein, "Introduction to Part II, Case Method in the Analysis of Public Administration", Public Administration and Policy Development: A Case Book, ed. by Harold Stein (New York: Hartcourt, Brace and Co., 1952), p. xxii; Foreman, "The Theory of Case Studies", p. 410.

<sup>54</sup>Stein, "Introduction to Part II, . . . .", p. xxi; Foreman, "The Theory of Case Studies", p. 410; Ernest Burgess, "Research Methods in Sociology", Twentieth Century Sociology, ed. by Georges Gurvitch (New York: The Philosophical Library, 1945), p. 36.

<sup>55</sup>Morris Davis and Marvin G. Weinbaum, Metropolitan Decision Processes: An Analysis of Case Studies (Chicago: Rand McNally and Co., 1969), p. 9.

<sup>56</sup>Stein, "Introduction to Part II, . . . .", p. xxii.

<sup>57</sup>R.G. Collingwood, The Idea of History (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), p. 246.



## CHAPTER II

### PRESSURE GROUPS

In this chapter, consideration will be given to those cases in which the city government (or, in one instance, the state government) made no provision for citizen participation by residents in the planning of their own communities. In these instances, however, the residents resorted to the formation of pressure groups in order to combat the government's plans for their areas. However, even in some of these cases, the residents--in their attempt to prevent the government from taking its proposed action in their neighborhoods--exceeded what would normally be regarded as normal pressure group tactics. For example, in one instance, the residents rehabilitated the neighborhood themselves and, in two cases, they presented alternate plans to the city's plans.

#### Middle Class Pressure Groups

##### Case 1, Northwood Acres<sup>1</sup>

In Northwood Acres, a small community within a suburban township, an oil company purchased some land that was zoned for industrial use in order to build a tank farm. The residents of Northwood Acres, in an attempt to prevent the construction of the tank farm, circulated a petition which opposed the establishment of the tank farm; more than





forty percent of the township's families signed this petition. The residents also undertook research which demonstrated that tank farms were the cause of numerous major fires. Before the Board of Supervisors could reach a decision, the oil company decided not to build its tank farms on that site.

Case 2, The West Village (New York City)<sup>2</sup>

The West Village is composed of charming residential dwellings inhabited by middle class intellectuals and professionals, and members of the Italian and Irish working class. It is precisely this mixture of buildings and people that makes it an attractive place to live to those who reside there. Within the West Village there is a distinct sense of identity as West Villagers coupled with a sense of hostility toward outsiders. Since 1950, the West Village has strongly opposed both city agencies and private developers who wish to widen the streets and build high-rise apartments in the area.

In 1961, the city announced its intention to construct a middle-income housing project in the West Village. Approximately 78 per cent of the proposed area was nonresidential. Of the 1,700 inhabitants, less than half were middle class. The city stated that 40 per cent of the housing was in poor condition. In response to the city's plans, Jane Jacobs, together with 54 concerned citizens,



founded the Committee to Save Greenwich Village West. This committee obtained strong neighborhood support, and there were no significant dissenting voices in the West Village. In addition, despite the fact that the committee's support was largely middle class, it also attracted significant working class membership and backing.

At the City Planning Commission's public hearing, only five citizens spoke in favour of the city's plan whereas 84 expressed their opposition. However, this opposition had little relevance to the city's decision. A forthcoming election caused Mayor Wagner to order the city agencies to shelve their plan for West Village.

### Case 3, Cadman Plaza (New York City)<sup>3</sup>

Behind the esplanade that overlooks the harbor, Brooklyn Heights consists primarily of small houses, many of which are over a century old, and exemplify the Colonial, Federal and Greek Revival styles of architecture which were in vogue when they were constructed. Despite their age, most of the houses are well kept up. The neighborhood represents a mix of income groups comprised of middle class, working class, and some poor, residents.

Into this neighborhood, the city decided to introduce the Cadman Plaza slum clearance project. The original plan envisaged the construction of a mammoth series of luxury



apartments. Unable to afford the high rents of these luxury apartments, most of the existing residents would have thus been forced to leave the neighborhood. Protests from the residents of the neighborhood resulted in a compromise which was accepted by some but not all of the residents. Under the terms of the compromise, 835 rental luxury apartments would be erected in the northern area of the project site, and 405 middle-income co-operative units in the southern part of the project; the buildings were to be 22, 23 and 24 stories high.

The compromise plan was opposed by many residents of Brooklyn Heights for several reasons. The first objection to the proposed project was that it would destroy the character of the entire Brooklyn Heights community, which is characterized by small, well kept old homes. The second objection was articulated by Martin S. James, Assistant Professor of Art at Brooklyn College, who was involved with community groups in Brooklyn Heights; he felt that on the project site there were 75 buildings of architectural or historical significance which should be preserved. The third objection to the city's plan was that it would dislocate many people--particularly those with low incomes--from the area, thus creating hardships for them; in addition, it was felt that the process would also sterilize the neighborhood.



The North Brooklyn Heights Community Group and the Central Brooklyn Heights Group for Preservation and Improvement hired an architect, Percival Goodman (the co-author of Communitas, a classic work in city planning), and, with him, worked out an alternate plan to that presented by the city.

The alternate plan, which was to become known as the Goodman Plan, was concerned primarily with the conservation and rehabilitation of the existing buildings. By rehabilitating these buildings, most of the historic and attractive structures in the area would be preserved; dislocation of the present residents would be drastically reduced; and 225 new apartments would be added to existing housing. Also, a 20-story middle-income apartment (probably a co-operative) was to be built at either end of the project site. In addition, four 6-story apartments would be constructed on land that was either vacant or that would require some demolition. These new buildings would provide a total of 600 new units.

The city's original plan would demolish the entire project site area, dislocating many people and destroying many historical buildings, as well as changing the character of the entire Brooklyn Heights community. In its place a series of mammoth apartment blocks would be constructed which would provide 1,200 new units, about two-thirds of which would be luxury dwellings. The Goodman Plan, on the





other hand, would leave much of the present housing standing. Thus fewer people would be displaced, most buildings of historic or architectural significance would be left standing, and the character of the entire Brooklyn Heights community would be less drastically affected. At the same time about 800 new units would be added to the existing housing stock. The Goodman Plan provided for 400 fewer total units than the city's plan, but twice as many middle-income units.

The plan that the city finally adopted entailed the demolition of almost the entire site area, and, in its place, the construction of these mammoth buildings for a total of 1,200 units. There would be co-operative, middle-income housing; however, both the down payment and the carrying charge per month would be significantly higher than in most other middle-income co-operatives. Most middle-income cooperatives in New York City at that time required a down payment of \$400.00 to \$500.00 a room, and levied a carrying charge of \$25.00 to \$30.00 per room every month. The Cadman Plaza co-ops, on the other hand, would require an \$800.00 a room down payment and a \$37.00 a month per room carrying charge.

#### Working Class Pressure Groups

##### Case 4, The Hill (New Haven)<sup>4</sup>

In response to a drastic housing shortage following



World War II, a variety of prefabricated temporary housing was used in New York City. In one area, small metal houses, which contained two tiny apartments were used. The New York City Housing Authority decided to close down its temporary housing projects in 1951 and the metal houses were offered for sale at \$75.00 each. They were purchased and brought to New Haven by two junk merchants--the Lebov Brothers. The Lebovs intended to use the shacks for low-income housing. At this time there was a serious housing shortage in New Haven; this shortage was further aggravated by a slum clearance project and a freeway, which had already dislocated 200 low-income families.

The Lebovs wanted to put the shacks in a well kept white, working class area known as "The Hill". The Lebovs had checked the zoning laws and found nothing in them to prevent the installation of shacks in the area.

When news of the project reached "The Hill" the neighborhood reacted in terms of "slums . . . Negroes . . . riffraff . . . crime . . . dirt . . . property values". A Miss Grava, a long-standing resident of the area, led the neighborhood campaign against the metal homes. She contacted one of the Aldermen for "The Hill", who in turn contacted the other Alderman for the district. Together they tried to find out what action the Board of Aldermen could take to prevent the Lebov project from being



established. Their solution was to introduce a bill revoking the Lebov license on the grounds that their housing was "a nuisance". The Mayor vetoed the bill but the Board of Aldermen overrode his veto.

On the dates the Board considered the bill (and a previous bill that was dropped), 200 to 300 people from the neighborhood were turning out at Board meetings. Also, Miss Grava was attempting to obtain city-wide support for "The Hill's" position. She found it in Mrs. Robert Clark, the head of the New Haven Woman's League of Voters; Richard Lee, the next Mayor; and her wealthy brother, Dominic Grava. In addition, many aldermen supported the residents of "The Hill" because they feared that if the Lebovs successfully installed their shacks on "The Hill", an unfavourable precedent might be established.

Clark, Lee and Dominic Grava advised Miss Grava to establish a formal organization to oppose the Lebovs. She followed their advice and received financial contributions from 36 per cent of "The Hill" residents.

When the Aldermen overrode the Mayor's veto, the Lebovs did not cease their activity. They first instigated legal action against the Board of Aldermen; next, they raised the cry of racial discrimination against the residents of "The Hill". There was probably some truth to the charge, but it is doubtful whether the metal houses would



have done very much to alleviate the housing shortage for low-income groups. For example, one Protestant minister, who was very concerned about housing for the Negro poor and active in the Oak Street slum clearance area, visited the Lebov project. He decided that it was not suitable housing for those who were to be relocated.

The Lebov position was finally destroyed by a letter from the federal government to the Urban Renewal Agency in New Haven. The letter warned that any city which did not take action to prevent the growth of new slums would lose all federal aid for housing and slum clearance.

#### Case 5, North Cambridge<sup>5</sup>

North Cambridge is a working class area that is already heavily industrialized and is becoming more so. Someone decided to build a trucking terminal in an area located very near schools, churches, playgrounds and a public housing project. A citizens' group, the North Cambridge Betterment Association, led the drive against the construction of the trucking terminal. They attempted to have the proposed site of the trucking terminal rezoned from heavy industry to light industry, thus preventing the installation of the terminal. At the public hearing on the zoning change, several hundred residents were present. At this first meeting the board refused to rezone the area. However, the board of appeals at the second hearing granted





the variance. In response to the ruling, the trucking company took the action to the Planning Board, which refused, however, to act. The dispute was taken next to the city council, which decided in favour of the residents of North Cambridge.

### Case 6, Cambridge<sup>6</sup>

In 1962, the Massachusetts Department of Public Works announced an intention to build an eight-lane expressway for the Boston Metropolitan area. This expressway would have necessitated the demolition of 1,300 homes in Brookline-Elm, a working class area. (This area is very similar to the West End of Boston, described by Gans.) It has adequate low-rental housing and reflects the atmosphere of an urban village. Research undertaken showed 62 per cent of the residents in the area opposed the highway and 27 per cent engaged in some form of protest activity. In Brookline-Elm, about 20 people were active, speaking at, and organizing, public meetings. Another 30 regularly attended meetings but spoke rarely or never.

Two groups arose almost simultaneously. One group was formed by the citizens of Brookline-Elm; the other was an advocate planning group. They soon joined forces. Gordon Fellman, the author of the article from which this description is drawn, states that the efforts by Save Our Cities (SOC)--the working class, neighborhood group--would



have been useless without the aid of the advocacy group. Fellman believes that the middle class advocacy group aided the anti-expressway movement in two ways. First, because of their professional training, the group members were able to both criticize the official plans and offer alternate plans. Further, the middle class advocacy group "spoke the same language" and shared the same values as the middle class civil servants and politicians, to whom they had to argue their case. The middle class government official thinks in terms of bureaucratic rationality and efficiency; the values of ethnic cohesion or close community life are foreign to him.

On the other hand, Fellman perceives the working class group as incapable of meeting the government officials' arguments on the basis of technical rationality. But, at the same time, essentially, the residents shared the cultural assumptions involved in technical rationality, and thus felt insecure when trying to confront the officials. Fellman also finds those residents involved in S.O.C. activities seem to lack any definite notion of the political process they seek to influence. In addition, Fellman reports that they lack faith in democratic procedures and are unable to express their opposition.

Although at times Fellman appears to state that the working class cannot intelligently participate in the



planning process--and must have the middle class fight for its causes--his argument can be interpreted in a somewhat different manner. His observations may also be interpreted as a criticism of the political process as it now exists, and of the values and language within which the political process is carried on. If one states, as Fellman has, that working class people have only a vague conception of the political process they are trying to affect; have little faith in these processes; and, moreover, have no ability to express their opposition to the results of these processes; one appears to be discussing the condition of the political processes themselves rather than the capacity of the working class to participate in these processes. Further, if one states, again as Fellman does, that only those people who share the middle class values and language of the government officials can deal with them (and therefore others are excluded from dealing with them), one is referring both to the government officials and to the values which they hold. Thus, Fellman is saying that the officials fail to recognize values of life styles different from their own, and, de facto, they exclude these other values and those individuals who hold them from their consideration. Furthermore, he is commenting upon the middle class values of technological rationality and efficiency; i.e., that they exclude such values as a close community life and ethnic cohesion from consideration.



Case 7, Corktown (Detroit)<sup>7</sup>

This case study depicts the attempt to utilize a residential area for industrial land uses. The area in question constituted 39 of the 250 acres of the Corktown region of Detroit, a working class area not far from downtown Detroit. The population of Corktown was 60 to 65 per cent Maltese and Mexican and 18 per cent Negro; the remaining residents were either of southern European extraction or from the southern United States. This issue, i.e., the City of Detroit's planning for the area, and the citizens' reaction to the plans, spanned most of the 1950's.

The strategy employed by the city's planning department was to select a project site within the Corktown area that encompassed the most blighted area; it was thought that this would present the strongest possible case when applying for federal assistance. At first, the plan involved a 75 acre site; later, it was reduced to 39 acres. A member of the Detroit Housing Commission staff privately admitted that he expected the surrounding areas of Corktown to deteriorate following the completing of the redevelopment project. The rest of Corktown could then be condemned and redeveloped for industrial purposes. In their attempt to prove that the project area was blighted, the city planning department went to great lengths. Their preliminary report, submitted to the federal Housing and Home Finance Agency, demonstrated that the area's housing was blighted. They also submitted evidence





from other city agencies demonstrating that, in comparison to other areas of the city, Corktown had a higher rate of building violation, of school absenteeism, of tuberculosis and infectious diseases and of violent and accidental deaths. In response to this report, the residents pointed out (and were supported by the HHFA) that the reporting areas used to gather this information--for example, census tracts, school districts, and health districts--did not coincide identically with the proposed project area, and consequently were not a valid measure of the conditions in the area.

To oppose the city's plan for the area, the Corktown Home Owners Association was formed. Throughout the Association's battle with the city, it was led by one woman--Mrs. Ethel Claes--and its membership increased to over 1,000 members (in an area of about 8,000 residents). The association employed two methods to oppose the city's plans. First, they acted as a pressure group; second, they led a drive to rehabilitate the area by the citizens themselves. Their record in both areas was outstanding.

As a pressure group, the Corktown Home Owners Association took the following steps. In 1951, a petition opposing the rezoning or condemnation of Corktown was circulated; it was signed by 1,200 people and presented to the city council. At the first public hearing, held before the city council in 1954, between 400 and 500 residents attended to



oppose the city's plan for their area. At this hearing, evidence was presented which was designed to demonstrate that the Plan Commission data on the area was manufactured and false. At the end of the hearing, the city council president declared that no evidence had been presented which proved that the area was a slum area; the council then passed a motion authorizing the Plan Commission to present a fully-documented report on blight in Corktown.

At the second and last public hearing, fewer residents turned out; those that did, however, were much more sophisticated and polished than the former group. Again they presented evidence to show that the area was not a slum, that disease and crime rates were low, and that the area was being rehabilitated by the residents themselves. (It is interesting to note that in all these activities Corktown was receiving no outside help.)

The second role which the association assumed was to head a campaign for the rehabilitation of Corktown by the residents themselves. The association took part in a "clean-up, fix-up" campaign and received a letter of commendation by the Junior Chamber of Commerce. The association also took part in a neighborhood conservation program. This specific program was being conducted by the Plan Commission in an attempt to help various groups to improve their respective neighborhoods. Also, the association vigilantly



opposed illegal conversions and zoning changes which violated zoning ordinances and building codes.

In effect, through the leadership of Ethel Claes, the Home Owners Association had taken those steps widely publicized by city planners, social workers, and civic betterment groups as the necessary steps to conserving neighbourhoods, but it appeared that the association's neighbourhood was located in the wrong place.<sup>8</sup>

Two weeks after the final public hearing, the city council unanimously approved the condemnation of the site for redevelopment. The site covered 39 acres and included 13 business sites, 19 multiple-dwellings, 60 single and two-family dwellings, 80 vacant lots; 140 families were affected.

#### Poor Pressure Groups

##### Case 8, Cooper Square (New York City)<sup>9</sup>

Cooper Square is a small neighborhood of 2,000 residents on the Lower East Side of New York. The area represents a variety of occupational and ethnic groups. The average income per household is only about 4,000 dollars a year, and, included in the area, is part of New York's skid row. The housing in the area is among the worst in the city, and there is a definite need for urban renewal. In 1956 the city announced a renewal plan which necessitated the demolition of a 12-block area and the construction of 2,900 middle-income units. The plan would have dislocated 2,400 tenants, 500 businesses, 450 furnished-room occupants, and 4,000 beds used by homeless men.



In 1959, the Cooper Square Development and Businessmen's Association was organized to represent the interests of those who would be dislocated by the city's renewal plan. They presented their objectives to several city agencies without success. Finally, in order to communicate the concern of the residents of Cooper Square, the association hired Walter Thabit to draw up an alternate plan which they could present to the city.

The drawing up of the Cooper Square plan took several years. Within this time, Thabit held more than 200 meetings with groups in the area to determine their needs and wishes. He discovered that a vast majority of the present tenants preferred to remain in the neighborhood. The resulting plan contained a thorough analysis of every physical and social aspect of the neighborhood. The basic idea underlying the plan was that the area should be redeveloped so as to house its current residents (with the exception of the skid row "bums"); and, wherever feasible, the redevelopment should accommodate the neighborhood's divergent interests. Following these initial premises, redevelopment would take place in such a manner that displacement from the neighborhood would be kept to a minimum--even during the redevelopment process itself. To accomplish this goal, the plan necessitated the immediate construction of new housing on vacant land. This housing would be reserved for those who would be displaced during the renewal. The heart of the Second





Avenue shopping district would be left intact. "The alternative plan thus represented a highly imaginative, professionally competent effort to formulate solutions for the renewal problem of a particular area of the city."<sup>10</sup> Specifically, the plan called for the building of 520 co-operative units, 620 low-cost public housing units, 300 middle-income apartments, a rooming house for single persons, and a building with 48 studio apartments for artists. Also the Second Avenue shopping district would be left almost unchanged because the shopping district was seen to be essential to the maintenance of the community. The plan also advocated that the skid row "bums" on The Bowery be removed from the neighborhood and that the facilities at Camp La Guardia be expanded to take care of them. The association did not regard the plan as the only possible one for the area; rather it was a basis for discussion with the city.

In 1963, the Chairman of the City Planning Commission expressed approval for the general ideas in the alternate plan and instructed his department to determine its feasibility. The Board of Estimate then set aside the vacant lots for the housing of those who would be displaced in the renewal effort. But the Housing Rehabilitation Authority eliminated one of the important underpinnings of the plan. Rather than limit the plan to the Cooper Square area, the Authority wished to include the St. Mark's Place area in the redevelopment area; this plan, however, would dislocate more residents



than the Association was willing to allow. The Authority and the neighborhood became locked in a deadlock and no action was taken for several years. Finally, in February 1970, the city approved the plan that Walter Thabit and the residents and businessmen of Cooper Square had drawn up years before.

In the sources from which the case study was drawn, no information was contained which specified which individuals, group, or groups in the neighborhood initiated the Cooper Square Development Committee and Businessmen's Association; also, the individuals or groups which participated in it once it was started were not mentioned, with the exception of the head of the Association, the director of the Church of All Nations Settlement House. Finally, although there was a great deal of interaction between Walter Thabit, the advocate planner, and the neighborhood groups, no information was presented to suggest the nature of this interaction.

#### Case 9, Grammercy Park (New York City)<sup>11</sup>

In March, 1959, Robert Moses, chairman of New York City's Committee on Slum Clearance, announced the development of the Grammercy Park Slum Clearance Project. The three block area that the project was to encompass was made up of a "grotesqueric of decorated tenements, industrial lofts, rooming houses and shabby stores, including many that are vacant."<sup>12</sup> Nevertheless, the area was reported to have a good deal of charm. It was not usually referred to as



Grammercy Park, a highly fashionable area which surrounds a private park, several blocks away from the proposed project area. The proposed area encompassed about 5,000 people and dozens of small businesses, all of whom would be displaced by the project. Most of the residents were low-income families and elderly people living there because of the low rents. The income level of most of the residents is reflected by the fact that 87 per cent, or 1,253 of the 1,420 families in the area, were financially eligible for public housing.

Moses' plan for the area involved demolition of the entire area. The land would then be sold to a syndicate at a marked-down price. The city would acquire the property for about \$5,900,000, and would resell it to the syndicate for \$2,480,775. The syndicate would then build five 16-story apartment houses, which would rent for about \$47 a room. To oppose Moses' plan the local residents and shopkeepers formed an organization called the Grammercy Neighbors. No information is given regarding the size of the organization or the SES of the groups active in it. The Grammercy Neighbors attacked Moses' plan on several grounds:

1. The neighborhood could be restored through rehabilitation and partial demolition; this would lessen the human suffering involved in demolishing the entire neighborhood.

2. The city's relocation program was entirely inadequate.



3. The state assemblyman for the district, Joseph J. Weiser, and his wife, were deeply involved in the syndicate which was to buy the land back from the city and build the apartments.

4. Neighborhood groups should be allowed to propose changes in the plan before the final plan was drawn up.

The debate which revolved around each of these issues will be discussed separately:

1. The Grammercy Neighbors requested that the project area be named a rehabilitation area; they maintained that about half the present buildings could be saved through a rehabilitation program. If this were done, the human suffering involved in full-scale demolition would be drastically reduced. The Grammercy Neighbors stated that \$47 a room (the rate to be charged in the new apartments) was more than most of the present residents could afford. Furthermore, they charged that by the time the project was completed, the rents would be much higher. This was a pattern that had occurred in several of Moses' other projects.

In 1958, the Citizens Housing and Planning Council hired an architect, Fredrick G. Frost Jr., to make a survey of the buildings in the project area. He reported that only 536 out of the 1,462 existing dwelling units had to be torn down. This meant that 926 of the dwelling units were in buildings which could be left standing (although some





buildings needed extensive rehabilitation). The Council then selected a committee of housing experts to review Frost's findings. This committee reached quite different conclusions; they reported that rehabilitation was not economically feasible in the area.

Moses also stated that rehabilitation was not feasible. He contended that of the 112 residential buildings and 25 non-residential buildings, only 18 residential and one non-residential building were in fair condition. The remaining buildings were either substandard or needed major repairs. The Grammercy Neighbors believed that most of the serious deterioration had occurred only after Moses had announced--three years before--that the area would be demolished. To Moses, however, this was irrelevant; he stated in response to the Grammercy Neighbors' protests, that "the entire theory of slum development is inconsistent with permitting random areas to remain until such haphazard partial rehabilitation happens."<sup>13</sup>

2. The Grammercy Neighbors opposition to the project was also based on the fact that the city's relocation procedures were inadequate. In response to this charge, Moses released Housing Authority estimates stating that 1,253 of the 1,420 families in the area (or 87 per cent) were eligible for public housing. Miriam F. Moody, chairman of the Grammercy Neighbors, stated that although this percentage was



financially eligible, many of them would be ineligible because of crime records, broken families, etc. She also pointed out that, normally, only 20 per cent of those displaced by slum clearance projects obtain an apartment in public housing. William Reid, chairman of the City Housing Authority, reiterated Moody's statements and accused Moses of seriously distorting the Housing Authority's figures. Reid also remarked that even the people who were relocated in public housing could usually not be relocated in the project, or sometimes even in the borough, of their choice. The New York Times undertook research which demonstrated that in two recent slum clearance projects only 14 and 18 per cent of the families involved obtained public housing.

Moses also reported to the federal government that all the families in the site area had been personally interviewed and, through these interviews, the relocation desires and housing needs of the residents had been ascertained. However, Moody stated that, of 600 families in the site which the Grammercy Neighbors investigated, they found only one which had been interviewed by Moses' committee. The person in charge of conducting the survey then stated that, indeed, he had not interviewed all the families; the claim that he had done so was Moses' claim, not his. (At approximately this time, the Cooper Square Development and Businessmen's Association announced that Moses' relocation survey



for the Cooper Square area had provided false information. The committee reported that they had interviewed 263 families; in fact, it was discovered that only nine had been previously interviewed by Moses' agents.)

3. The state assemblyman for the area that included the project site, Joseph J. Weiser, had previously informed the residents that he would oppose the demolition; an investigation by the Grammercy Neighbors to determine the reason for his ensuing inaction led to the discovery that he was the lawyer for the syndicate which was slated to buy the land from the city, and build the apartments on it. In addition, his wife was a principal in the \$2,014,000 that the syndicate had to raise in order to purchase the land from the city. Following this discovery, the Slum Clearance Committee removed the sponsorship of the project from the syndicate with which Weiser was associated, and reassigned it to Webb and Knapp Inc. Also, the Citizens Union--a city-wide civic association--asked Moses to answer specific questions about five recent slum clearance projects, including Grammercy Park. These five questions were: "Who first proposed the project site?" "Were there other bids besides the selected sponsor?" "What sort of inquiries were made regarding the credit and qualifications of the sponsor?" "Who owns stock in the sponsoring group?" "What was done about tenant relocation?" Moses promised to answer these questions "in due time".

4. The Grammercy Neighbors' suggestion that the



residents participate in the planning process did not involve public controversy.

On June 2, 1959, the Board of Estimate dropped the Grammercy Park project. The decision to drop the project apparently resulted from opposition to the project by Mayor Wagner and Manhattan Borough President Hulon E. Jack. Both thought that the area was capable of redeveloping itself. It was also rumored that they believed the residents were justified in stating that there were inadequate provisions made for relocation of the residents.

This chapter has dealt with cases in which the residents reacted to threats posed to their neighborhoods by city government (and, in one case, by an oil company). In all cases, the residents' response consisted of the formation of pressure groups in an attempt to influence the actions of city governments. It is clear in many--but not all--these instances, that the use of pressure groups successfully prevented the proposed actions from occurring. It is also evident that, in several cases where there was no governmental sanction or encouragement, the residents nevertheless did more than merely attempt to influence the city's actions. In these cases, the residents proposed alternate plans for the area, and, in one case, actually undertook the rehabilitation of their area.





## FOOTNOTES, CHAPTER II

<sup>1</sup>James V. Cunningham, The Resurgent Neighborhood (Notre Dame, Ind.: Fields Publishing Co., 1965), pp. 110-115.

<sup>2</sup>Davies, Neighborhood Groups and Urban Renewal, pp. 72-109.

<sup>3</sup>Brooks Atkinson, "Human Scale is Urged in Gauging Need for Housing in Historic Brooklyn Heights", New York Times, May 2, 1961, p. 34; "City is Assailed on Housing Plan", New York Times, May 16, 1961, p. 33; "All of Cadman Site Urged as Big Co-ops", New York Times, June 2, 1961, p. 33; Martin Arnold, "City is Attacked in Cadman Plaza", New York Times, September 20, 1961, p. 31; "Minister Opposes Cadman Renewal", New York Times, November 9, 1961, p. 43.

<sup>4</sup>William J. Muir Jr., "Defending the Hill Against the Metal Houses", State and Local Government: A Case Book, ed. by Edwin A. Bock (Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1963), pp. 3-24.

<sup>5</sup>William C. Loring Jr., Frank L. Sweetser and Charles F. Ernst, Community Organization for Citizen Participation in Urban Renewal (Cambridge: The Cambridge Press, Inc., 1957), pp. 84-90.

<sup>6</sup>Gordon Fellman, "Neighborhood Protest of an Urban Highway", American Institute of Planners Journal, XXXV (March 1969), 118-122.

<sup>7</sup>Robert Mowitz and Deil S. Wright, Profile of a Metropolis (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1962), pp. 81-139.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid., p. 129.

<sup>9</sup>"Cooper Square: A Study in Frustration", Columbia Law Review, LXVI (March 1966), 511-517; Edmund J. Bartnett, "Cooper Square Plan Cuts Relocation", New York Times, July 31, 1961, p. 19; Harry Shapiro, "East 3rd Street: Pollution of Space", Village Voice, March 26, 1970, pp. 1 and 66.

<sup>10</sup>"Cooper Square: A Study in Frustration", pp. 513-514.



<sup>11</sup>Charles Grutzner, "Grammercy Group Protests Razing", New York Times, March 5, 1959, p. 38; Charles Grutzner, "Moses Distorts, East Siders Hold", New York Times, March 17, 1959, p. 67; Charles Grutzner, "Limits in Housing Stressed by Reid", New York Times, March 20, 1959, p. 33; "Inquiry is Sought on City Slum Unit", New York Times, March 25, 1959; Charles Grutzner, "Relocation Rules of U.S. Opposed", New York Times, May 2, 1959, p. 11; "City Queried on Slum Clearance", New York Times, May 11, 1959, p. 11; "Moses Promises Answer", New York Times, May 13, 1959, p. 32; and Paul Crowell, "Grammercy Area Wins Housing Ban", New York Times, June 3, 1959, p. 37.

<sup>12</sup>Grutzner, "Grammercy Group Protests Razing", p. 38.

<sup>13</sup>Ibid.



### CHAPTER III

#### THE ATTITUDE SURVEY AS A MEANS OF PARTICIPATION

The last chapter discussed cases in which the city had established no mechanism for citizens to either participate or to have their views considered in the planning for their neighborhoods. In this chapter, one case will be presented in which the city did attempt to ascertain the needs and wants of the residents--by employing an attitude survey.

In his article, "Use of the Attitude Survey in Neighborhood Planning", Mel J. Ravitz (who was also involved in the case study presented in this chapter) presents what he considers to be the two functions of attitude surveys in neighborhood planning.<sup>1</sup> First, attitude surveys provide the planners with information concerning the needs and wants of the neighborhood residents. This greatly benefits the planners when they redesign the neighborhood. Their second function is to appraise the success of the rehabilitation program by measuring the attitudes of the residents both before and after the conservation effort. A third possible use of the attitude survey--which is not mentioned by Ravitz--is that it could, perhaps, be used to ascertain the needs and wants of those individuals or groups who are unlikely to become involved in the planning process in any other way, even when opportunities are available.



Use of Attitude Surveys in Working Class NeighborhoodsCase 10, Boulevard-Graiot-Mack (BGM) (Detroit)<sup>2</sup>

The case study presented here is the only one which found that involved the employment of an attitude survey in city planning and urban renewal. Unfortunately, the only available information concerning the rehabilitation effort in this case consists of: (1) Neighbourhood Conservation: A Pilot Study by Maurice F. Parkins, published by the Detroit City Plan Commission, and (2) the previously-mentioned Ravitz article. The Parkins study, like most studies published by city planning departments, is long on words, but either leaves out or obscures information concerning who made the decisions in the project area, what the decisions actually were, and how they were made. Ravitz, who was involved in this project, was an employee of the Detroit City Plan Commission when he wrote the article.

The planning for the rehabilitation project in the BGM neighborhood consisted of two major procedures. The first method involved the use of an attitude survey, which aided the formation of the preliminary plan. The second method undertaken by the city was to send in a community development worker to organize a neighborhood council; together this council and the city could work out the details of the final plan before it was submitted to the city council. A city-wide citizen's group that reviewed the final plans was also established. However, that had little





relevance.

This particular project was part of the City of Detroit's attempt to implement its "Master Plan", a plan involving the conservation of 55 of Detroit's neighborhoods. The primary purpose of the conservation, or rehabilitation, was to eliminate slums--thus preventing the deterioration of the neighborhoods. Accordingly, the end goals of this project, and the context within which the planning took place, were established before the attitude survey was undertaken and before the BGM Neighborhood Council was established. Although neither author provides much information on the SES of its residents, BGM appears to be a graying (i.e., a basically sound but slowly deteriorating) area with a largely working class population. Ravitz does, however, mention that it was a racially-mixed, changing area.

The results of the attitude survey and the following actions based on those results will now be discussed. The survey demonstrated that several aspects of the neighborhood had created acute dissatisfaction among the residents. These aspects (according to their rank order) included the type of new residents (i.e., Negroes) moving into the neighborhood, inadequate parking space, too much traffic on residential streets, lack of playgrounds and parks, too much noise and dirt, and inadequate city services. However, the city planners had already taken note of many of these causes of neighborhood dissatisfaction. In view of



this consideration, one might question the value of the attitude survey. Nevertheless, the plan, based on traditional kinds of planning analysis and the results of the attitude survey, suggested that the following remedial measures be taken:

1. Changes in the existing street system to eliminate or discourage through-traffic from the area.
2. Expansion of the present public school facilities in the neighborhood. . . .
3. Provision of new and the improvement of existing recreational facilities.
4. Removal of all dilapidated structures, alley dwellings and objectionable non-conforming uses.
5. Provision of offstreet parking.
6. Provision for alley lighting and improvement of existing street lighting.
7. Resurfacing and paving of streets and alleys where needed.
8. Changes in zoning districts where needed.
9. Rehabilitation of private structures through voluntary citizen action in cooperation with city departments and supplemented by code enforcement.
10. General improvements of municipal services.<sup>3</sup>

Suggestions 1, 2, 3, 5 and 10 reflected the wishes of the residents according to the attitude survey. Suggestion 6 was also a suggestion designed to solve a source of resident dissatisfaction, although not a major one. Suggestions 4, 7, 8 and 9, however, which included rehabilitation, demolition and zoning changes, do not appear to have been responses to residents' dissatisfaction with the area.



Moreover, these suggestions comprised the most central parts of the conservation effort and, if effected, would have the most far-reaching effects on the neighborhood. It appears then that citizen participation through the use of the attitude survey was effective only inasmuch as it affected the more peripheral aspects of the conservation effort. (This, of course, assumes that, first, the results of the attitude survey accurately reflected the residents' real concerns, and also that the suggestions made by the Plan Commission were responses to the attitude survey--and not merely suggestions that would have been made without such a survey. However, Parkins, the author of the survey from which this case study is primarily taken, indicated that the planners themselves were aware of these problems.)

The second method used by the city in this study was to send in a community organizer to establish a neighborhood group with which the city could bargain. Yet even before interaction between the city and the BGM Neighborhood Council commenced, the nature of the neighborhood restricted the outcome of the negotiations. For example, the attitude survey revealed a desire by the residents for more public parking space and for more parks and recreational facilities. However, at this time only 1.2 per cent of the land was vacant. This meant that the space for these facilities would have had to come from existing houses and commercial facilities and thus would have involved considerable dislocation.



It has previously been mentioned that BGM was a racially mixed, changing neighborhood. And, as the attitude survey revealed, the white residents were distressed by the influx of Negroes into their neighborhood; they were also anxious to leave the neighborhood. Consequently, it was difficult to organize them into neighborhood council and its bloc organizations. In fact, Negroes were found to be twice as willing to join than were whites. The planners presented their preliminary report to the neighborhood council. Next, they appeared before the neighborhood council and the bloc organization to discuss criticisms of the plan. Although these criticisms resulted in a modification of the plan, no information is available to suggest the nature of the changes made. The modified plan was then passed by the neighborhood council by a four-to-one vote. No available information suggests who voted for or against the plan. The final plan, later approved by city council, called for spot clearance, the elimination of much through-traffic, the reduction of residential density from 22 dwellings per net residential acre to 17, the expansion of elementary schools and recreational space, the development of offstreet parking, and rehabilitation--through code enforcement, financial assistance and the establishment of an information center and a demonstration home. A total of 199 structures were to be removed, but the number of people and businesses which would be displaced cannot be ascertained.





Also, the council established a number of working committees, each concerned with such aspects of neighborhood conservation as relocation and code enforcement. Between 1954 and 1958, more than 1,600 residential structures had received some repair work.

If one assumes that this case study typifies instances in which attitude surveys are used to ascertain resident attitudes, it appears that attitude surveys may be used by planning departments merely to justify their original plans and intentions. In effect, the employment of attitude surveys, when divorced from actual sharing of power with the residents, is not a legitimate means of obtaining citizen participation.



### FOOTNOTES, CHAPTER III

<sup>1</sup>Mel J. Ravitz, "Use of the Attitude Survey in Neighborhood Planning", American Institute of Planners, XXIII (January, 1967), 179-183.

<sup>2</sup>Maurice F. Parkins, Neighborhood Conservation: A Pilot Study (Detroit: Detroit City Plan Commission in Cooperation with the Housing and Home Finance Agency, 1958); Ravitz, "Use of the Attitude Survey. . . .", pp. 179-183.

<sup>3</sup>Parkins, Neighborhood Conservation, pp. 13-14.



## CHAPTER IV

### SHARING OF POWER

The previous chapter discussed the use of a mechanism which could be used by the city to gain information concerning the residents' needs and wishes without necessarily placing any power in the hands of the citizenry; this chapter will consider those cases in which an actual sharing of power exists between the city and the residents of the community affected by the renewal plan.

Typically, sharing of power between the city and a neighborhood group occurs when the city either establishes a neighborhood group or chooses an already-established group with which to bargain. In such cases, what normally begins as an attempt at co-operation often develops into more than cooptation once the process starts. Often real bargaining between the city and the neighborhood group occurs. At times, other organizations functioning as pressure groups arise which force the city to modify its position. Even where a sharing of power does exist, the city always retains the formal power to ultimately approve or reject the results of the negotiations; yet often the city grants de facto power in the neighborhoods. This is done when the city hesitates to proceed with any proposal that has not first received strong approval at a public hearing, and by the neighborhood



group with which the city has been negotiating.

Although, superficially, it may appear that all attempts by a city agency to organize a neighborhood exemplify cooptation, this is not necessarily the case. An example drawn from a study of attempts to organize a local school constituency illustrates this point. Falkson and Gardner studied two such cases in the city of Detroit. They concluded that, in one case, cooptation had occurred. In the second case, the organization involved was a militant one which demanded numerous services for the community in general, and for the school in particular. Some of the items they subsequently received were more street lighting, playground equipment, the establishment of a black studies program, and integrated textbooks in the schools. Furthermore, the local school principal successfully used the threat of militancy by the local citizens' school organizations to bargain with the school board in order to obtain necessary items for the school.<sup>1</sup>

#### Sharing of Power With Middle Class Groups

##### Case 11, The West Side Urban Renewal Area (WSURA), (New York City)<sup>2</sup>

The West Side was once a fashionable area of New York City but by 1956 it was in rapid decline. At this time, the population was about 57 per cent white, 33 per cent Puerto-Rican and 9 per cent non-white. Nevertheless, the area contained a large middle class with leadership





capabilities as well as the powerful Woodrow Wilson Reform Democratic Club. By 1958, the city had created an organization, Park Hudson, with which to bargain, in order to draw up the first renewal plans for the area. The first plan envisaged the establishment of 7,800 new housing units--400 lower-income units, 2,400 middle-income units, and 5,000 high-income units. This plan necessitated the relocation of 4,300 families and 1,300 single people. Following some discussion at the City Planning Commission public hearing, the ratio of new housing units was changed to 600: 3,600: 3,600. In the meantime, the Strykers Bay Neighborhood Council was formed, composed of 43 organizations in the area. This council successfully replaced Park Hudson as the spokesman for the area in the negotiations with the city.

As the date when the City Planning Committee and the Board of Estimate were to pass judgment on the final plan drew closer, activity by the West Side organizations increased. The three main organizations--the Neighborhood Council, the Reform Democratic Club, and the Puerto Ricans--formulated their final positions on the plan and began to mobilize their supporters. By this time, the city's modified plan envisaged the construction of 1,000 low-income units, 4,200 middle-income units, and 2,800 high-income units. The Puerto Ricans (actually, the four or five Puerto Ricans who spoke for them) demanded that 30 per cent, or about 2,500 of the units be for low-income residents and that relocation



should be minimal. The neighborhood council backed the city's plan, despite the fact that its president, Father Browne, an Irish Catholic priest, fought within the council for a plan similar to that of the Puerto Ricans. The Reform Democratic Club, composed almost entirely of middle-class liberals, also backed the city's plan.

At the City Planning Commission hearing, approximately an equal number of speakers supported and opposed the plan. Responding to the criticism of the plan, Mayor Wagner increased the number of low-income units to 2,500. At the Board of Estimate hearing, the Puerto Ricans opposed this plan. They argued that whereas 5,000 low-income units were to be destroyed, only 2,500 would be built to replace them. Father Browne (speaking for himself rather than for the neighborhood council) stated that too many low-income people were being displaced, and the plan should be defeated. Nonetheless, the Board of Estimate passed the plan unanimously.

Although the Puerto Ricans and Father Browne lost the battle for 2,500 more units of low-income housing, Browne continued to fight for low-income groups. His particular concern was the quality of housing for the poor. Browne worked toward the establishment of low-income housing which would blend in with the surrounding neighborhood; high-rise projects, he believed, did not. He was partially successful when, in 1965, the city built at least one nine-story,



70-unit apartment building in WSURA that blended in with the surrounding buildings.

By 1968, the city had built only 1,200 low-income units and had rehabilitated only 300 low-income units. Father Browne, still president of the Strykers Bay Neighborhood Council, stated that between 600 and 700 low-income families in WSURA who had been relocated three or four times were still waiting for permanent housing. He also criticized Mayor Lindsey's failure to appear at Board of Estimate hearings whenever the subject of low-income housing for those displaced by urban renewal was considered.

### Case 12, Washington Park (Boston)<sup>3</sup>

The next three case studies (Washington Park, the South End and Charleston) deal with rehabilitation efforts in Boston in the 1960's; during this time, Edward Logue presided over the attempted renewal of Boston. Before discussing each case, it is thus useful to look at the nature of what Keyes calls the "rehabilitation planning game" in Boston under Logue. First, Logue held preconceived ideas of what he wanted to be accomplished generally; also, he had formulated a strategy to obtain these ends. The most important of Logue's ideas follow:

1. Within each neighborhood or project area, an organization would be established (if an appropriate one did not already exist). The Boston Renewal Authority (BRA)



project team would then negotiate the plans for each area with the relevant organization. Until this organization had approved the plan, no public hearing would be called. Hopefully, any significant conflicts regarding the plan would thus be resolved or neutralized before the plan came before a public hearing. In order to achieve this goal, it was necessary to include all significant interests in the community.

2. It was necessary to obtain an overwhelmingly positive vote at the public hearing.

3. The emphasis on neighborhood planning and neighborhood approval necessitated decentralization of the planning process. An independent BRA project team would be established in each project area. The project leader's function would be similar to that of an advocate planner insofar as he would be a spokesman for the neighborhood in his dealings with Logue. Logue would interfere only if serious problems arose; he did, however, have the final word.

4. A clearance of approximately 20 per cent of the residential structures would be undertaken in each area. Negotiations should be carried on with this figure in mind. Logue believed that to attempt clearance of much more than 20 per cent would create opposition within the neighborhood; much less than 20 per cent clearance would fail to have any significant impact on the neighborhood's physical structure. Also, the project boundaries could be manipulated in order





to bring about an approximately 20 per cent clearance.

The results and strategy did not always work out as planned, but it does provide an idea of the context within which the action took place.<sup>4</sup>

Keyes posits an additional element, which penetrates to the heart of what he calls the "rehabilitation planning game":

(I)n simplified terms, this game is one in which the LPA (Local Public Authority) guarantees certain forms of public expenditures--schools, community facilities, new roads, easily accessible improvement loans and mortgages--in exchange for private investment in rehabilitation of residents, businesses and institutions, and for support of clearance and willingness to express that support at a public hearing.<sup>5</sup>

The next three cases will be considered within the context of this framework. Case 12, Washington Park in Boston, will be discussed first.

In a single decade, the population of Washington Park had altered from 70 per cent white to 70 per cent black. First the middle class, and then the working class Negroes had moved into Washington Park. But on their heels came the Negro poor, causing great displeasure among the Negro middle and working classes. As early as 1949, the Snowdens, a Negro couple, had organized Freedom House; during the 1950's, Freedom House and the Snowdens strived to maintain the Upper Roxbury area of Washington Park as an upper middle



class, racially-integrated area. At the same time, the Roxbury Community Council was formed with similar aims for the area. They believed that urban renewal could stem the migration of middle class whites and Negroes from the area and thus re-establish Washington Park as a fine residential area for the middle class. As a result, even before Logue came to Boston, "the ball was rolling". In 1959, the BRA chose the Middle Roxbury area of Washington Park as a renewal area. When Logue came to Boston the only thing remaining to get the project underway was to choose either Freedom House or the Roxbury Community Council as the neighborhood group with which the BRA would negotiate the renewal plans. Logue chose Freedom House.

Freedom House, still headed by the Snowdens, then established the Washington Park Steering Committee to negotiate with the BRA. The committee, which was composed of middle and working class Negroes (and no Negro poor), then proceeded to outdo the BRA in their efforts to achieve what has classically become known as "nigger removal". Because this case occurred prior to the emergence of the Civil Rights Movement, there was no one to speak in favor of the Negro poor. Consequently, the Snowdens encountered no opposition other than that of the BRA itself; the latter occasionally modified the steering committee's recommendations. Indeed, Keyes states that if the BRA project team had attempted to include the Negro poor in the negotiations, it would have



However, despite its displeasure, the steering committee accepted the plan. The steering committee also prevented the inclusion of a woman's welfare institution in Washington Park. In sum, the steering committee pursued a policy which had no element of public-regardingness in it.

The final plan reflected the steering committee's opinion that Washington Park should be "a good place to live" for the middle class. The final plan involved the dislocation of about 27 per cent of the residents and the demolition of 35 per cent of the housing in the project area; no low-income housing would be built.

#### Sharing of Power With Working Class Groups

##### Case 13, Charlestown (Boston)<sup>6</sup>

Charlestown is an Irish-Catholic, working class community. The community is extremely tight-knit; intermarriage commonly occurs and extended families are the rule rather than the exception. Before the project there was a high rate of home ownership (although much of the housing was dilapidated) and a low welfare and crime rate. The area was hyper-political, boasting an 82 per cent voter registration and a great deal of organizational life. Further, a high sense of identification with Charlestown prevailed, coupled with a distrust of the city government which had introduced "the El", skyways, and public housing projects to Charlestown for the benefit of the rest of the city and the suburbs.



incurred violent opposition from those groups already involved in the negotiations. This case does not appear to exemplify the previously mentioned instances of cooptation of a neighborhood group by the city for its own aims; rather, it appears that the city was coopted by the neighborhood group for its own aims.

The subject of relocation and relocation housing was never broached until the BRA project team pointed out the need for low-income public housing in the area. However, when the subject was brought up, the steering committee refused to discuss it.

During the negotiating period, the project area was enlarged to include the basically-sound area of Upper Roxbury. This was done because, in the original project area, it appeared that 55 per cent of the housing would have to be demolished; Logue believed this to be politically unfeasible. By enlarging the project area, the amount of clearance was immediately reduced.

When the BRA project team presented three alternate plans to the steering committee (this became their standard operative procedure), the steering committee astounded the project team by choosing the plan which required the largest amount of clearance (60 per cent). When the BRA project team backed those plans which made provisions for 40 per cent clearance, it was attacked by the steering committee.





Before the BRA project team came to Charlestown, a group of residents had created the Self Help Organization of Charlestown (SHOC) in order to improve the community; this group hoped to be the organization that would negotiate with the BRA project team if Logue chose Charlestown as a renewal area. The original SHOC had broad community support. About five per cent of the residents attended its first meeting.

When the BRA project team arrived in the area, the first director of the project team, Dick Green, was well received by the residents. He admitted he did not have all the answers. Moreover, he was willing to hear the views of the residents. Then Green was removed, and another project director sent in. The new director was discomfited by the free-wheeling style of the SHOC; in his opinion, renewal should be negotiated with a small group. Further, he believed that influential groups in the community such as the clergy had not been included in SHOC and that they should now be brought into the negotiations. Consequently, with Logue's approval, he created the Federation of Charlestown Organizations as a group with which to negotiate the renewal plan.

Although formally more democratic than SHOC, in effect the Federation was run by the clergy. When the BRA called a public hearing to approve the Early Land Acquisition, it met with opposition from SHOC; the latter maintained that the BRA was being allowed "to put its foot in the



community" without presenting a final plan and without first agreeing to the removal of "the El", the one promise upon which any renewal plan for Charlestown had to be based. The hearing was attended by 1,000 residents; 85 per cent opposed the Early Acquisition Plan. At the same time, however, a petition was circulated and signed by a majority of those present. The petition expressed a desire for renewal but only after a comprehensive plan had been drawn up and submitted to the community. The major opposition seemed to be based on the fact that one elite-based body had claimed to speak for all Charlestown. The BRA project team had been so out-of-touch with the community, they did not know "what hit them".

At this point, Logue called in several of the more moderate SHOC leaders and asked for their suggestions. He was given a four-point program encompassing the following steps: (1) getting rid of "the El"; (2) drawing up a comprehensive plan; (3) demonstrating the economic feasibility of renewal; and (4) informing all Charlestown residents of the contents of the plan. Logue accepted this program and from this meeting emerged an informal group called "the Moderate Middles". This group was probably supported by a larger group of Charlestown's residents than either the Federation or SHOC. (The latter was, by this time, dominated by a group opposed to any renewal.)

Logue sent in a new project director who actually



went to the people instead of negotiating with any one group. In addition, the BRA would not appear before a public hearing until all four of the above-mentioned points were met.

After the four-point program had been met and the final plan presented to a public hearing, between 1,300 and 1,800 residents favored the plan and between 500 and 700 were opposed.

The final plan attempted to preserve the entire community. Despite the fact that a pre-Logue analysis of the district had estimated that only 40 per cent of Charlestown's housing was worth preserving, only 11 per cent clearance was envisaged by the final plan. This meant that 525 households (about 2,000 people) or less than nine per cent of Charlestown's households would have to be relocated. A serious attempt would be made to find residences within Charlestown for all these people. Rehabilitation would be the main tool of renewal, and most of the homeowners were financially capable of handling it. Rents would rise; however, most of the tenants seemed able to pay higher rents. Also, the city would tear down "the El" and establish new schools, playgrounds, shopping facilities and a community college. The type of renewal which took place in Charlestown and the necessity for the BRA to "up the ante" to guarantee community support resulted from the existence of vigorous opposition toward renewal (offset by only a shaky coalition of supporters).



Case 14, The South End (Boston)<sup>7</sup>

Two good discussions of this unusual case exist. The first is found in Chapter Three of Keye's The Rehabilitation Planning Game; the second, in Herbert H. Hyman's article, "Planning with Citizens: Two Styles". This account is drawn from both sources, although it relies more on the Hyman article.

Between 1961 and 1965, planning was undertaken for the South End of Boston. The South End comprised of one square mile in one of the most deteriorated areas of Boston. Between 1950 and 1965, its population had decreased from 55,000 to 29,000. It is said that the South End contained five per cent of Boston's population and 95 per cent of its problems. It contained a large skid row, a criminal element known as the "night people", and a large elderly population--many of whom lived in rooming houses. In all, about a third of the South End residents inhabited rooming houses. The South End had the second highest percentage of families on welfare, the highest infant mortality rate, the highest crime rate, the lowest educational level, and the lowest rate of owner-occupied homes in the city. The area included a number of ethnic working class communities--the most significant of which was the Syrian community. There was also an influx of "urbanites" into the area, that is, middle class professionals who had moved back to the city, buying and restoring town-houses to their original condition. The area employed about





17,000 people and some of the industries within it needed space. In all, the South End appeared to possess a low capability to participate in urban renewal. In any planning for this neighborhood, reconciling the diverse and conflicting interests which existed appeared to be a difficult task.

The planning for the South End consisted of two distinct stages. During the first planning stage, the project director worked mainly with a community-wide elite. During the second stage of planning, the project director, Dick Green--who had studied city planning in a department where the pluralist model of power was stressed--worked closely with neighborhood groups. These two styles of planning had an impact on both the manner in which the plan was drawn up and on the plan itself.

When Logue was to choose the community group with which to negotiate, the United South End Settlement (USES) was the obvious candidate. USES then aided in the formation of the South End Urban Renewal Committee (URC), as the group with which the city would bargain. An attempt was made to obtain representatives from a cross-section of the "non-problem groups" in the neighborhood. Also, the committee wished to take into account the interests of all groups in the community (with the exception of "the night people"). It is interesting to note that the majority of the active committee members owned property, whereas only nine per cent



of the residents in the South End were property owners. Nevertheless, the make-up of the committee, consisting primarily of community leaders, suited the attitude of the project director.

The plan, drawn up under the direction of the first planner, was actually drawn up by a South African planner with little knowledge of the neighborhood. Furthermore, this plan was primarily "concerned with aesthetics and design integrity, permitting little flexibility in adapting to desires of neighborhood residents."<sup>8</sup> Both the chairman of the URC and the project director agreed with the orientation of the planner. The following list constitutes the main elements of the first plan.

1. The main street of the adjacent downtown business district would be extended into the South End; all the business, cultural and recreational facilities of the South End would thus be concentrated around this "community". The neighborhood citizens groups' resulting opposition to this commonway was based on the belief that it would become a hangout for criminals and would make crosstown traffic more difficult, thereby reducing shopping and visits to friends.

2. The heavy through-traffic would be reduced by funneling it around the area: internal traffic would be reduced by closing off many east-west streets. The neighborhood residents opposed these changes on the grounds that they might further isolate them from their neighbors.



3. This plan also called for a clearance of approximately 35 per cent and the construction of 2,500 units of low-income public housing. The housing would consist of high-rise apartments, concentrated in one area. In the other areas of the South End, the emphasis would be on rehabilitation rather than demolition. To replace vacant buildings and lots, miniparks and new housing that conformed with the present stock would be built. These proposals reflected the values and interests of the community leaders. The latter wished to limit the blacks to areas already predominantly black; further, they wished to increase the value of their own properties through the use of rehabilitation loans and the conversion of rooming houses into dwellings for middle-income families. This part of the plan was opposed by the rooming house operators, fearful of losing their business.

In response to neighborhood criticism of the first plan, several things happened. The plan was "dumped", the project director replaced by Dick Green, and the chairman of the URC was replaced by a member of the Syrian working class community.

Green successfully formulated a program for the South End. His success was largely due to the fact that he regarded the South End as a group of very different neighborhoods. Thus, on the whole, he bypassed the URC and community elite, and, instead, dealt directly with the neighborhood groups and the people. Despite his strategy, the participation



rate was low. Only about 10 per cent of the adult population attended even one planning meeting during the four-year period. However, under Green's tenure, opportunities were made available to those who were interested in voicing their opinion. The groups which did participate were working class and middle class. There is little evidence of participation by the poor, the elderly or the skid row "bums" (although the interests of the elderly were, in effect, represented by the rooming house operators).

It is interesting to note that, on one occasion, the "urbanites" were defeated in their attempt to obtain more housing and land use which would cater to their interests and, in the process, displace lower-income groups. And, in another instance, a coalition of a working class neighborhood association and the tenants of a public housing project were successful in having some land set aside for housing instead of for industrial uses. Also, whereas the first plan would have abolished the Syrian community, the final plan left it intact. The second and final plan, which gained the support of the majority of the articulate residents of the South End, included the following provisions:

1. Like the first plan, the second involved centralizing the neighborhoods' facilities; however, it proposed building up the South End's traditional main street by adding new cultural and business facilities, up-grading the





present commerical facilities, and beautifying the street.

2. The second plan also advocated (as had the first) funnelling through-traffic around the neighborhood. The second plan also tried to reduce internal traffic--but in a less drastic manner than the first plan.

3. The second plan envisaged clearance of 25 per cent of the land (the first plan called for 35 per cent clearance). Eight hundred (rather than 2,500) units of public housing would be built; in all, about 3,000 new structures would be built. This housing would be placed throughout the South End and would utilize existing house designs. Luxury apartments would be built on the periphery of the central business district. About 19 per cent of the population, or 3,500 people, would be displaced; no information is provided regarding the SES of those residents. Whereas Green claimed that most of these people could be relocated in the South End, Keyes has stated that this is unlikely. As in the first plan, great emphasis would be placed on utilization of the existing housing stock.

Since the adoption of the second plan, CAUSE, a group representing the interests of the lower classes, has tried to change certain aspects of the second plan. In particular, they have called for more low-income housing and they have attacked the middle class influx into the area.



Case 15, Wellington-Harrington (Cambridge)<sup>9</sup>

At a public hearing in 1963, the Cambridge Renewal Authority presented its renewal plan for the Wellington-Harrington neighborhood; here the plan was violently attacked. Consequently, the federal government withdrew funds until the city could obtain public support for its proposals. To recoup its losses, the city appointed a planner to work with an autonomous neighborhood citizens committee. The planner chose the committee, but once chosen, it operated independently. The planner appointed some of the most rabid opponents of renewal to the committee. Later, the City Manager directed that all contemplated city activity for that neighborhood must first be channelled through the committee. In drawing up the plan, the author stated that the committee first decided what it wanted done; it then directed the planner to work out the technicalities. The final plan, developed in this manner, required less relocation than the first plan. Moreover, instead of the high-rise apartments which had been envisaged by the first plan, two- and three-family homes were to be constructed. At the second public hearing, in 1964, the plan was overwhelmingly approved by the residents. The author did not suggest the social class of the neighborhood residents, but Wellington-Harrington would appear to be a working class, graying neighborhood.

Case 16, Coney Island (New York City)<sup>10</sup>

In Coney Island, a community of New York City, the



population is chiefly Jewish and Italian. In the early 1960's there was an influx of lower-income Negroes and Puerto Ricans. When the Negroes and Puerto Ricans moved into Coney Island, they generally lived in housing described as "terrible". It usually consisted of either a rooming house or a summer bungalow converted to year-round use.

The Coney Island Community Council, representing 45 business, civic, and social groups in the community, decided to remedy the housing situation. At first, it was difficult to obtain the co-operation of the Negroes and Puerto Ricans; eventually, however, the Council gained their confidence. Once this was accomplished, the Community Council, together with the Negro and Puerto Rican groups, developed plans to establish lower- and middle-income housing developments, which they hoped would solve the housing problem in Coney Island. The plans were then submitted to the Board of Estimate. The newspaper account, from which this case-study is drawn, provides no details of the social class of the white residents of Coney Island, or of those whites involved in the Community Council. (It was mentioned only that the head of the Community Council was an optometrist.) However, the fact that a large proportion of the community is Italian suggests that Coney Island is, to a large extent, working class; consequently, it has been included in the working class cases.



Sharing of Power With the PoorCase 17, Melbank-Frawley Circle (New York City)<sup>11</sup>

The Melbank-Frawley Circle in New York City contained some of the worst areas of Harlem. Because Mayor Lindsey wished to institute urban renewal in the areas which needed it most in 1966 the city decided to build some vest-pocket housing. It established a neighborhood group, the Melbank-Frawley Circle Housing Council with which to negotiate. In response, the United Residents of Melbank-Frawley Circle Association, a predominantly Puerto Rican group, was organized which charged that the Housing Council did not represent the many segments of the community. The United Residents then hired their own planner and, with him, developed an alternate plan to vest-pocket housing. (The plan for vest-pocket housing was, however, also rejected by the Housing Council.) The United Residents and their planner developed a plan which would reflect the cultural, economic, and social fabric of El Barrio (a Puerto Rican ghetto); the plan also sought the "rejuevanation of the old public housing project site, and its integration with the adjoining urban fabric."<sup>12</sup> Because they had observed that families left the project when their incomes moved up, the United Residents advocated the establishment of a substantial amount of middle class housing; these families could then remain in El Barrio. Also, by using the air rights over the streets, no relocation from the neighborhood need occur. The housing itself would be built in a prefabricated shell system; the individual or family would then buy





or rent the shell, and the occupant would be free to do whatever he pleased with it. The alternate plan also envisaged many community facilities, e.g., health care and job training centers, office space and shops, in order to make the neighborhood self-sustaining.

The dispute between the largely Negro, Melbank-Frawley Circle Housing Council and the largely Puerto Rican United Residents of Melbank-Frawley Circle Association resulted in cessation of all planning on renewal and Model Cities programs for a two-year period in Harlem and East Harlem. Behind this dispute, there was a conflict over the control of renewal planning for the community and, even further in the background, a battle concerning the future control of the Model Cities program in Harlem and East Harlem raged.

In addition, another conflict had arisen at the same time in the Melbank-Frawley Circle area; this dispute crossed ethnic lines. The major contention occurred between those who wanted an economically-mixed area--and thus wanted both middle income housing and low-income housing to be built--and those who wanted only low-income housing to be built. The city Housing and Development Corporation, together with various community groups, including the Melbank-Frawley Circle Housing Council, put forth a plan containing provisions for 2,900 new units through either new construction or rehabilitation. Approximately 640 units would be low-income housing which would rent for \$11 to \$15 a room. Thirty per



cent of the remaining units would be owned by private developers or non-profit owners; these would rent for \$24 to \$25 a room (still extremely high by Manhattan standards). This plan was approved by the Board of Estimate. Robert Anazazasti, chairman of the Harlem Model Cities Planning Commission, and Jessie Gray, the rent strike leader, opposed the project on the basis that it provided an insufficient number of low-income dwellings.

Case 18, Woodlawn (Chicago)<sup>13</sup>

In Woodlawn, a Negro ghetto of Chicago, an Alinsky-style community organization, TWO, was created. TWO is a federation composed of 85 to 90 organizations in Woodlawn; these organizations comprise a total membership of more than 30,000 people. Before TWO entered the urban renewal controversy discussed below, they had already won several victories. TWO became involved in urban renewal at approximately the same time that the University of Chicago announced plans to annex land for expansion, and the City Planning Commission announced a comprehensive rehabilitation plan for Woodlawn. In both cases the residents were not consulted. TWO protested both of these actions. As a result, Mayor Daley brought together the University and TWO to negotiate a new plan. The negotiations led to an agreement that before any housing was torn down by the university, the low-income housing would be built on vacant land. The city also agreed to grant to TWO the majority of seats on any committee that would draw up



plans for Woodlawn.

Case 19, Hunter's Point (San Francisco)<sup>14</sup>

Hunter's Point is a 125-acre area of San Francisco, consisting primarily of temporary homes built during the Second World War. After the war, low-income minority groups moved into these temporary homes but this housing, never meant to last, deteriorated quickly. The area also lacked adequate recreational, educational and commercial facilities. In 1966, the community's leadership created the Unter's Point-Bayview Joint Housing Committee; this committee established a number of end goals for renewal. These goals included new housing at prices within the reach of the present residents, relocation within the area of present residence, recreational, educational and commercial facilities similar to those of other neighborhoods, residential dwellings which would attract residents of various economic and ethnic backgrounds.

The Housing Committee, together with the San Francisco Redevelopment Agency, hired an architect as the prime consultant in the planning of the area. With the advice of the architect, a renewal plan was developed.

This plan contained provisions for low-income housing and some middle-income housing in order to obtain a mixture of income groups in the city. In all, 755 families and 197 individuals would be relocated. However, relocation within the neighborhood was not difficult because a large amount of



vacant land in the area existed. Moreover, because rent subsidies would be provided, present residents could afford new housing within the neighborhood.

Case 20, West Oakland<sup>15</sup>

The West Oakland Planning Committee (WOPC) and the city fought for control over the model cities program in the black ghetto of West Oakland. Agreement was reached when the city and WOPC agreed to create a joint 25-member Model Cities policy committee on which neighborhood WOPC would have the majority (51 per cent) of the seats. Further, the city manager would possess only veto power over the proposals worked out by the policy committee, and the project director would be chosen by the city manager from a list of applicants selected by the policy committee. WOPC would also control the study committees on the policy committees, thus controlling the place from which ideas generated. Nevertheless, Spiegel and Mittenenthal have stated that "it was not the residents per se who engaged in planning, but rather a few community leaders who absorbed themselves in the style and jargon of social planning enough to be able to prepare grant applications and program proposals."<sup>16</sup>

The following list of ideas, presented by a neighborhood group to WOPC (and, subsequently, published by WOPC), exemplifies the type of planning proposals which originate from neighborhood groups in poor areas.





## Ideas for a Model City in West Oakland

### A. Services we need here now:-

1. hospital
2. drug store
3. clinic, with doctors for babies and old people too
4. dentist
5. nice hotel or motel with a nice restaurant
6. bowling alley
7. recreation center, with swimming for poor and senior citizens
8. soda fountain
9. supermarket, with fair prices, clean, with good meat
10. part-time, free child care for mothers to take job training, or for short jobs
11. music, art and science center, and place to show movies
12. fishing pier, with bait shop on waterfront
13. public incinerator for trash
14. subsidized garbage collection
15. new branch of library

### B. Ideas to Make West Oakland Better:-

1. screen railroad yards with a "green belt" of trees
2. take junkyards and auto wreckers out of residential areas, and put high fences around them
3. city should add curbs, gutters, sidewalks, good lights and street trees all through West Oakland
4. businesses should spruce up their buildings
5. have policemen walking around again
6. have "skill pool" of local handymen who would do rehabilitation of houses
7. have tools on loan (cement mixers, portable scaffolding, ladders, etc.) so that people could fix up their homes
8. add tot lots where there are vacant lots
9. double the sanitation crews and sweep side streets
10. add small parks with barbecues in vacant lots
11. have city maintained parking lots on each two blocks so streets can be cleaned and cars are safe
12. re-zone so industry is away from residences
13. improve schools--more landscaping, get rid of portables, add pre-schools for all children, use schools more--adult education, cultural shows, etc., whist parties
14. have a credit union in West Oakland
15. have help available for small businesses
16. have protected bus stops--roofed, lighted at night
17. build some subsidized housing--like fourplexes for teenage couples so they can start right; old folks to live together in small space with less house maintenance



18. underground utilities (poles, etc.)
19. preserve what is good (fine old buildings), only  
tear down what is bad (sheds, empty houses, etc.)
20. sell Ernie Raemoni Park and use money for a park  
where the people are
21. slow traffic down and make streets safe for children
22. have low-interest loans so homeowners can afford to  
fix up their homes.<sup>17</sup>

Spiegel and Mittenenthal have also demonstrated that planning in a ghetto is a disjointed process because, despite the presence of a few community leaders who attend every planning meeting, attendance tends to be sporadic. Thus, a particular issue which is agreed upon at one meeting can be rejected at another meeting, simply because an entirely different group of people may be present. The same issue then has to be worked through again.

#### Case 21, Action Area (Baltimore)<sup>18</sup>

This paper was written by two planners concerned with this case. The case involves the Community Action Agency (CAA), an agency of the Baltimore City government, and the Health and Welfare Council of Baltimore (HWC), a private agency. The CAA contracted the HWC to provide technical planning assistance in the formulation of a renewal plan for an area which was termed "Action Area". In turn, the CAA would attempt to organize the residents. "Action Area" was a poor area of Baltimore and the planners wished to provide the residents of this area with the opportunity to design their own renewal plan.



Even before the planning process began, however, some restrictions were placed upon the process. First, there was no guarantee that the design produced by the residents would be implemented. The design would first have to obtain the approval of the CAA, the city council and the OEO. In practice, the plan would have to be tailored in such a way as to get funding from the city council and the OEO. Thus certain proposals, for example, an increase in the supply of low-income housing--which would have struck at the heart of the housing problem--had to be rejected in favor of alternatives which would merely make the present housing more palatable.

To organize the "Action Area", each of the 15 neighborhood centers that the CAA operated was asked to elect two delegates to the planning committee. However, no elections were held. An effort was made then to seek out community residents who had no history of previous community involvement. With the exception of one member, all those chosen were poor according to OEO criteria. Once chosen, they elected their own officers and chose the name Neighborhood Housing Action Committee (NHAC). The authors were faced with numerous obstacles when they attempted to plan with the poor. First, the planners discovered that the poor were too apathetic to participate in activity which, until the implementation stage was reached, was nothing more than an intellectual exercise. Also, the residents appeared to be more concerned



with direct action that would produce immediate results--such as a rent strike or a demonstration against current housing conditions--than with long-term planning. Another obstacle consisted of the poor's inability "to comprehend formulations and to conceptualize well enough to gain a complete understanding of the causative factors to which a program should be directed."<sup>19</sup> Because of this factor, only one of the program ideas discussed by the NHAC was suggested by a resident.

Despite these obstacles, renewal plans were finally prepared and all the necessary agencies did approve them (although it took some direct action to gain their approval).

In this chapter, several cases were presented in which there occurred a sharing of power between the neighborhood and city government. As was seen, the results were rarely what the city intended when it introduced citizen participation into the renewal planning. As is shown by these case studies, the designation by the city of a group with which to work out the renewal plans for the area usually led to a rash of citizen activity within the renewal area. And as a result of this burst of activity and interest, often there occurred a genuine sharing of power between the city and the neighborhood.







#### FOOTNOTES, CHAPTER IV

<sup>1</sup>Joseph L. Falkson and Marc A. Grainer, "Urban Bureaucracy and the Politization of the Urban Poor", unpublished paper.

<sup>2</sup>Davies, Neighborhood Groups and Urban Renewal, pp. 110-148; "West Siders Hail Housing Project", New York Times, May 28, 1965, p. 20; "Priest Says City Dislocates Poor", New York Times, September 21, 1968, p. 19.

<sup>3</sup>Keyes, The Rehabilitation Planning Game, pp. 158-190; "Neighborhood Groups", Columbia Law Review, IV (March, 1966), 565-568.

<sup>4</sup>Keyes, The Rehabilitation Planning Game, pp. 28-30.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid., p. 9.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid., pp. 89-138; "SHOC is the Self-Help Organization of Charlestown", Columbia Law Review, IV (March, 1966), 506-508.

<sup>7</sup>Keyes, The Rehabilitation Planning Game, pp. 52-84; and Herbert H. Hyman, "Planning With Citizens: Two Styles", American Institute of Planners Journal, XXV (May, 1969), 105-112.

<sup>8</sup>Hyman, "Planning With Citizens. . . .", p. 106.

<sup>9</sup>"Wellington-Harrington: The Constructive Citizen", Columbia Law Review, IV (March, 1966), 509-511.

<sup>10</sup>"Coney Adjusting to Its Newcomers", New York Times, November 30, 1963, p. 52.

<sup>11</sup>Ellen Perry Berekley, "Vox Populi: Many Voices from a Small Community", The Architectural Forum, CXXVIII (May, 1968), 58-64; "190-Acre Renewal Area in Lower Harlem Gets U.S. Approval", New York Times, June 3, 1967, p. 37; Stephen V. Roberts, "Negro-Latin Feud Hurting Harlem", New York Times, February 25, 1968, p. 45; and David K. Shapple, "Harlem Housing Approved by City", New York Times, November 22, 1968, p. 31.



<sup>12</sup>Berekley, "Vox Populi. . . .", p. 61.

<sup>13</sup>Charles E. Silberman, "Up From Apathy: The Woodlawn Experiment", Urban Planning and Social Policy, ed. by Bernard J. Friedan and Robert Morris (New York: Basic Books Inc., 1968), pp. 183-197.

<sup>14</sup>"Citizen Participation", Civil Engineering, XXXVIII (November, 1968), 30.

<sup>15</sup>Speigel and Mittenthal, Neighborhood Power and Control, pp. 74-108.

<sup>16</sup>Ibid., p. 147.

<sup>17</sup>Ibid., pp. 148-149.

<sup>18</sup>Harold C. Edelston and Ferne K. Koldver, "Are the Poor Capable of Governing Themselves?", Citizen Participation in Urban Development, II, ed. by Speigel, pp. 225-240.

<sup>19</sup>Ibid., p. 223.



## CHAPTER V

### SHARING OF POWER BETWEEN PRIVATE INSTITUTIONS AND NEIGHBORHOOD GROUPS

This chapter is concerned with cases in which the renewal planning was carried on by a powerful non-governmental institution and a neighborhood group. However, even in these instances, the city retained the right to veto the results of the negotiations.

#### Middle Class Neighborhood Groups

##### Case 22, Hyde Park-Kenwood (Chicago)<sup>1</sup>

Hyde Park-Kenwood was an area of Chicago inhabited by professors, intellectuals and middle class professionals. The University of Chicago was the dominant institution in this area. The life-style of the residents reflected their occupations and backgrounds; thus, their life-style was characterized by intellectualism, political liberalism, and an extremely high rate of community participation.

Two factors resulted in the concern with the conservation and rehabilitation of Hyde-Park-Kenwood. First, as working class Negroes entered the neighborhood, deterioration of the housing supply occurred. To the incoming Negroes, this housing was desirable (and far superior to the housing they left). The average middle class resident, however, considered this same housing to be a slum. Between 1950



and 1956, a great influx of Negroes into the neighborhood had occurred. About eight per cent of these were professors, but the vast majority were working class Negroes. Most of the residents of Hyde Park-Kenwood were willing to accept middle class Negroes into the neighborhood. On the other hand, they regarded the continued influx of working class Negroes as a threat to the continued existence of Hyde Park-Kenwood as a community of middle class intellectuals and professionals. Also, the University of Chicago wished to maintain Hyde Park-Kenwood as a desirable residential area for middle class intellectuals so that it could continue to attract excellent faculty and students. Concern for the conservation and rehabilitation of Hyde Park-Kenwood also arose because the University of Chicago and other institutions in the area needed land to expand their facilities.

Because of the nature of the land use and population in Hyde Park-Kenwood area, the options that were available for any renewal attempt were limited for several reasons. The main one was that to conserve an area means in effect to reduce the rapid turnover in population. In Hyde Park-Kenwood this would in practice bring to a halt the immigration of non-whites. Consequently, to talk of conservation in this context meant to conserve the area as a middle class neighborhood. The second reason was the physical plant was to be the focus of attention for the renewal efforts. But it was those homes that were occupied by Negroes and lower class





whites that were regarded as slums and would be torn down. Also, the housing that was to be torn down would provide space for badly needed community facilities and for the expansion of institutional plans. The third reason was that the Hyde Park-Kenwood area was densely overcrowded in terms of land use; thus there was little or no vacant land on which to build needed facilities or to relocate residents. The fourth reason was that the displaced people and businesses could return to their previous location only if they could afford the higher prices for their new housing or commercial facilities. Mike Nichols expressed the situation in these terms: "This is Hyde Park, White and Black, shoulder to shoulder against the lower classes."<sup>2</sup>

In 1949, the Hyde Park-Kenwood Community Conference was formed to work for the renewal of the area. At approximately the same time, the University of Chicago also became interested in the renewal of the area. In 1954, Mayor Kennedy announced that the University of Chicago, working closely with the Conference, would be responsible for drawing up a renewal plan for the area. In 1955, the city went further and contracted the University of Chicago to produce a plan. Consequently, between 1954 and 1957, the Planning Unit of the University of Chicago increasingly functioned as a semi-public body, performing tasks normally carried out by city agencies. The ultimate power to approve or reject the renewal plan, however, remained with the city government.



The Conference received active support from the community's middle class residents. Between the Conference itself and the block groups (which it helped to organize and which interlocked, but were not part of it) about nine per cent of the Hyde Park-Kenwood families belonged to either the Conference or one of its block groups.

In its relationship with the Planning Unit, the Conference functioned primarily as a mediator between the people and the Planning Unit, rather than as a pressure group on the Planning Unit. It relayed information from the Planning Unit to the people; it then fed back the residents' views to the Planning Unit. The Conference had its own planning committee composed of nationally-known experts. These experts, however, accorded only a part-time commitment--responding to the Planning Unit's ideas rather than offering alternatives. The ultimate power held by the Conference was its ability to withhold approval from the final plan, which would have caused the city government to veto the plan. However, they were reluctant to use this threat.

Rossi and Dentler have remarked that the Conference opened up an avenue for participation in the renewal plan. And, when this avenue was taken, the residents were able to exert some influence upon the outcome of the plan. Nevertheless, they also state that this avenue was not often used. Although 50 per cent of the adult residents did attend at



least one meeting, frequently this participation was nothing more than a demonstration of support for the renewal effort. But, at the same time, it is interesting to note that the Conference's relationship with the block groups was ambiguous; that is, the Conference was never clear as to whether it should follow or lead the block groups. There is at least one case where, despite vigorous protests by a block group over a University plan for their area, the Conference backed the University.

Rossi and Dentler have stated that the Conference influenced the renewal plans in three ways. First, the Conference gave "legitimacy" to the whole concept of rehabilitation of the neighborhood. (At this time, rehabilitation was a completely new and untried concept.) The Conference created a public awareness that something could and should be done to renew the area. The Conference also influenced the renewal plans by "humanizing" the Planning Unit's proposals, which were generally oriented towards institutional expansion, commercial facilities and traffic patterns. Further, the Conference kept alive the issue of lower and middle class housing, but was unwilling to oppose the final plan when lower-and middle-income housing were not included in it. The third role that the Conference played was to influence the specific details of the plan. In influencing the specific details, the Conference did not play a significant role (although in Northwest Hyde Park, the block groups,



led by a Negro sleepingcar porter, did play a significant role in this regard.)

Although Rossi and Dentler do not provide any statistics to suggest how many people were displaced, it appears that a great number of working class blacks and whites were displaced. In addition, because the renewal decreased the stock of modestly-priced apartments, other groups who had traditionally lived in Hyde Park-Kenwood--for example, newly-marrieds and retired school teachers--were forced to leave the neighborhood.

Several liberal and left-wing groups and one Hyde Park-Kenwood group opposed the plans; however, the city government approved the renewal plans.

In 1965, James V. Cunningham, formerly Executive Director of the Conference, wrote that the decline of the area has been halted. If he is correct, then the renewal efforts were successful insofar as Hyde Park-Kenwood was conserved as "a good place to live" for middle class intellectuals and professionals; nonetheless, in the process, other groups were harmed.

#### Working Class Neighborhood Groups

##### Case 23, Homewood-Brushtown (Pittsburg)<sup>3</sup>

This case involves co-operation between Action-Housing Inc. and a neighborhood group in the rehabilitation of a graying area. Action-Housing Inc. had been formed by





Pittsburg's business and civic elite. One of its chief concerns was the rehabilitation of graying neighborhoods. It would enter a neighborhood only after it had been asked to do so by neighborhood residents. At this point, a community development worker would be sent by Action-Housing Inc. to try to organize a neighborhood council. The council would carry the major burden of local planning and action; together, Action-Housing and the neighborhood council would equally share decision-making power and joint responsibility for fund-raising.

Homewood-Brushtown was a rapidly-declining graying area, with a population of approximately 30,000; the area was also undergoing a rapid racial transition. By the time the planning stage was complete, the area was almost entirely Negro.

During the planning stage, the residents worked directly with professional planners; and many of the ideas which the final plan embodied were originated by the residents. In the early stages of the planning process, most of the citizens who participated directly in the program were from the stable working class strata. Only a few poor residents were involved at first but, in time, the participation of low-income residents increased, and several became members of the Board of Directors. As the plan developed, each proposal was taken first to the neighborhood council and then down, through various stages, to the residents who would



be directly affected. Many suggestions and criticisms from the residents were embodied in the final plan.

The final plan will take approximately 20 years to implement and will cost more than 20 million dollars. Some of the main features of the plan are: (1) demolition of housing in the industrial section and the creation of an industrial park; (2) rehabilitation of existing housing; (3) erection of new housing on vacant land; (4) consolidation of the shopping area; (5) construction of new schools and play-areas; (6) building of new streets; and (7) social planning to solve problems of unemployment, crime, health, family life and recreation.

No information was provided regarding either the number of residents to be dislocated, or the provisions to be made for those residents. On the day the final plan was presented to the city council, more than 300 residents went to the city council to demonstrate their approval of the plan.

In this chapter, case studies were presented in which the residents instigated the renewal plans for their neighborhoods, rather than the initiation coming from the outside. However, even in these cases the neighborhood did not have near the ultimate decision-making power over the contents of renewal programs for their area. In Hyde Park-Kenwood, the Community Conference in effect reacted to plans drawn up by the University of Chicago's Planning Unit. In Homewood-



Bushtown, half the formal decision-making power and probably most of the potential funds were controlled by Action-Housing Inc.



FOOTNOTES, CHAPTER V

<sup>1</sup>Peter H. Rossi and Robert A. Dentler, The Politics of Urban Renewal (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1961); and Cunningham, The Resurgent Neighborhood, pp. 81-109.

<sup>2</sup>Rossi and Dentler, The Politics of Urban Renewal, p. 65.

<sup>3</sup>Cunningham, The Resurgent Neighborhood, pp. 115-156.





## CHAPTER VI

### URBAN RENEWAL AND CITY PLANNING WHERE RESIDENTS HAVE ULTIMATE DECISION-MAKING POWER

Unlike the cases considered in the previous chapters, this chapter will deal with those cases in which ultimate decision-making power lies in the hands of the residents. In the majority of these cases, this focus of power resulted from the residents' desire to conserve their neighborhoods primarily by themselves.

#### Middle Class Participation

##### Case 24, Mt. Royal (Baltimore)<sup>1</sup>

Traditionally, Mt. Royal had been one of Baltimore's finest downtown residential neighborhoods; however, at the time of the housing shortage during and after World War II, many of the townhouses had been divided and re-divided into smaller and smaller apartments. Between 1940 and 1950, the population of Mt. Royal increased by 16.5 per cent, yet in this period, no new buildings were constructed. First poor southern whites moved into the neighborhood; then, in the early 1950's, an influx of Negroes occurred. The neighborhood appeared to be deteriorating.

In 1953, several residents of Mt. Royal requested that the city name Mt. Royal an area that would be rehabilitated through code enforcement; the city agreed. The code enforcement program went smoothly, but, after a year, the residents realized that more measures must be taken to



restore Mt. Royal to its original condition.

Meanwhile, a Neighborhood Council had been formed comprising representatives from all the existing groups in the neighborhood. One of these groups, the Mt. Royal Protective Association, became the action wing of the Council. The Association quickly realized that in urban renewal there existed a potential tool through which overcrowding and non-conforming commercial uses could be eliminated. The Association organized a rally at which 500 residents (most of them property owners) demanded that the city name Mt. Royal an urban renewal area. The city promised to do so; however, instead of merely waiting for the city to take action, the Association began to act by itself. The homeowners of Mt. Royal established a corporation to buy homes which might otherwise fall into speculators' hands. These homes were then rehabilitated and rented or resold to families that were acceptable to the present homeowners. Further, an agreement was reached with the leaders of the Negro community whereby Negroes would be allowed to live in Mt. Royal on a quota system; also, a screening process would be established to prevent undesirables of either race from entering Mt. Royal.

#### Working Class Participation

##### Case 25, Bradford Street (Boston)<sup>2</sup>

Bradford Street was a neighborhood in the South End of Boston, occupied by working class people, a large percentage of whom were foreign-born. The housing was primarily



single-family row housing which was owner-occupied.

The rehabilitation effort in this neighborhood began with the concern of a group of neighbors regarding the lack of adequate playgrounds in the area. The group involved with this concern contacted the South End Planning Council, who provided them with a community organizer. With his help, the group organized a Neighborhood Association which carried on several activities. The first of these activities was to pressure the city government for playgrounds; this was eventually successful. Second, the Association pressured certain city departments to provide better sanitation and health services to the area; this again was successful. Finally, the group attempted to rehabilitate their neighborhood. Most of the homeowners in the area had extensive interior repair work done to their homes. Also, alleys and yards were cleared up. Unfortunately some faulty repair work resulted in two fires, but this could have been avoided if there had been some minor technical assistance from the city.

Case 26, Back-of-the-Yards (Chicago)<sup>3</sup>

Back-of-the-Yards is a four-square-mile neighborhood in Chicago with a population of approximately 125,000. Its inhabitants are working class, Catholic, and are mostly of Eastern European stock. At one time it had been a slum with high crime and disease rates.

In 1938, Saul Alinsky went to Back-of-the-Yards and



organized a people's organization--the Back-of-the-Yards Council--but 16 years passed before the Council, after a number of successes in other fields, considered the problem of rehabilitation of Back-of-the-Yards. By this time, although the area was still solidly working class, its population did possess the type of economic underpinnings that made private rehabilitation feasible.

In 1953, the Back-of-the-Yards Council organized a meeting of community leaders to discuss rehabilitation of the area. At this meeting a five-point program, suggesting the following measures, was adopted: (1) people would be urged to rehabilitate their homes; (2) property owners would be encouraged to convert their stores into apartments; (3) title and tax searches would be conducted on the 922 vacant lots in the neighborhood; (4) builders and contractors would be urged to build new homes in the area; and (5) the Council would apply pressure to the appropriate city departments to enforce housing codes and to prevent illegal conversions.

Back-of-the-Yards had been blacklisted with regard to mortgages and loans for rehabilitation. The Council then took action to ensure that the necessary loans were available. It placed prominent banking executives on its building and finance committee, and threatened that the residents of the area would withdraw their savings if the banks did not co-operate.





After taking this action, the Council instigated a public campaign for rehabilitation. The Council attempted to make the rehabilitation of one's home the publicly-accepted "thing to do", thus in effect placing the pressure of public opinion on those who did not go along. This attempt was successful. Within two years, about 68 per cent of the housing code violations had been corrected. After three years, more than 5,000 homes had been rehabilitated (and, after that time, the number became so great, it could not be calculated). In addition, the Council had the Continental Can Co. fill in a stagnant creek. Also, the city was persuaded to rezone any existing trucking terminals from the area.

The Council's rehabilitation efforts were successful. Land and property values rose by 10 per cent (by 1958) and realtors encountered an increasing demand for housing. Further, the first new housing in the neighborhood in years was built. Moreover, rehabilitation was accomplished with almost no displacement--although it appears that a few people were forced to move because of increased rents. (It has also been charged that rehabilitation was a means of keeping Negroes from entering the neighborhood.)

In an attempt to isolate the reasons for the success of rehabilitation efforts, the following factors predominate: (1) the residents were financially able to undertake renewal;



(2) the residents were capable of doing much of the repair work themselves; (3) a long-established, successful community organization existed, which could command the respect of the residents, the city government and private institutions; and (4) perhaps the fear of Negro immigration.

### Participation by the Poor

#### Case 27, West Dallas<sup>4</sup>

West Dallas was a neighborhood composed of Negro-owned shacks. After a tornado had destroyed part of the area, the residents feared that the city would use the damage done by the tornado as an excuse to demolish the rest of the area. Consequently, the residents decided to rehabilitate the community. Within three years, they had brought 1,689 homes up to the level required by the housing codes; 403 shacks had been demolished; and 122 new homes built.

#### Case 28, Metro North (New York City)<sup>5</sup>

Metro North was an area of New York City containing a population of approximately 20,000. It is a poor area with many people on welfare; those who are not on welfare have low incomes.

In 1968 the Metro North Association was formed. It originated as a union of two organizations--a group of tenants who had begun to oppose the landlords, and a group of community leaders who were searching for solutions to the area's problems. However, other organizations and individual



citizens later joined. The Association became a type of forum where all matters of concern to the residents were discussed. It also served as a decision-making body where future plans for the area could be established, so that Metro North could present a united front to the city.

When the Association decided to rebuild the neighborhood, a city planner and architect were hired; with their help, the Association produced a plan for Metro North. Mayor Wagner accepted the plan and recommended it to the appropriate city agency. He then ordered all city agencies which had plans for Metro North to first have them approved by the Association.

The first task to be tackled was the rehabilitation of existing buildings. This was effected by the co-operation of the Association, the city government, private industry and the F.H.A. Next, a plan to institute a series of vest-pocket parks was worked out with the city. The Association also developed a plan for the relocation of those residents who would be displaced by urban renewal.

In this study there has been a wide variety in types of citizen response in renewal and planning activities. Citizen response has varied from instances in which the residents reacted against threats posed to their neighborhood by outside agencies, to instance in which the residents initiated, planned and implemented renewal plans for their neighborhood largely on their own.



## FOOTNOTES, CHAPTER VI

<sup>1</sup>Martin Millspaugh and Gurney Breckenridge, The Human Side of Urban Renewal (Baltimore: Fight Blight Inc., 1958), pp. 67-89.

<sup>2</sup>Loring, Sweetser and Ernst, Community Organization, pp. 15-20.

<sup>3</sup>Millspaugh and Breckenridge, The Human Side of Urban Renewal, pp. 178-219.

<sup>4</sup>Robert S. Strother, "Self Help in Slums", National Civic Review, LIV (January, 1965), 12-15.

<sup>5</sup>Norman C. Eddy, "The Unfolding Drama of Metro North", Citizen Participation in Urban Development, II, ed. by Speigel, pp. 35-46.





## CHAPTER VII

### CONCLUSIONS

#### First Series of Hypotheses

The first series of hypotheses (1.a, 1.b, 1.c, 2.a, 2.b, 2.c, 3.a, 3.b and 3.c) are drawn from James Q. Wilson's assertions regarding those groups which are capable of participating in urban renewal and those which are not.

His assertions were presented in Chapter I, where he argues that the middle class is capable of participating in renewal and planning activities, but he maintains that the lower classes (and here he includes both the working class and the poor) are not. Wilson further argues that when the lower classes do participate, their participation represents only a response to threats and never an attempt to implement a broad program for the betterment of the entire community.

Hypothesis 1.a - The middle class participates in urban renewal and the city planning process to a greater extent than either the working class or the poor.

This thesis has presented seven cases which deal primarily with middle class participation in planning and renewal activities: Case 1, Northwood Acres; Case 2, West Village; Case 3, Cadman Plaza; Case 11, West Side Urban Renewal Area; Case 12, Washington Park; Case 22, Hyde Park-Kenwood; and Case 24, Mt. Royal. Also, in one other case--



Case 14, South End--the middle class was one of several groups involved in the renewal planning for the area. Further, in this particular case, the middle class participated as a group with specific goals; these goals were distinguishable from the goals of the other groups in the renewal area. A review of these cases demonstrates that the middle class is capable of participation in urban renewal and the city planning process. In fact, in many of these instances, they participated with a great deal of sophistication.

In Case 1, Northwood Acres, the citizens successfully campaigned against the construction of tank farms by an oil company. In their strategy designed to prevent these tank farms from being built, they not only circulated a petition, but also conducted research which demonstrated that tank farms constituted a fire hazard.

In Case 2, the residents of the West Village successfully opposed both the city and private developers who wanted to demolish part of the area and construct high-rises. The group which developed to oppose this plan launched a sophisticated and well-organized attack on the city's proposals. For instance, when the city held a public hearing to discuss the proposed plan, the West Village group provided 84 individuals from the area who gave prepared speeches--many representing differing reasons for opposing the plan.

In Case 3, Cadman Plaza, the residents of Brooklyn



Heights fought the city's plans which involved the demolition of part of the area and the erection of high-rise apartments. The opposing groups in the area hired an architect with whom they evolved a plan for the proposed project site, designed to achieve the following goals: (1) through rehabilitation and conservation, preserve most of the historic and attractive buildings in the area; (2) dislocate fewer residents; and (3) at the same time, by constructing two high-rise apartments and rehabilitating older buildings, adding over 800--mostly middle-income--apartment units to the area. (The city's plan, which required the demolition of the entire project area, would have provided 1,200 new units, two-thirds of which would have been luxury apartments.)

In Case 11, the WSURA middle class residents participated in the discussion concerning the ratio of luxury, middle-income and lower-income housing which would be made available. However, middle class participation in the planning process was not, in any respect, very sophisticated.

In Case 12, Washington Park, the middle class residents initiated and pressured the city for urban renewal of the area; the residents, themselves, then participated in the renewal planning for their neighborhood.

In Case 22, Hyde Park-Kenwood, the citizens of the area created a climate of opinion which made rehabilitation appear both desirable and feasible. After this task was



done however, the Hyde Park-Kenwood citizens basically reacted to and criticized the University of Chicago's renewal plans for the area. Through their criticism, they exerted a significant impact on the renewal attempts. But, despite the fact that the Hyde Park-Kenwood Community Conference had appointed several nationally-known experts in urban planning and urban affairs to its plan committee, the Conference was unable to go beyond criticism of the University's plan and offer an alternate plan. Primarily, this failure resulted from the fact that these experts were working only on a part-time basis on the Hyde Park-Kenwood renewal efforts. Approximately nine per cent of Hyde Park-Kenwood families were organized into the Conference and its bloc organizations.

In Case 24, Mt. Royal, the residents initiated an attempt to renew their area. They exerted pressure upon the city government to designate the area first as a rehabilitation area and later as an urban renewal area. Five hundred residents attended one rally to support urban renewal for Mt. Royal. Also, the residents themselves began to purchase homes which had begun to deteriorate. They restored, and then resold, these houses.

These seven cases illustrate that the middle class appears to possess the necessary skills and resources (financial and otherwise) to effectively participate in the planning process. It is also evident that the middle class





often possesses resources within the renewal area which enable them to participate in a highly sophisticated manner. In Case 1, Northwood Acres, the residents conducted research which demonstrated that the proposed tank farm would be a fire hazard. In Case 2, at a public hearing, the citizens of the West Village proved that they were capable of fighting the city on technical grounds, as well as opposing it on such grounds as the intrinsic charm and the sense of community of the West Village. For instance, at the hearing, an accoustical engineer testified that it had been scientifically demonstrated that the West Village was quieter than most of the city; another resident quoted figures from the Department of Air Pollution to prove that the West Village had cleaner air than the rest of the city; three lawyers attempted to demonstrate that the city's renewal project violated federal, state and municipal laws; a Puerto Rican cited figures to prove that the West Village was an integrated community; in addition, letters were read from architects, artists and novelists who stated that the West Village was not a blighted area and that urban renewal would be harmful.

In Case 3, Cadman Plaza, the residents included a Professor of Art who was qualified to demonstrate that a specific number of homes in the area were of historic or architectural value. Later, the residents hired an advocate planner and, with him, formulated an alternate to the city's



plans.

In Case 11, WSURA, a great deal of middle class participation occurred; however, none of it appears to have required any special expertise.

In Case 12, Washington Park, the middle class residents did not engage in any activities that would require any sort of special expertise (unless the organizational and verbal skills which the participants used are considered to be types of expertise). As was previously mentioned in the Washington Park case, the residents rather than the city initiated the demand for renewal.

In Case 22, Hyde Park-Kenwood, the members of the Hyde Park-Kenwood Community Conference's planning committee were nationally-known experts in urban affairs and urban planning. Consequently, they were able to deal with the University of Chicago's Planning Unit on an equal basis. (In this area, the University's Planning Unit was performing tasks which would normally be undertaken by a city's planning department.) Also, the Hyde Park-Kenwood neighborhood contained individuals who possessed the necessary organizational and verbal abilities to instigate a campaign for rehabilitation; moreover, at this time, the concept was unheard of and untried in North America. However, it must be reiterated that, despite the existence of a planning committee composed of urban experts, the Conference was unable to offer



an alternate plan to that proposed by the University's Planning Unit. Instead, the committee members spent their time reacting to and criticizing the University's plans. Also, to perform the day-to-day organizational tasks of the Conference, it became necessary to hire a full-time executive director and a paid staff.

In Case 24, Mt. Royal, the middle class residents had the money to instigate their own rehabilitation program. Part of their strategy consisted of purchasing houses that were deteriorating, repairing them, and then reselling them.

An analysis of these cases demonstrates that middle class neighborhoods possess the required resources, skills and money to participate effectively in the planning process. Often, within the neighborhood itself, there are individuals who can argue with the public administrators on the administrators' own grounds of technical rationality and efficiency. Also, the middle class possesses the financial resources to engage in activities which require money, to hire a planner to formulate an alternate plan to that presented by the city, or even to buy and rehabilitate houses. Furthermore, the middle class has, on the whole, the organizational and verbal skills which enable them to both organize their neighborhoods and deal with the administrators.

However, a few qualifications must be added to the foregoing generalizations. First, two of the cases involved



neighborhoods which are by no means typical middle class neighborhoods. Both West Village (Case 2) and Hyde Park-Kenwood (Case 22) contain levels of education, sophistication, and political activism which can be equalled in few other places in North America. Second, in Cadman Plaza (Case 3), where the residents presented an alternate plan to that of the city, it was necessary to hire a full-time advocate planner. Even the Hyde Park-Kenwood Community Conference's planning committee, composed largely of nationally-known experts on urban planning and urban affairs, was unable to formulate an alternate plan. (This was not due to lack of ability but rather lack of time.) These examples suggest that if a middle class neighborhood wishes to offer alternatives to the city's plans, it must take the same measures as a working class or a poor neighborhood; i.e., it must obtain the services of a full-time advocate planner. Finally, the fact that the middle class can effectively participate in planning and renewal activities may say as much about the present political institutions and the values of the public administrators as it does about the middle class. Indeed, the institutions in which the middle class functions are basically their institutions. And, of even greater importance, due to education and socialization, both the middle class participants and the middle class bureaucrats and elected officials inhabit a common universe of discourse in which, for instance, appeals to technical rationality and





efficiency are taken seriously. In fact, the very ability of the middle class to participate effectively in the planning process may depend not so much on their special skills, but on the fact that the environment favors their style of participation.

Hypothesis 1.b - The middle class is the least likely of the three classes to participate in planning and renewal activities in response to a threat.

The evidence here indicates that in six out of the eight instances of middle class participation (all but Case 11, WSURA, and Case 14, South End) the participation was motivated precisely by a threat or perceived threat. In two cases (Case 2, the West Village, and Case 3, Cadman Plaza), participation was motivated by a threat posed by the city governments. In both of these cases, the city was planning to construct a high-rise apartment block that would not only displace many residents but also destroy the character of the neighborhoods.

In one case, Case 1, Northwood Acres, the residents reacted to a threat posed by an oil company planning to install a tank farm in the community.

In Three cases (Case 12, Washington Park; Case 22, Hyde Park-Kenwood; and Case 24, Mt. Royal) participation developed as a reaction to a real or perceived threat represented by the influx of low-income or minority groups into



the neighborhood.

In Case 12, Washington Park, middle class Negroes used urban renewal as a tool to halt and reverse the deterioration of the neighborhood; this deterioration occurred simultaneously with the immigration of low-income blacks into the area.

In Case 22, Hyde Park-Kenwood, the middle-income residents--both white and Negro--also regarded rehabilitation as a means of halting and reversing the deterioration of the neighborhood that had resulted from the influx of working class Negroes.

In Case 24, Mt. Royal, the middle class residents used rehabilitation as a vehicle to end and reverse the deterioration of the neighborhood that had occurred as lower-income people, both black and white, entered the area.

In these three cases it is evident that the middle-income residents were reacting to the threats that the character of their neighborhoods as they knew them would be destroyed.

Thus in seven of the eight cases involving middle class participation, action resulted from a threat or a perceived threat; Wilson, on the other hand, believes that reaction to a threat is the response of only the lower-income groups. However, in four out of the six cases in which



participation of the middle class was a response to a threat, the residents did more than merely express a negative reaction. Instead, the residents either presented, suggested, implemented or supported some positive proposals. These four cases are Case 3, Cadman Plaza; Case 12, Washington Park; Case 22, Hyde Park-Kenwood; and Case 24, Mt. Royal.

Hypothesis 1.c - The middle class is more likely than either the working class or the poor to participate in the planning and implementation of a broad or sophisticated program.

The evidence indicates that Wilson's assumption is correct. In six of the eight cases of middle class participation (all but Case 1, Northwood Acres, and Case 2, West Village) the participants were involved in planning, and sometimes implementing, a broad program. In three instances (Case 12, Washington Park; Case 22, Hyde Park-Kenwood; and Case 24, Mt. Royal) the middle class first initiated, and then participated in, the planning and implementation of renewal or rehabilitation programs. In two cases (Case 12, Washington Park, and Case 22, Hyde Park-Kenwood) the residents initiated, and then helped plan and implement comprehensive renewal programs for their neighborhoods. In Case 24, Mt. Royal, residents initiated, planned and implemented rehabilitation efforts (but not on the same scale as Washington park and Hyde Park-Kenwood). (In all three cases, the residents initiated action in response to a threat caused by the immigration of low-income groups.).



TABLE 1  
THE LEVEL, SOPHISTICATION AND RESPONSIVENESS TO THREATS  
FOUND IN MIDDLE CLASS PARTICIPATION

Cases	Cases in Which the Residents Participated in Significant Numbers	Cases in Which There Was Little or no Participation	Cases in Which Residents Partic- ipated in Broad Planning Activities	Cases in Which the Participa- tion Was a Response to a Threat
Case 1 Northwood Acres	X			X
Case 2 West Village	X			X
Case 3 Cadman Plaza	X	X	X	X
Case 11 WSURA	X	X	X	X
Case 12 Washington Park	X	X	X	X
Case 14 South End	X	X	X	
Case 22 Hyde Park-Kenwood	X	X	X	X
Case 24 Mt. Royal	X	X	X	X





In one case (Case 3, Cadman Plaza) the residents' participation was, initially, a response to the city's plans for their neighborhood. However, they did more than merely oppose the city; they offered alternate plans. The residents of Cadman Plaza presented an alternative to slum clearance encompassing a large area.

Further, in two instances (Case 11, WSURA, and Case 14, South End) the middle class residents participated in the planning of comprehensive renewal plans for their areas. In both cases the city initiated the renewal planning and then established or selected community groups with which to negotiate.

In the two remaining cases (Case 1, Northwood Acres, and Case 2, West Village), the middle class participants opposed plans for their neighborhoods without offering any alternatives. Although Wilson regards mere opposition as a bad thing per se, this author does not. In Northwood Acres, opposition to a possibly dangerous tank farm does not appear to require any alternate proposal. Nor would opposition to high-rise apartments in the West Village seem to call for an alternate plan, for almost any plan could potentially destroy the uniqueness of the West Village.

In summary, the evidence relating to Hypotheses 1.a, 1.b and 1.c indicates that the middle class possesses the skills and resources to participate in renewal and planning



activities, even of the most comprehensive type. Furthermore, the middle class not only participates in renewal planning, but it often initiates the demand for renewal or rehabilitation of its neighborhood. However, participation of the middle class in renewal activities is, in most cases, initiated in response to a threat posed either by the city's plans for the area or the immigration of a low-income group.

Hypothesis 2.a - The working class participates in urban renewal and the city planning process to a lesser extent than the middle class.

Twelve cases have been presented which deal with working class participation in planning and renewal activities: Case 4, The Hill; Case 5, North Cambridge; Case 6, Cambridge; Case 7, Corktown; Case 10, BGM; Case 13, Charlestown; Case 14, South End; Case 15, Wellington-Harrington; Case 16, Coney Island; Case 23, Homewood-Brushtown; Case 25, Bradford Street; and Case 26, Back-of-the-Yards. The evidence relating to these cases does not support Hypothesis 2.a.

In Case 13, Charlestown, the city of Boston decided to rehabilitate the area and sent in a project team. An extremely high rate of community participation characterized the ensuing renewal planning for Charlestown and the controversy which accompanied it. For example, more than 1,000 people came to the first public hearing, and between 1,800 and 2,400 to the second meeting. Further, the project team went directly to the community; it spoke and negotiated with



numerous groups and individuals. The final result was a broad renewal plan that would rely mainly on rehabilitation; the plan would involve the demolition of only 11 per cent of the present housing and would relocate most of its tenants within Charlestown; the "El" would be torn down; and new schools, playgrounds, shopping facilities and a community college would be constructed.

The South End, Case 14, appears to be an area with a low potential for citizen participation in the renewal planning. The community was composed largely of the elderly and problem-ridden groups; several ethnic working class communities were present, and the area had recently witnessed an influx of middle class professionals. During the second stage of the city's renewal planning for the area, the project team worked closely with the neighborhood groups in the area. At the neighborhood meetings, the level of participation was low. Only about 10 per cent of the adult population attended even one planning meeting during the four-year period. Despite this lack of involvement, there was sufficient participation to formulate a comprehensive renewal plan for the South End; the proposal envisaged the demolition of 25 per cent of the existing buildings, the construction of 3,000 new structures, the centralization of neighborhood facilities, and the funnelling of through-traffic around the neighborhood. Also, in one instance, sufficient participation by a coalition of a working class neighborhood association and the tenants of a public housing project occurred to create a successful



plan which set aside some land for housing instead of for industrial use. Also there was sufficient participation to keep the Syrian community (the largest white ethnic community in the South End) intact.

In Back-of-the-Yards (Case 26), the Neighborhood Council alone initiated, planned, and implemented a highly successful rehabilitation effort for this community of 125,000 people. The rehabilitation effort was based on a five-point program containing the following points: (1) people were urged to rehabilitate their homes; (2) property owners were encouraged to convert their stores into apartments; (3) title and tax searches were conducted on the 922 vacant lots in the neighborhood; (4) builders and contractors were urged to build new homes in the area; and (5) the Council applied pressure to the appropriate city departments to enforce housing codes and to prevent illegal conversions. The area had previously been a bad slum; however, although the residents were roughly the same people who had lived there 20 years before the rehabilitation efforts, they were now considerably more "well-to-do".

In Case 23, Homewood-Brushtown, the working-class residents of the community (with some participation by the poor residents) and Action-Housing Inc. formulated a comprehensive renewal plan for the graying neighborhood of 30,000. Action-Housing Inc. was an organization formed by the Pittsburgh business and civic elite, primarily to rehabilitate







areas of the city. Decision-making power and fund-raising responsibility were divided equally between the community and Action-Housing Inc. Plans for rehabilitation of the area required approval first by the neighborhood council, and then by the residents who would be specifically affected.

The plan which was developed and agreed upon will take 20 years to implement and cost more than twenty million dollars. Some of the main goals of the final plan are:

- (1) to tear down housing in the industrial section and create an industrial park;
- (2) to rehabilitate existing housing;
- (3) to consolidate the shopping area;
- (4) to build new schools and play-areas;
- (5) to build new streets; and
- (6) to plan solutions to social problems of unemployment, crime, health, family life and recreation.

In Corktown, Case 7, the residents of the area--led by the Corktown Home Owners Association--took action on their own initiative, and without any outside aid, to rehabilitate their area. The Association had about 1,000 members, in spite of the fact that the total population of Corktown was only about 8,000. In their rehabilitation campaign, they took all the actions that civic betterment groups, social workers and city planners said should be taken to conserve a neighborhood. Among other things, the Association took part in a "clean-up, fix-up" campaign and received a letter of commendation from the Junior Chamber of Commerce. The



Association also took part in a neighborhood conservation program sponsored by the Detroit Plan Commission. In addition, the association vigilantly opposed illegal conversions and zoning changes which violated the zoning ordinances and building codes. The results of the rehabilitation efforts were highly successful. Furthermore, in an attempt to block the city's plans for the area, more than 500 residents attended a public hearing.

In Case 15, Wellington-Harrington, a committee of neighborhood residents, together with a planner, evolved a renewal plan for the area.

In Case 10, BGM, rehabilitation planning for the area was carried on through use of two methods. First, the preliminary plan was formulated through the use of an attitude survey and traditional planning methods. Then the final plan was worked out with a Neighborhood Council, which was organized by a community development worker sent in by the city. The final plan, which the city and the Neighborhood Council agreed on, included spot clearance, the elimination of much through-traffic, the reduction of residential density from 22 per net residential acre to 17, the expansion of elementary schools and recreational space, the development of off-street parking, and rehabilitation through code enforcement. The Neighborhood Council then addressed itself to certain aspects of conservation; e.g., relocation and code enforcement.



In Case 16, Coney Island, the Coney Island Community Council initiated a plan to remedy the terrible housing conditions of the Negro and Puerto Rican poor who had recently moved to Coney Island. The Community Council, together with Negro and Puerto Rican groups, devised plans to establish lower-and middle-income housing developments on Coney Island.

In Case 6, Cambridge, a somewhat different situation arose. The residents opposed a proposal made by the state government, but suggested no alternatives. Then, when another source suggested a positive alternative, the residents backed the alternative.

When the state government announced plans for the construction of an eight-lane expressway through Brookline-Elm, a working class section of Cambridge, two groups simultaneously emerged to oppose the expressway. One was a group of area residents; the other, a group of advocate planners. While the citizens' group merely opposed the expressway, the advocate planners worked out an alternative re-routing for the expressway. There appears to have been no resident involvement in working out the re-routing of the expressway, although the residents gave their support to the re-routing. About 20 residents were active in organizing and speaking at public meetings; another 30 regularly attended meetings.

In one instance, Case 25, Bradford Street, a group of residents initiated a series of actions to improve their



small neighborhood. The citizens first pressured the city to build new playgrounds in the area, and to improve services to the area. Later, the residents attempted to rehabilitate the neighborhood. Most of the homeowners had extensive repair work done to their homes.

In two other cases (Case 4, The Hill, and Case 5, North Cambridge), the residents opposed actions which were planned for their areas without offering or supporting any alternatives. In Case 4, The Hill, the residents opposed the placement of metal homes in their neighborhood. (These metal homes had been used for temporary housing in New York City, and had later been discarded by the city.) At one meeting involving discussion of the metal homes, between 200 and 300 persons attended. In Case 5, North Cambridge, the residents opposed the construction of a trucking terminal in their neighborhood. At the public hearing concerning the zoning change required to prevent the entrance of the trucking terminal, several hundred residents were present.

Hypothesis 2.b - When the working class does participate in planning and renewal activities, this participation is more likely to be a response to a threat than is middle class participation.

The available evidence does not support Hypothesis 2.b. It has been clearly demonstrated that middle class participation in the planning process is, in almost all cases studied (seven out of nine), a response to a threat. On the other





hand, only four, or possibly five, out of the twelve cases of working class participation were instigated by a threat (Case 4, The Hill; Case 5, North Cambridge; Case 6, Cambridge; Case 7, Corktown; and, possibly, Case 26, Back-of-the-Yards). In four cases (Case 10, BGM; Case 13, Charlestown; Case 14, South End; and Case 15, Wellington-Harrington) the working class participated in programs that were instigated from the outside but the participation was not a response to a specific threat. There were three, or possibly four, working class cases in which the rehabilitation or renewal efforts were instigated, not in response to a specific threat, and which were planned and implemented either wholly or partially by the community (Case 16, Coney Island; Case 23, Homewood-Brushtown; Case 25, Bradford Street; and, probably, Case 26, Back-of-the-Yards).

Also, it is interesting to note that in half (or in a majority, if Back-of-the-Yards is included) of those cases where working class participation was a response to a threat, the response surpassed a merely negative reaction. In one case, the residents supported an alternate plan drawn up by others. And in one case (or two, if Back-of-the-Yards is included) the residents initiated and implemented a rehabilitation plan by themselves.

The two cases in which the citizens simply reacted to a threat instead of offering or backing an alternate plan are Case 4, The Hill, and Case 5, North Cambridge. In Case 4, the residents of The Hill opposed the placement of low-income, temporary metal housing into their neighborhood.



In Case 5, the North Cambridge residents opposed the construction of a truck terminal in their neighborhood.

In one case, the residents first opposed the city's plans, but, when an alternative was offered by an outside group, they supported the alternative. In Case 6, the residents of Cambridge opposed the building of a freeway through a working class neighborhood. Then, when an advocate planning group proposed a re-routing of the expressway, the residents backed this plan.

In one case (Case 9, Corktown), the residents' initial participation was a response to a threat by the city government to demolish part of the area; however, the residents later planned and implemented an extensive rehabilitation effort by themselves.

It has been stated that the Back-of-the-Yards rehabilitation campaign was merely a response to the threat of Negro immigration. But this factor was certainly not the only reason for the rehabilitation, nor does it appear to have been likely that it was the main motivation. (However, it probably was one of the motivating factors.) Even if the campaign was merely a response to a threat, the result was a highly successful rehabilitation effort for this neighborhood of 125,000. Furthermore, the rehabilitation effort for this neighborhood was planned and implemented entirely by the community itself.



Hypothesis 2.c - The working class is less likely than the middle class to participate in the planning and implementation of a broad or sophisticated program.

The available evidence does not support this hypothesis. It reveals no significant difference between the middle class and the working class in regard to their participation in broad or sophisticated renewal programs. Whereas six of the eight middle class cases involved either the planning or implementation of a broad program, eight of the twelve working class cases similarly involved the planning or implementation of a broad program. In other words, three-quarters of the middle class as compared with two-thirds of the working class cases involved participation in the planning or implementation of a broad program.

In two instances, Case 26, Back-of-the-Yards, and Case 7, Corktown, the residents initiated, planned and implemented extensive rehabilitation programs with little or no outside help.

In Case 16, Coney Island, the residents formulated a proposal for the construction of lower- and middle-income housing in Coney Island; they presented this plan to the city.

In Case 23, Homewood-Brushtown, the initiation and planning of a renewal plan was jointly undertaken by the neighborhood residents and a powerful private institution. The resulting renewal plan will take 20 years to implement and will cost more than twenty million dollars. The main



TABLE 2

THE LEVEL, SOPHISTICATION AND RESPONSIVENESS TO THREATS  
FOUND IN WORKING CLASS PARTICIPATION

Cases	Cases in Which the Residents Participated in Significant Numbers	Cases in Which There Was Little or no Participation	Cases in Which Residents Participated in Broad Planning Activities	Cases in Which the Participa- tion Was a Response to a Threat
Case 4 The Hill	X			X
Case 5 North Cambridge	X			X
Case 6 Cambridge	X			X
Case 7 Corktown	X		X	X
Case 10 BGM	X		X	
Case 13 Charlestown	X		X	
Case 14 South End	X		X	
Case 15 Wellington-Harrington	X		X	
Case 16 Coney Island	X		X	
Case 23 Homewood-Brushtown	X		X	





TABLE 2 continued

Cases	Cases in Which the Resident Participated in Significant Numbers	Cases in Which There Was Little or no Participation	Cases in Which Residents Particip- ipated in Broad tion Was a Response Planning Activities to a Threat	Cases in Which the Participa-
Case 25 Bradford St.	X			
Case 26 Back-of-the-Yard	X		X	X <sup>a</sup>

<sup>a</sup>Whether or not this case was pre-mainly a response to a threat is in question.



features of this renewal plan include: (1) demolishing housing in the industrial section and creating an industrial park; (2) rehabilitating existing housing; (3) building new housing on vacant land; (4) consolidating the shopping area; (5) constructing new houses and play areas; (6) building new streets; and (7) introducing social planning to solve the problems of unemployment, crime, health, family life and recreation.

In Case 13, Charlestown; Case 14, South End; Case 10, BGM; and Case 15, Wellington-Harrington, the residents participated in the planning (and, in one case, the implementation) of broad renewal programs for their neighborhoods.

In Case 13, Charlestown, the residents participated in the planning of a renewal proposal which envisaged rehabilitation, 11 per cent clearance, and the construction of new schools, playgrounds, shopping facilities and a community college.

In Case 14, South End, the residents participated in the planning of a renewal program that included the construction of approximately 3,000 new structures, the demolition of 20 per cent of the existing structures, the centralization of neighborhood facilities, and the funnelling of through-traffic around the area.

In Case 10, BGM, the residents participated in the planning of a renewal program which involved rehabilitation,



spot clearance, and the expansion of schools, recreation facilities, and off-street parking. Also the BGN Neighborhood Council was responsible for the relocation of displaced residents and businesses and code enforcement.

In Case 15, Wellington-Harrington, the residents participated in the formulation of a broad renewal plan for their neighborhood.

In summary, the evidence presented in the available case studies indicates that the working class participates in renewal and planning activities to the same extent as the middle class. Moreover, the working class and the middle class are both equally likely to participate in the planning and implementation of a broad renewal program. It also appears that it is the middle class, rather than the working class, which is far more likely to participate in planning and renewal activities as a response to a threat.

Hypothesis 3.a - The poor participate in urban renewal and the city planning process to a lesser extent than either the middle class or the working class.

There are nine cases dealing primarily with participation by the poor (Case 8, Cooper Square; Case 9, Grammercy Park; Case 17, Melbank-Frawley Circle; Case 18, Woodlawn; Case 19, Hunters' Point; Case 20, West Oakland; Case 21, Action Area; Case 27, West Dallas; and Case 28, Metro North), and three cases which deal marginally with participation by the poor (Case 11, WSURA; Case 14, South End; and Case 23,



Homewood-Brushtown)--i.e., in these cases a low level of participation has been reported.

The evidence presented by these case studies is not amenable to the formation of definite conclusions as was the evidence from the cases dealing with middle class and working class cases. Nevertheless, the available case studies do tend to support this hypothesis. However, it should be noted that the rate of participation by the poor far exceeds that which James Q. Wilson would expect it to be. Also, the level of participation far exceeded general expectations based on the low rate of participation by the poor, as reported in the standard political participation literature (Cf. Chapter I, pp. 3-8).

Seven of the cases involving participation by the poor do not report or even suggest that there was a low or insufficient level of participation by the poor. (These cases are Case 8, Cooper Square; Case 9, Grammercy Park; Case 17, Melbank-Frawley Circle; Case 18, Woodlawn; Case 19, Hunters' Point; Case 27, West Dallas; and Case 28, Metro North.)

In Case 8, Cooper Square, the residents and businessmen of the neighborhood hired an advocate planner and, with him, drew up a renewal plan which was ultimately accepted by the city. The advocate planner, Walter Thabit, held more than 200 meetings with groups from Cooper Square in order to





discern their needs and wishes.

In Case 9, Grammercy Park, the local residents and shopkeepers formed an organization to oppose Moses' plan to demolish the area.

In Case 17, Melbank-Frawley Circle, the city's intention to renew the area resulted in a great deal of conflict and participation within the community. The two causes of conflict around which participation revolved were: (1) a conflict between the Negroes and Puerto Ricans over which group constituted the legitimate bargaining agent for the community; and (2) a conflict regarding the inclusion of lower- and middle-income housing or merely lower-income housing in the renewal plans.

In Case 18, Woodlawn, an Alinsky-style community organization exerted pressure on the University of Chicago to build lower-income housing before displacing residents while their facilities were being expanded.

In Case 19, Hunters' Point, the residents and the city together formulated a renewal plan for the area.

In Case 27, West Dallas, the residents initiated and implemented a rehabilitation program for their area. And, in Case 28, Metro North, the citizens hired an advocate planner and, with him, formulated a renewal plan for the area which was then presented to the city.



The sources from which Cases 8, 9, 17, 18, 19, 27 and 28 are drawn do not specifically refer to the levels of participation found in these areas. On the other hand, it appears significant that they do not mention the existence of any problem regarding the level of participation; nor do they report a lack of participation.

However, five cases do suggest that, at present, there is somewhat less potential for participation by the poor than there is by the middle and working classes. These cases are Case 20, West Oakland; Case 21, Action Area; Case 11, WSURA; Case 14, South End; and Case 23, Homewood-Brushtown.

In Case 20, West Oakland, despite the neighborhood groups' submission of suggestions expressing what they considered to be the needs of their neighborhoods, the amount of community participation was rather low. Participation in the Model Cities planning in West Oakland was undertaken mainly by a few community leaders, who emersed themselves in the jargon and style of social planning. Further, apart from these few community leaders--who regularly attended the planning meetings--the overall attendance changed at almost every meeting. Disjointed planning resulted and decisions made at one meeting had to be gone over at later meetings.

In Action Area (Case 21), the planners who attempted to formulate a renewal plan for the area with the residents



report that they encountered several difficulties in trying to plan with the poor. The poor were found to be apathetic and unable to conceptualize in abstract terms; they also appeared to be more concerned with direct action than with long-term planning. However, the planners do specify that, despite these obstacles, they were able to work out a plan with the poor.

However, it should be noted that there are several factors present which would offer additional and/or alternate explanations for the failure of the poor to participate effectively in this case. First, there was no guarantee that the results of the planning would ever be actually implemented. The plans would first have to be approved by the CAA, the city council and the OEO. Second, because of the necessity of having the plans approved by these bodies, the plans were tailored accordingly. In practice, this meant that certain proposals--such as an increase in the supply of low-income housing, which would get to the heart of the housing problems in the area--were excluded from the plan. Third, the poor who did participate in the process were not elected by the community, nor were they the community leaders; instead, a deliberate attempt was made to seek out individuals who possessed no previous experience in community affairs. The question can be raised that if a group of the middle class citizens who had no previous experience with community affairs were brought together to



plan a project--which not only omitted some of the main problems facing their community, but furthermore had only a dubious chance of approval by the necessary authorities--how apathetic, unable to conceptualize and uninterested in long-range planning would the middle class participants be.

In Case 14, South End, the majority of residents were poor. When the city negotiated the renewal plans for the area with the residents, little participation by the poor resulted despite the fact that the planner, who directed the second stage of the planning, negotiated directly with the people and neighborhood groups. However, after the plan was adopted, a group representing the interests of the lower-income residents was formed and it began to make demands for more lower-income housing.

In Case 11, WSURA, a public controversy occurred regarding the nature of the renewal plan for the area. The area contained a great many poor residents, primarily of Puerto Rican descent. However, most of the participation was carried on by the middle class. There appears to have been little participation by the poor themselves, although individuals did exist who represented their interests. Specifically, five Puerto Ricans took on the task of representing the interests of the Puerto Ricans in the renewal area. Also, a Catholic priest, the president of the Strykers Bay Neighborhood Council, attempted to represent the needs of all the





low-income residents in the area.

In Case 23, Homewood-Brushtown, the renewal area contained both working class and poor elements. At first, participation came entirely from working class individuals; but later, the amount of participation by the poor increased.

Thus the evidence concerning levels of participation by the poor presented in five of the twelve cases points to certain problems pertaining to participation by them.

The first problem according to the available case studies is that the amount of participation by the poor will be somewhat less than the amount exerted by the middle or working classes. However, regardless of whether further research proves or disproves this assumption, several comments may be made concerning the level of participation observed in these cases.

First, although a high rate of participation is probably preferable, a substantial rather than a high rate of participation by the poor is perhaps necessary to ensure that their interests are represented in urban renewal and city planning. Indeed, J. Clarence Davies III suggests that a high degree of participation may not be necessary. Though he has observed that neighborhood groups do not involve a high proportion of the residents, he suggests that:



They are usually not unrepresentative. The stakes of the group leaders in the renewal controversy tend to be the same as the stakes of the people whom they claim to represent. The ethnic, economic, political and social characteristics of the group leaders are usually similar to the characteristics of their followers.<sup>1</sup>

Another study of a black community organization shows that the concern of both those individuals involved in the community organization and the rest of the residents were very similar and, further, that a high rate of interaction existed between members of the community organization and the rest of the community.<sup>2</sup>

The second comment regarding the apparent low level of participation by the poor is to refrain from considering it as a given; rather we should consider Jack L. Walker's suggestion and investigate the reasons for this low level of participation. Walker suggests that the lack of participation exhibited by the poor is due, not merely to their inadequacies;

(the low level of participation by the poor) may also have its roots in the society's institutional structure, in the weakness or absence of group stimulation or support, in the positive opposition of elements within the political system to wider participation, in the absence, in other words, of appropriate spurs to action, or the presence of tangible deterrants.<sup>3</sup>

It is important to expand upon Walker's comments. Case 6, Cambridge, illustrated society's institutional structure is controlled by people who hold the middle class values of technological rationality and efficiency. Consequently the governmental officials, both elected and civil servants,



inhabit a common universe of discourse. When a working class or lower class individual, acting upon a different set of values, requests the government to do or not do something, he is not received with very much sympathy or understanding. Also, the results of several community power studies illustrate that the real decision-making in American local government is performed by the civic association network, the public officials--both elected and civil service--and sometimes the representatives of some other powerful groups (which will occasionally include the older Negro leadership). Basically, however, the lower and working classes have little or no access to the real decision-making apparatus. And, when they do use public hearings to express their views, they are rarely listened to.

Another of Walker's themes is that the lack of participation by the poor may be due to the absence or weakness of any stimulus to participation. Schattschneider, on the same theme, has pointed out that a large proportion of the non-voters are also the poorest and least educated portions of American society. He believes that their non-voting is based on the fact that the issues which divide American political life are issues which have relevance to the lives of "the better-off" segment of American society, not to the poor and uneducated.

Case 21, Action Area, exemplified an instance where, on the one hand, participation was encouraged but, on the



other, no real alternatives which would stimulate the desired participation were presented. (Specifically, in this case, there was no guarantee that the formulated plans would be approved and funded by the other bodies which had to approve them. And, in an attempt to ensure that the plans would be approved, these proposals were specifically tailored in order to guarantee their approval by the necessary bodies. To achieve this goal, measures which would have struck at the guts of the housing problem were eliminated.)

The suggestion that the cause of apathy may be found as much within the political system as within the poor themselves becomes especially provocative when one considers that at least one study of a slum population--John B. Seeley's--suggests that although the typical slum contains individuals who will probably always have to be cared for, it also contains other elements who would probably be capable of participation in urban renewal and city planning. To be specific, he found people who were capable of thinking beyond the needs of their day-to-day existence.<sup>4</sup>

The second problem to be encountered in the study of participation by the poor in renewal planning (mentioned specifically in only one case study--Case 24), is that the poor may be unable to conceptualize sufficiently well to offer solutions to problems other than the most immediate ones. But if this were found to be the case (and our evidence is too limited to permit generalization on the basis





of one case) the problem could be at least partially remedied through the use of advocate planners who could present several alternate plans.

Hypothesis 3.b - When the poor do participate in planning or renewal activities, it is more likely to be a response to a threat than is either middle class or working class participation.

The available case studies do not support this hypothesis. Whereas six of the eight middle class cases, and four (or possibly five) of the twelve working class instances of participation were a response to a threat, no more than four of the nine instances of participation by the poor were a response to a threat. (Nine rather than twelve cases are used as the base line here because, in three cases of participation by the poor, there was little or no participation.) Furthermore, in every instance in which the participation of the poor was instigated by a threat (i.e., in all four cases), the residents did more than merely express a negative reaction. Instead, the residents either presented, suggested, implemented or supported some positive alternative. But the same type of active participation was exhibited by only four of the six middle class cases, and by only two of the four working class cases (or three of the five cases if Back-of-the-Yards is included).

The four cases in which participation by the poor was instigated in response to a threat are Case 8, Cooper Square; Case 9, Grammercy Park; Case 18, Woodlawn; and



Case 27, West Dallas.

In Case 8, Cooper Square, the residents responded to a threat to demolish the entire area and erect middle-income housing units. If this plan had succeeded, more than 3,000 residents and 500 small businesses would have been displaced. The residents and businessmen of the area, together with an advocate planner, spent two years working out an alternate plan. This plan, accepted by the city many years later, called for redevelopment of the area with a minimum amount of dislocation.

In Case 9, Grammercy Park, a city department proposed that a five-block area be cleared and that high-rise middle-income apartments be erected in their place. This five-block area was inhabited by 5,000 people, most of whom were poor. A neighborhood group successfully opposed the city's plans; instead, they suggested that the area be rehabilitated.

In Case 18, Woodlawn, TWO, an Alinsky-style community organization, opposed the University of Chicago's plans to further expand into the neighborhood and thereby displace numerous residents. Together, TWO and the University formulated a plan whereby the University would be allowed to expand but only after it had built low-income housing on vacant lots for those who would be displaced.



In Case 27, West Dallas, the residents feared that the city would use the fact that a recent tornado had caused much damage as an excuse to demolish the entire area. In response to this threat, the community embarked upon a rehabilitation of the area.

Hypothesis 3.c - The poor are the least likely of the three classes to participate in a broad or sophisticated program.

The case studies presented do not support this hypothesis. In eight of the nine cases (i.e., in all but Case 9, Grammercy Park) the poor participated in the planning or implementing of broad or sophisticated renewal or planning activities. Comparable activity occurred in all eight of the relevant middle class cases and in eight of the twelve working class cases. In fact, in two of these cases (Case 27, West Dallas, and Case 28, Metro North) the residents actually initiated the renewal or planning activities.

In Case 27, the residents of West Dallas undertook the rehabilitation of their area without any public assistance. Within a three-year period, the residents brought up 1,689 homes to housing-code standards, demolished 403 shacks, and built 122 new homes.

In Case 28, Metro North, the residents of the area decided to rebuild their neighborhood. They hired a planner and an architect and, with them, formulated a plan for this



community of 20,000. When the plans were completed, they submitted them to Mayor Wagner, who then recommended the plan to the appropriate city agency. While the entire plan was being worked out with the city government, several smaller steps were taken. Plans for the rehabilitation of existing buildings were worked out with the city, F.H.A. and private industry. Next, a plan for the establishment of a series of vest-pocket parks was worked out with the city. Also, a plan was formulated to rehouse those residents who would be displaced by urban renewal.

In Case 8, Cooper Square, the residents of the area hired an advocate planner and, with him, devised a comprehensive renewal plan for the area; years later, this plan was accepted by the city. The plan contained a thorough analysis of every physical and social aspect of the neighborhood. The proposed redevelopment of the area was planned in such a way that the vast majority of the present residents could be housed within the neighborhood, even during the redevelopment process itself.

In Case 17, Melbank-Frawley Circle, the situation is somewhat more complicated. The city established a group with which to negotiate renewal plans. A group of Puerto Rican residents then organized an alternate group, which, with the help of an advocate planner, formulated a sophisticated alternative to the city's initial proposal. The alternative, a complex proposal envisaging the building of





TABLE 3

THE LEVEL, SOPHISTICATION AND RESPONSIVENESS TO THREATS  
FOUND IN PARTICIPATION BY THE POOR

Cases <sup>a</sup>	Cases in Which the Residents Participated in Significant Numbers	Cases in Which There Was Little or no Participation	Cases in Which Residents Particip- ipated in Broad tion Was a Response Planning Activities to a Threat	Cases in Which the Participa-
Case 8 Cooper Square	X		X	X
Case 9 Grammercy Park	X			X
Case 11 WSURA		X		
Case 14 South End		X		
Case 17 Melbank-Frawlwy Circle	X		X	
Case 18 Woodlawn	X		X	X
Case 19 Hunters' Point	X		X	
Case 20 West Oakland		X	X	
Case 21 Action Area		X	X	
Case 23 Homewood-Brushtown		X		



TABLE 3 continued

Cases <sup>a</sup>	Cases in Which the Resident Participated in Significant Numbers	Cases in Which There Was Little or no Participation	Cases in Which Residents Participated in Broad Planning Activities	Cases in Which the Participa- tion Was a Response to a Threat
Case 27 West Dallas	X		X	X
Case 28 Metro North	X		X	

<sup>a</sup>Cases 11 only are relevant to this chart in that there was little or no participation.



lower and middle class housing, and the installation of such community facilities as shops and a health care and job training center, meant that relocation from the neighborhood would be kept to a minimum through the use of air rights over the streets. Because of the split in the community between the Negroes and Puerto Ricans, renewal planning was held up for a long time. Eventually, however, the city negotiated a renewal plan with several groups in the area. The final plan, worked out between the city and a number of neighborhood groups, included provisions for 2,900 new low- and middle-income housing units.

In Case 18, Woodlawn, the University of Chicago and an Alinsky-style community organization worked out a plan which permitted expansion of the University, but only after new low-income housing was first built for those who would be displaced.

In Case 19, Hunters' Point, a neighborhood group and the city formulated a renewal plan for this 125-acre community.

In Case 20, West Oakland, WOPC, a community group, gained control of the Model Cities policy committee in West Oakland. Several neighborhood groups presented their ideas to the policy committee. One neighborhood group presented a list of what they felt were the short-range and long-range needs of the neighborhood. The short-range needs centered



around the need for more health, commercial, cultural and recreational facilities. Many of the suggestions regarding the long-range needs, however, involved fairly drastic changes in land use. For instance, among the suggestions were: screening the railroad yards with a green belt of trees; removing the junkyards from residential areas; building tot lots and small parks in empty lots; rezoning of industry away from the residences; putting utilities (poles, wires, etc.) underground; demolishing only seriously delapidated buildings; selling a park in a low density area and building one where the people lived; and building some subsidized housing.

In Case 21, Action Area, a private agency was contracted by the City of Baltimore to work out a renewal plan for the area with the citizens of that neighborhood. In spite of the fact that the planners have stated that they encountered numerous problems when trying to plan with the residents, a renewal plan was eventually agreed upon. This plan was subsequently approved by the City of Baltimore and the other agencies which could have vetoed it.

The first set of hypotheses, that is Hypotheses 1.a, 1.b, and 1.c, 2.a, 2.b, 2.c, 3.a, 3.b and 3.c, may now be summarized.

First, the evidence indicates that the working class is as capable of participation in urban renewal and the city





TABLE 4

COMPARISON OF THE LEVEL, SOPHISTICATION AND  
RESPONSIVENESS TO THREATS FOUND AMONG THE MIDDLE CLASS,  
THE WORKING CLASS AND THE POOR

	Middle Class	Working Class	Poor
1. Number of cases	8	12	12 <sup>a</sup>
2. Number of cases in which residents participated in significant numbers	8	12	7
3. Number of cases in which there was little or no participation	0	0	5
4. Number of cases in which the residents initiated the renewal or planning activity	3	5	2
5. Number of cases in which the residents implemented the renewal or planning activity with little or no aid	1	3	1
6. Number of cases in which the residents participated in broad or sophisticated planning or renewal activities	8	8	8
7. Number of cases in which the citizens participated in some form of positive activity short of broad or sophisticated renewal planning	0	1	0
8. Number of cases in which the participation was a response to a threat	6	4 <sup>b</sup>	4
a. number of cases in which the participation was in response to a threat, and never advanced beyond that point	2	2	0
b. number of cases in which the participation began in response to a threat, but in which the residents went beyond it and suggested, initiated, implemented or backed some form of positive alternative	4	2 <sup>c</sup>	4

<sup>a</sup>Three of these cases comprise instances where there was little or no participation in spite of the fact that the opportunity existed. Thus, if these three cases were omitted, only nine cases of participation by the poor would remain.

<sup>b</sup>If Back-of-the-Yards were included, the number would be 5.

<sup>c</sup>If Back-of-the-Yards were included, the number would be 3.



planning process as is the middle class. Indeed, there are indications that the poor may be more capable of participating than one would expect. In every working class case, as in every middle class case, a significant level of participation occurred within the community. An insufficient amount of citizen participation occurred in only five of the twelve poor cases. Even in two of these five cases there was sufficient sustained participation to carry on the planning activities--although more problems were encountered than would normally be the case. This participation by the working class and the poor extended to their participation in renewal and planning activities of a broad or sophisticated sort.

Although all eight of the relevant cases of middle class participation involved participation in very broad or sophisticated planning activity, similar participation also occurred in eight of the twelve working class cases and in eight of the twelve poor cases. (The total number of poor cases is listed at twelve, but this total includes three cases in which there was little or no participation by the poor despite the fact that the opportunity for participation existed. Consequently, we are in effect only discussing eight out of nine cases.) Also, the working class appears to be as likely to initiate renewal and planning activities as is the middle class--although the poor appear to be much less likely to do so than do the middle or working classes.



Further, the working class seems to be more inclined to implement rehabilitation with little or no outside help. The fact that the middle class does this less often than the working class may be due to the fact that the middle class is better able to co-opt the city for its own aims than is the working class.

On the other hand, the reason that the poor appear to be less able than the working class to implement rehabilitation plans with little or no outside help may be due not only to the usual factors associated with low levels of political participation by the poor, but also to the lack of financial means which characterizes the poor areas.

The evidence presented by an analysis of the case studies demonstrates that the working class and, to a lesser extent, the poor can and do participate in planning and renewal activities. In addition, the evidence raises question regarding the elitest component of the "pluralist" theory. (This theory was discussed in the first chapter of this thesis.) The elitest aspects of this theory hold that the working class participates much less than the middle class, and the poor participate hardly at all. Further, the elitest component of the pluralist theory maintains that the causes for lack of participation exist not within the institutional setting or the society as a whole, rather, lack of participation stems from inadequacies present within the individual or class. However, the evidence presented here indicates that, under certain



circumstances the working class can participate to the same extent as the middle class and that the poor can participate to a far greater extent than would be expected. This information not only raises fundamental questions concerning the elitest component of the pluralist theory of democracy, but it also questions the reasons for the low rate of participation described in current political science literature. Specifically, the evidence suggests that the causes of apathy are based as much in the social structure as they are in the individual. One possible explanation for the low rate of participation which is so frequently reported is that much of the literature dealing with participation is concerned primarily with voting and other activities connected with election campaigns. And it has been suggested that,

for the bulk of the American people the voting decision is not followed by any direct, immediate, visible personal consequences. Most voters, organized or unorganized, are not in a position to foresee the distinct and indirect consequences for themselves, let alone the society. The ballot is cast and for most people that is the end of it.<sup>5</sup>

Schattschneider has also noted that the American political system is designed in such a way that elections are not fought over major issues. He has further pointed out that even those issues which are brought to the fore do not concern society's poor.<sup>6</sup> Walker has suggested that, indeed, the American political system is adept at suppressing issues rather than bringing them to the fore.<sup>7</sup>





On the other hand, the results of urban renewal and planning activities to the residents are often more immediate, more personal, and more easily foreseen. The issues of a national, or civic election may frequently become blurred to the point of obscurity. However, although the allocation of "who gets what, where and how" may not be immediately evident in renewal activities, the issues are, at least, far clearer. The efforts of renewal are particularly salient to those persons who will be affected directly.

The available evidence also indicates that it is the middle class--rather than the working class or the poor--which alone is likely to participate in planning and renewal activities in response to a threat. Six of the eight cases of middle class participation were instigated as a response to a threat, whereas only four of the twelve cases of working class participation and four of the twelve cases of participation by the poor originated as a response to a threat. However, in four of the six middle class response cases--in comparison with two of the four working class response cases and all four of the poor response cases--the residents did more than merely oppose the proposed plans; they either backed, suggested, planned or implemented some form of positive alternative.

How does one explain the fact that it is the middle class which almost always participates in response to a



threat--rather than the working class or the poor, as Wilson argued? This author suggests three possible explanations for middle class behavior. First, without the existence of threats, the middle class individual has no compelling reason to participate in planning and renewal activities. He usually lives in a good neighborhood and thus the main impetus to participate is likely to arise when his neighborhood is threatened. On the other hand, the working class, and especially the poor, are more likely to inhabit neighborhoods characterized by such constant problems as overcrowding, deterioration, lack of recreational and commercial facilities; an attempt to resolve these problems may thus result in an interest in renewal and planning activities.

The second reason underlying the middle classes' participation only in response to a threat may be that the middle class has had more practice, not only in using their political resources, but also in being successful in their uses of political resources than either the working class or the poor. Thus, when faced with a threat, the middle class is adept at using its political resources to deal with that threat.

The third possible explanation, which will be considered in the discussion of the next hypothesis, is that the middle class is the most "private regarding" of all three classes.



### The Second Hypothesis

The second hypothesis employs Keyes' modified usage of Wilson's "public regarding-private regarding" dichotomy. Keyes and this author use the term "public regarding" to refer to those individuals or groups who think "of the impact of residential renewal on the entire spectrum of interest groups in the project area". In contrast, the term "private regarding" refers to those individuals or groups who are "concerned with promoting the cause of only some of the interest groups in the area at the time of renewal planning".<sup>8</sup>

Hypothesis 4 - The middle class, when participating in urban renewal and city planning, are more "public regarding" than the working class or the poor.

The available evidence does not support this hypothesis. The middle class, when engaged in renewal planning, is extremely "private regarding" and it is willing to use or even initiate urban renewal as an instrument to rid the area of lower-income or "problem" groups. (Further, it does not seem to matter whether the middle class is black or white; regardless of race, the middle class is interested in ridding its neighborhood of lower-income groups.)

In four cases (Case 11, WSURA; Case 12, Washington Park; Case 14, South End of Boston; and Case 24, Mt. Royal) where the middle class wished to use urban renewal it was as a vehicle to eliminate or lower the number of low-income



TABLE 5  
CLASSIFICATION OF CASES INTO PUBLIC REGARDING  
OR PRIVATE REGARDING

Case		Public or Private Regarding
<u>Middle Class Cases</u>		
Case 2	West Village	probably public
Case 3	Cadman Plaza	probably public
Case 11	WSURA	private
Case 12	Washington Park	private
Case 14	South End	private
Case 24	Mt. Royal	private
<u>Working Class Cases</u>		
Case 7	Corktown	probably public
Case 12	Washington Park	private
Case 13	Charlestown	public
Case 14	South End	?
Case 16	Coney Island	public
<u>Poor Cases</u>		
Case 9	Cooper Square	public
Case 17	Melbank-Frawley Circle	private





or "problem" people in the area. In Washington Park (Case 12), middle class Negroes had campaigned for years for an urban renewal program which would eliminate the poor Negroes from the area. When they were involved in the renewal planning, the middle class Negroes strongly objected to any plans proposed by the city which would have reduced the number of poor Negroes to be dislocated.

Likewise in Mt. Royal (Case 24), the middle class residents petitioned the city for an urban renewal program which would have eliminated the lower-income people from its neighborhood. Also, the Mt. Royal Protective Association established a corporation to buy homes which might otherwise be bought by speculators. These homes were then rehabilitated and rented or resold to families which were acceptable to the present homeowners. Further, an agreement was reached whereby Negroes would be allowed into Mt. Royal on a quota system, and a screening process was created to prevent "undesirables" of either race from entering. (In the past, more poor Southern whites than poor Negroes had moved into Mt. Royal.)

In WSURA (Case 11) the city proposed a renewal program involving the demolition of 5,000 lower-income housing units and the construction of only 1,000 lower-income units to replace them; the majority of units to be built would be middle- and upper-income units. A group of Puerto Ricans,



together with an Irish Catholic priest, campaigned for 2,500 units of lower-income housing. However, the middle class Woodrow Wilson Reform Democratic Club and the largely middle class Strykers Bay Neighborhood Council backed the city's plan.

In the South End of Boston (Case 14), the middle class pushed for a renewal plan which would have displaced many of the poor and the elderly residents, and brought in more middle class residents. However, they were unsuccessful.

The case of Hyde Park-Kenwood (Case 22) is difficult to evaluate along a "public regarding-private regarding" dichotomy for a number of reasons. First, although the rehabilitation would have resulted in the dislocation of a large number of lower-income people, many members of the Hyde Park-Kenwood Community Conference felt guilty about this and attempted to keep the issue of lower-income housing alive. Nevertheless, when they had to choose between two alternatives--supporting the renewal plan which involved a great deal of dislocation of lower-income groups, or opposing the entire proposal--they supported the plan. The second factor which complicates evaluation of this renewal scheme is that the dynamics of an attempt to conserve an area such as Hyde Park-Kenwood seemed to foreclose many options from the start. One of the aspects of rehabilitation was to tear down deteriorating buildings. Then, because of the high



density of land use in the area and because of the need for institutional and commercial facilities, little or no space was left in which to relocate the displaced residents. Moreover, conservation of the area required a reduction of population turnover, which in effect necessitated the reduction of immigration by lower-income groups.

There are perhaps two cases--the West Village (Case 2) and Cadman Plaza (Case 3)--in which the actions of the middle class might be described as "public regarding". And, in both instances, the interests of the middle class, as well as those of the lower classes, were at stake. Thus, although the results may be described as "public regarding", it is difficult to judge whether or not the mass of the middle class participants were "public regarding" in the motivation of their actions. The neighborhoods of both cases are quite similar. In fact, Brooklyn Heights, where the Cadman Plaza project was to be placed, is sometimes referred to as an extension of the West Village. Both communities are inhabited largely by the "hip" intellectuals and professionals. Both are composed of a mixture of various income and ethnic groups; indeed, this fact partially explains why they are considered attractive places to live. Both communities also contain many buildings of historical and architectural significance.

Although the middle class in both cases opposed



projects which would have displaced working class residents, the reasons behind their actions are not known. Hence, ambiguity results because it cannot be determined whether the middle class was acting in a "public regarding" or a "private regarding" manner. On the one hand, their actions may have been based upon a genuine concern for the other income groups within the neighborhood. On the other hand, their main concern might have been to maintain the architectural variety and attractiveness of the areas, which slum clearance projects would have destroyed.

The middle class "box score" on the "public regarding-private regarding" dichotomy is four "private regarding" cases and one case in which the results were "private regarding"--but these results at least raised some cognitive dissonance on the part of the actors--and two cases which were probably "public regarding".

Unfortunately, the working class and poor cases relevant to this hypothesis do not provide the type of evidence that the middle class cases do. However, one generalization may be made: when the working class and the poor are engaged in renewal planning, they are not "private regarding" in the militant manner of the middle class.

There are five working class cases relevant to the "public regarding-private regarding" dichotomy (Case 7, Corktown; Case 12, Washington Park; Case 13, Charlestown;





Case 14, South End; and Case 16, Coney Island). Two of these cases--Case 13, Charlestown, and Case 16, Coney Island--can definitely be classified as "public regarding".

In Case 13, Charlestown, there was an active concern that no element of the community be harmed by the renewal efforts. It should be noted, however, that certain factors in the community favored the "public regarding" orientation of the participants. First, there was no significant problem group within the neighborhood. Second, Charlestown was an extremely tight-knit community.

In Case 16, Coney Island, the Coney Island Community Council decided to improve the housing conditions of the low-income Negroes and Puerto Ricans in Coney Island. With the co-operation of representatives from both the Negro and Puerto Rican groups, the Council formulated a plan to establish lower- and middle-income housing in Coney Island and submitted it to the Board of Estimate.

In Case 2 (Corktown) it is difficult to evaluate the orientation--i.e., "public regarding" or "private regarding"--of the working class actors; however, they could not be definitely regarded as "private regarding". Here the city selected some of the worst parts of the area to bulldoze and establish an industrial park. It is difficult to ascertain whether opposition to this move by the rest of Corktown was based on concern for the residents of the area



to be bulldozed or on a realization that once one area was bulldozed, the rest of the community would deteriorate. Indeed, opposition may have been based on a combination of both factors.

In Case 14, South End, it is also difficult to evaluate the orientation of the working class residents. The residents can be classified as "private regarding" inasmuch as they hoped that renewal would rid the South End of a major portion of its skid row. On the other hand, their actions concerning the provision of housing for the poor and the elderly is more difficult to evaluate. The first plan for the South End, formulated by the city planners and the community-wide elite, involved the construction of 2,500 units for the poor and elderly; however, these units would have been conventional high-rise public housing, and they would have been "all lumped together" in one area. The final plan, worked out between the city planners and the neighborhood groups, which were largely working class, reduced the number of new units for the poor and elderly to 800, but the units would be scattered around the South End and would conform architecturally to the existing housing stock. Also, many more existent housing and rooming houses which served these groups would be left standing.

In one case, Case 12, Washington Park, the working class acted in a manner which was definitely "private regarding". Here, the working class Negroes joined the middle



class Negroes in support of an urban renewal program which would effectively rid the area of poor Negroes.

The available evidence indicates that the working class is less "private regarding" (and conversely more "public regarding") than the middle class when engaged in renewal planning. In two instances, the working class acted in a "public regarding" manner, in one, they acted in a "private regarding" fashion; in two other cases, their actions are difficult to evaluate.

The "public regarding-private regarding" dichotomy is applicable to only two poor cases (Case 9, Cooper Square, and Case 17, Melbank-Frawley Circle). In Melbank-Frawley Circle, the actors may be described as "private regarding", because, to a large extent, the Negroes and the Puerto Ricans in the renewal area were each engaged in a fight for funds for their own race--to the exclusion of the other race. On the other hand, actors in Case 8, Cooper Square, may be classified as "public regarding" insofar as they were concerned with and made provisions for the welfare of all groups in Cooper Square, with the exception of the men in the Bowery. (It appears that no group, regardless of its class composition, will attempt to maintain or support such a problem group in their neighborhood.)

In summary, the middle class is the most "private regarding" class in urban renewal and planning activities. The available evidence demonstrates that the middle class



acted in a "public regarding" manner in two cases, in a "private regarding" manner in four cases; in one case their actions were difficult to evaluate. The working class acted in a "public regarding" manner in two cases, in a "private regarding" manner in two cases; in one case their actions were difficult to evaluate. The poor acted in a "public regarding" manner in one case, and in a "private regarding" manner in one other case.

The evidence presented here not only fails to support the second hypothesis, it also raises doubts regarding Banfield's and Wilson's thesis concerning the "public regarding" middle class and the "private regarding" lower classes. Banfield and Wilson have described the "public regarding" ethos as a willingness "to take the welfare of others, especially those of 'the community' into account as an aspect of their own welfare."<sup>9</sup> As we have demonstrated, the middle class, when engaged in renewal and planning activities, is more willing than any other class to conceive of the public welfare as the welfare of their particular class. Perhaps the willingness of the middle class to utilize the government's power and money (which Banfield and Wilson identify as the "public regarding" ethos) represents nothing more than the middle class' willingness to use the government's power and money for their own ends. This certainly occurred in planning and renewal activities where the middle class was willing to use the government's power and money to





rid their neighborhoods of lower-income groups.

The evidence discussed under this hypothesis raises crucial questions for anyone who wishes to place ultimate decision-making power on renewal and planning questions in the hands of the separate neighborhoods. It appears that very few neighborhoods are willing to tolerate problem groups or such groups as men on skid row, if they perceive the existence of another alternative, and no residents willingly accept the introduction of these groups into their neighborhood. Thus, it appears that in some instances a decentralization of decision-making might harm those groups already on the bottom (although these cases would probably be restricted to instances in which the poorest group was a minority in the neighborhood--unable to mobilize itself and lacking any group to serve as its spokesmen). With the rise of black militancy, this situation is likely to occur less frequently than it did formerly. Nevertheless, the problem still faces "poor whites" and such groups as the men on skid row, who are, on the whole, unorganized and unrepresented. However, the point should be made that a decentralization of decision-making power would not necessarily be more harmful to the bottom-most groups than was or is the practice of dictating renewal planning from above. This type of planning has rendered incalculable harm to the poor.

The third hypothesis concerns the relationship



between citizen participation and the presence or absence of governmental structures facilitating participation.

Hypothesis 5 - The amount and sophistication of citizen participation will increase as the governmental structures which facilitate this participation move closer to placing actual decision-making in the hands of the citizenry.

Evidence to support this hypothesis does not exist, although perhaps for somewhat different reasons than would initially be expected. The reason is that numerous examples exist in which the citizens take the initiative and engage in planning or rehabilitation activities without any government mandate to do so. And other instances have occurred where, although the government initially encouraged participation in the renewal planning, some of the residents in the area far exceeded the government's expectations.

In nine cases, the residents commenced rehabilitation efforts or renewal planning without the initiation or encouragement of any governmental body (Case 7, Corktown; Case 22, Hyde Park-Kenwood; Case 24, Mt. Royal; Case 25, Bradford Street; Case 26, Back-of-the-Yards; Case 27, West Dallas; Case 28, Metro North; Case 19, Coney Island; and Case 15, Washington Park). However, in two cases, the residents were attempting to prevent their neighborhood from becoming the object of a slum clearance project. In Case 7, Corktown, the area had been designated as an urban renewal area; as part of the attempt to prevent government action, the Corktown



TABLE 6

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CITIZEN PARTICIPATION AND THE GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURES THAT  
FACILITATED THE PARTICIPATION

Cases	What Sort of Structure Was Established by the Government	Actions Taken by Residents
Case 1 Northwood Acres	none	formed pressure group
Case 2 West Village	none	formed pressure group
Case 3 Cadman Plaza	none	formed pressure group, hired advocate planner, and with planned drew up an alternative plan
Case 4 The Hill	none	formed pressure group
Case 5 North Cambridge	none	formed pressure group
Case 6 Cambridge	none	formed pressure group
Case 7 Corktown	none	formed pressure group; rehabilitated neighborhood
Case 8 Cooper Square	none	formed pressure group, hired advocate planner, and with him drew up an alter- nate plan
Case 9 Grammercy Park	none	formed pressure group
Case 16 Coney Island	none	developed housing plans and presented them to the city



TABLE 6 continued

Cases	What Sort of Structure Was Established by the Government	Actions Taken by Residents
Case 18 Woodlawn	none	formed pressure group, worked out plans with University which allowed University expansion only after housing was built for those to be displaced
Case 22 Hyde Park-Kenwood	none	initiated campaign for rehabilitation of area, then worked with University planning team in formulating the rehabilitation plans
Case 23 Homewood-Brushtown	none	residents and a powerful private institution came together to plan for the renewal of the neighborhood
Case 24 Mt. Royal	none	residents decided to rehabilitate the area, and took actions to do so
Case 25 Bradford St.	none	residents rehabilitated area
Case 26 Back-of-the-Yards	none	residents rehabilitated area
Case 27 West Dallas	none	residents rehabilitated the neighborhood
Case 28 Metro North	none	residents initiated renewal planning for the area, and then went to the city with the plans





TABLE 6 continued

Cases	What Sort of Structure Was Established by the Government	Actions Taken by Residence
Case 10 BGM	city used attitude survey, and set up a neighborhood council with which to bargain	residents did not demand any more or different participation that city demanded, and the residents let the city do everything it had previously planned to
Case 12 Washington Park	the city chose an already established group with which to work out the renewal plans for the area	the group had pushed for urban renewal prior to the city's entry into the area. And it continued to push for a renewal plan that would rid the area of low income groups, after the city's entry
Case 13 Charlestown	city first chose an already established group with a broad popular base to negotiate with. Then city turned around and set up an elite group with which to negotiate with	when elite based group set up the residents opposed it, and the results of its negotiations with the city. Instead they demanded that views of all of the residents be taken into consideration
Case 19 Hunters' Point	city chose an already established group with which to negotiate the renewal plans for the area	residents did not challenge the legitimacy of the established group
Case 11 WSURA	city set up group with which to bargain with	another group was formed which challenged the legitimacy of the city sponsored group. Also other groups in the area took part in the debate concerning the nature of the renewal program, that took place in the area
Case 14 South End	the city set up an elite based group with which to bargain	the plan that was worked out with the elite based group, was attacked by many of the residents, and the renewal plans for the area were reworked with a great deal of grass roots involvement



TABLE 6 continued

Cases	What Sort of Structure Was Established by the Government	Actions Taken by Residents
Case 15 Wellington-Harrington	city set up group to bargain with	the legitimacy of the city sponsored group was not challenged
Case 17 Melbank-Frawley Circle	city created a group with which to negotiate the renewal plans for the area	another group arose which challenged the legitimacy of the city sponsored group
Case 21 Action Area	agency, with a contract from the city, established a group with which to work out the renewal plans for the area	the agency had trouble keeping the renewal planning going due to resident apathy
Case 20 West Oakland	the Model Cities Program estab- lished by the federal govern- ment, required some citizen involvement in the Model Cities program in each city	the city and the residents of West Oakland fought each other for control of the Model Cities program in West Oakland



Home Owners Association organized a campaign to rehabilitate the area. The association proceeded to take those actions which city planners, civic betterment groups, and social workers considered necessary to conserve neighborhoods. They became involved in a neighborhood conservation program conducted by the City Plan Commission. They vigilantly opposed illegal conversions and zoning changes which violated zoning ordinances and building codes. The association also took part in a "clean-up, fix-up" campaign and received a letter of commendation by the Junior Chamber of Commerce.

In Case 27, West Dallas, a tornado destroyed part of the area. After this occurrence, the residents feared that the city would use the damage caused as an excuse to destroy the rest of the area. Consequently, the residents decided to rehabilitate the community. Within three years, they brought up 1,689 homes to the housing codes; 403 shacks were demolished; and 122 new homes were built.

In the remaining five cases--where the residents initiated the rehabilitation efforts for their neighborhoods--the neighborhoods were not threatened by annihilation.

In Case 22, Hyde Park-Kenwood, the residents began the campaign for, and helped plan, the rehabilitation of the area. At this time, the concept of rehabilitation was new and untried.

In Case 26, Back-of-the-Yards, the Back-of-the-Yards



Council initiated, planned and implemented a successful rehabilitation of the community of 125,000 people, formerly regarded as one of the worst slums in Chicago.

In Case 24, Mt. Royal, the residents suggested that the city name their neighborhood one of the areas to be rehabilitated through code enforcement. Once they realized that this step was insufficient to restore the neighborhood to its former standards, the residents embarked upon other efforts. They began buying and rehabilitating buildings, and they exerted pressure upon the city to name the area an urban renewal area.

In Case 12, Washington Park, the middle class residents campaigned for urban renewal in their area years before the city designated it as an urban renewal area.

In Case 16, Coney Island, the residents initiated plans designed to solve the housing problems of the lower-income groups of Coney Island. When the plans were completed, they were submitted it to the city.

In Case 28, Metro North, the residents decided to rebuild the neighborhood. They hired a planner and an architect; with them, they formulated a plan and submitted it to the city.

Of these nine cases, three involved middle class initiative; four involved working class initiative; and two





cases involved initiative by the poor.

In two other cases (Case 3, Cadman Plaza, and Case 8, Cooper Square), the city first announced slum clearance projects for these areas. However, the city government made no provisions for, or expressed no interest in, citizen participation. Nonetheless, the residents hired advocate planners and, with them, worked out alternate plans.

Further, in five cases (Case 11, WSURA; Case 13, Charlestown; Case 14, South End; Case 17, Melbank-Frawley Circle; and Case 20, West Oakland), citizen participation was first introduced by the public authorities. A situation then arose whereby the residents either challenged the legitimacy of the group that the city had chosen to bargain with, or exhibited more participation than the city appreciated.

In Case 11, WSURA, the city established an organization, Park Hudson, with which to formulate renewal plans for the area. In opposition, another group was created--the Strykers Bay Neighborhood Council--composed of 43 organizations in the neighborhood; this latter group attempted (on the whole, successfully) to replace Park Hudson as the spokesmen for the area. Furthermore, several other groups or individuals arose and participated in what amounted to a public debate concerning the nature of renewal in the area. They included the Woodrow Wilson Reform Democratic Club, five Puerto Ricans representing the interests of the Puerto



Ricans in the area and Father Browne, an Irish Catholic priest who defended the interests of the low-income people in the area.

In Case 13, Charlestown, the city first selected a previously established group with which to negotiate the renewal plans for the area. The city then created a second group, which was largely dominated by the clergy, with which to bargain.

When a public hearing was held regarding a minor point in the renewal plan, it was attended by more than a thousand residents--85 per cent of which opposed the city on the issue under discussion. At this point, the city was obliged to change its tactics and deal with the people rather than merely negotiate with any one group.

In Case 14, South End, the city negotiated the first renewal plan for the area with a group composed of a community wide elite. A great deal of criticism of the first plan was voiced by the residents of the South End. Consequently, when the second plan was drawn up, the city negotiated directly with the people and the neighborhood groups.

In Case 17, Melbank-Frawley Circle, the city created a group with which to negotiate renewal plans for the area. A predominantly Puerto Rican group was then established which claimed that the other group did not represent certain



sections of the community. As a result, all renewal planning in the area was halted for a couple of years. Finally, the city developed and implemented a renewal plan which bypassed the Negro-Puerto Rican cleavage; instead it negotiated a renewal plan around another cleavage, which centered upon the question of whether lower- and middle-income housing, or only lower-income housing, should be built.

In Case 20, West Oakland, a dispute occurred between the city and the residents over control of the Model Cities program in West Oakland. Eventually the residents gained control of 51 per cent of the policy-making boards for the Model Cities program in the area.

Seven other cases involve instances in which although no mechanism for citizen participation was established, some citizen response arose to try to prevent the city (or, in one case, an urban university and, in another, a private developer) from taking certain actions in their neighborhoods. These cases are: Case 1, Northwood Acres; Case 2, West Village; Case 4, The Hill; Case 5, North Cambridge; Case 6, Cambridge; Case 9, Grammercy Park; and Case 18, Woodlawn. The major significance of these cases is that they all involve actual action or planning to prevent the installation of something undesirable, whether it be an expressway, slum clearance project, tank farm, temporary metal housing, or university buildings, by an outside agency into their neighborhood. In all cases, the residents responded by



opposing the measures through traditional pressure group tactics. In one case (Case 18, Woodlawn), the city forced the University of Chicago to negotiate their plans with the residents.

It appears that of all the cases where the city established a mechanism for citizen participation, only four instances exist in which the citizens did not either challenge the legitimacy of the negotiating body chosen by the city or, in effect, demand more of a say than the city was prepared to give them. These cases are Case 10, BGM; Case 15, Wellington-Harrington; Case 19, Hunters' Point; and Case 21, Action Area.

In Case 10, BGM, the city decided to rehabilitate a number of neighborhoods in Detroit, including BGM. First, the city employed an attitude survey to obtain the residents' ideas; a neighborhood council was then established for bargaining purposes. In the end, however, the city proceeded to do what it had wanted to do all along.

In Case 15, Wellington-Harrington, the residents protested the renewal plan proposed by the city; consequently, the plan was abolished. The city then appointed a planner to formulate a renewal plan with the residents. He chose a committee of residents and, together, they worked out a plan which received the overwhelming approval of the residents at a public hearing.





In Case 19, Hunters' Point, the city and a group selected by the city hired an architect and, with him, worked out the renewal plans for the area.

In Case 21, Action Area, a private agency contracted by the city and the residents formulated a renewal plan for the area. The amount of participation was so low, however, that it was difficult to maintain the planning process. As it has been pointed out earlier, this lack of participation may be attributed to three factors. First, there was no guarantee that the final plan would receive the approval of the various agencies which would provide funds. Second, in order to obtain these necessary funds, the major emphasis of the plan was placed upon ensuring its approval rather than attempting to solve the basic housing problems in the area. And, finally, the residents chosen to participate were individuals who possessed no record of community participation.

In short, evidence to support Hypothesis 3 does not exist. On the contrary, the amount of, and sophistication of, citizen participation in the planning and renewal activities does not relate too much to the presence of governmental structures facilitating this participation. Numerous examples of instances in which the citizens took some form of action without any governmental structures to facilitate this action have been presented. In some cases, the action



consisted of merely protesting a proposed plan; in other cases, an alternate plan was formulated; and, in others, a rehabilitation effort for a neighborhood, the size of a small city, was initiated and implemented.

The common impetus behind citizen participation in the case studies here appears to be based upon the very fact that a certain activity is introduced into the neighborhood which vitally affects the interests of the residents.

(In the following list, the four cases in which there was no more participation than the city wanted will be excluded.) In seven cases (Case 7, Corktown; Case 27, West Dallas; Case 3, Cadman Plaza; Case 9, Cooper Square; Case 2, West Village; Case 9, Grammercy Park; and Case 18, Woodlawn) there were threats to clear and dislocate all or part of the neighborhood. In two cases--Case 22, Hyde Park-Kenwood, and Case 27, Mt. Royal--(and possibly Case 26, Back-of-the-Yards) the rehabilitation resulted from a fear of the immigration of lower-income groups. Five cases of participation were instigated by miscellaneous threats: Case 1, Northwood Acres, by a tank farm; Case 4, The Hill, by the installation of temporary metal housing; Case 5, North Cambridge, by a truck terminal; and Case 6, Cambridge, by an expressway. In five other cases (Case 11, WSURA; Case 13, Charlestown; Case 14, South End; Case 17, Melford-Frawley Circle; and Case 20, West Oakland) citizen participation was instigated



by the fact that the city was planning rather broad renewal and rehabilitation programs for these areas.

The sources from which these cases are drawn provide no conclusions or suggestions concerning the amount and sophistication of citizen participation in the planning process, and in relation to the governmental structures that are established to facilitate this participation. However, these levels do not appear to be closely related to the social class of the residents. For example, the working class residents of Corktown and Back-of-the-Yards and the poor residents of West Dallas seemed as capable as the upper middle class residents of Mt. Royal and Hyde Park-Kenwood in initiating and implementing rather broad rehabilitation efforts. Further, the poor residents of Cooper Square appeared as capable as the middle class residents of Cadman Plaza in participating in the formulation of an alternate plan to that presented by the city.

Hypothesis 6 - Urban renewal and city planning with citizen participation at the neighborhood level leads to urban renewal and city planning which is responsive to the needs, wants, and customs of the neighborhood residents.

Before the evidence relating to this hypothesis is presented, the results of planning and renewal activities that are imposed on the neighborhood from above will be reiterated. As a result of this type of planning, more than 1,665,000 people (of whom more than 60 per cent were Negro, Puerto Rican or members of some other minority group) were forced to move from their places of residence. Very often,



the displaced families and individuals would be forced to move into housing that was worse than the housing to be demolished--and the rents were usually higher. Also, small businessmen in the renewal areas would be forced out of business, receiving little compensation and little chance of relocating. To replace the demolished residences, high-rise apartment blocks for the well-to-do would be erected. Only about six per cent of urban renewal construction is devoted to public housing. Further, much of the housing that was destroyed could only be considered slums by middle class standards; actually, this housing was adequate for lower-income groups. Also, this housing was frequently inhabited by cohesive ethnic communities which were then forever destroyed.<sup>10</sup>

The evidence presented by an analysis of the case studies in this thesis overwhelmingly supports the fourth hypothesis--although some exceptions do exist. This evidence will now be presented.

1. In ten cases of neighborhood renewal or rehabilitation or citizen proposals for such, either no, or only minimal, displacement from the neighborhood was involved. These cases are: Case 3, Cadman Plaza; Case 7, Corktown; Case 8, Cooper Square; Case 13, Charlestown; Case 16, Coney Island; Case 18, Woodlawn; Case 19, Hunters' Point; Case 26, Back-of-the-Yards; Case 27, West Dallas; and Case 28, Metro North.





TABLE 7

RESULTS OF RENEWAL PLANNING WITH CITIZEN PARTICIPATION

Cases	Renewal With Little Displacement	Reduced Dislocation	Opposed Renewal That Would Dislocate Many People	Plans Resulted or Were Pro- posed that Would Benefit Community in Some Way Other Than Reduced Relocation	Prevented Undesirable Object From Enter- ing Area	Residents Attempted to or Did in Fact Rid Their Areas of Certain Groups
Middle Class Cases						
Case 1 Northwood Acres					X	
Case 2 West Village			X			
Case 3 Cadman Plaza	X			X		
Case 11 WSURA		X		X		
Case 12 Washington Park						X
Case 22 Hyde Park- Kenwood						X
Case 24 Mt. Royal						X



TABLE 7 continued

Cases	Renewal With Little Displacement	Reduced Dislocation	Opposed Renewal That Would Dislocate Many People	Plans Resulted or Were Pro- posed that Would Benefit Community in Some Way Other Than Reduced Relocation	Prevented Undesirable Object From Enter- ing Area	Residents Attempted to or Did in Fact Rid Their Areas of Certain Groups
Working Class Cases						
Case 4 The Hill					X	
Case 5 North Cambridge						
Case 6 Cambridge					X	
Case 7 Corktown				X		
Case 10 BGM						
Case 13 Charlestown	X				X	
Case 14 South End					X	X
Case 15 Wellington- Harrington		X				
Case 16 Coney Island	X					



TABLE 7 continued

Cases	Renewal With Little Displacement	Reduced Dislocation	Opposed Renewal That Would Dislocate Many People	Plans Resulted or Were Pro- posed that Would Benefit Community in Some Way Other Than Reduced Relocation	Prevented Undesirable Object From Enter- ing Area	Residents Attempted to or Did in Fact Rid Their Areas of Certain Groups
Case 23 Homewood- Brushtown						
Case 25 Bradford St.						
Case 26 Back-of-the- Yards	X					
Poor Cases						
Case 8 Cooper Square	X					X
Case 9 Grammercy Park				X		
Case 17 Melbank- Frawley Circle					X	
Case 18 Woodlawn		X				
Case 19 Hunters' Point						



TABLE 7 continued

Cases	Renewal With Little Displacement	Reduced Dislocation	Opposed Renewal That Would Dislocate Many People	Plans Resulted or Were Pro- posed that Would Benefit Community in Some Way Other Than Reduced Relocation	Prevented Undesirable Object From Enter- ing Area	Residents Attempted to or Did in Fact Rid Their Areas of Certain Groups
Case 20 West Oakland					X	
Case 21 Action Area						
Case 27 West Dallas						
Case 28 Metro North	X					





In Case 3, Cadman Plaza, the residents opposed a city plan to build mostly luxury, and some middle-income, apartments which would dislocate many lower- and middle-income residents. The residents, together with an architect, evolved an alternate plan. This plan would have drastically reduced the amount of dislocation and, at the same time, add about 600 new units both through the rehabilitation of existing buildings and the construction of four new apartment buildings. These new buildings would in some cases be built on vacant land.

In Case 7, Corktown, the residents--without any outside aid--conducted a campaign to rehabilitate the area. It has been stated that they followed all the steps advocated by planners, civic betterment groups, and social workers, in order to conserve a neighborhood.

In Case 8, Cooper Square, the residents and an advocate planner formulated a plan to redevelop the area in such a way that all the present residents (with the exception of the alcoholics) would be housed within the area.

In Case 13, Charlestown, the residents successfully negotiated a renewal plan with the city. One of the main aims of the plan was the rehabilitation of the area in such a manner that all of the present population could be maintained. The final plan called for the relocation of only about nine per cent of Charlestown's households (Logue



considered 20 per cent to be the acceptable minimum) and a serious attempt would be made to rehouse this nine per cent in Charlestown.

In Case 16, Coney Island, the residents submitted a plan to the city which envisaged the construction of lower- and middle-income housing projects in order to relieve the housing problem of the poor in New York City.

In Case 18, Woodlawn, the residents and the University of Chicago worked out a plan which permitted the expansion of the University--but only after the construction of low-income housing on vacant lots for those persons who would be dislocated.

In Case 19, Hunters' Point, the residents and the city worked out a comprehensive renewal plan for the area which provided for relocation within the area. In this instance, their goal was easily achieved because a large amount of vacant land existed.

In Case 26, Back-of-the-Yards--a neighborhood of 125,000--the residents worked out a successful rehabilitation effort involving only minimal dislocation.

In Case 27, West Dallas, the residents rehabilitated the area in order to prevent the city from declaring the whole area the object of a slum clearance program.

In Case 28, Metro North, the residents and the city



agreed on an urban renewal project for the area. One of the first tasks undertaken was the formulation of a plan providing relocation for the residents who would be displaced by urban renewal.

2. As well as the cases discussed above, two other cases--Case 11, WSURA, and Case 15, Wellington-Harrington--(and perhaps a third case, Case 14, South End) have been presented in which citizen activity successfully reduced the amount of dislocation which would take place without adequate relocation provisions within the neighborhood.

In Case 11, WSURA, the city's first proposal required 7,800 new housing units; these units were to include 400 lower-income units, 2,400 middle-income units and 5,000 high-income units. The plan would also require the dislocation of 4,300 families and 1,300 single people. After a debate within the renewal area, the city modified the plan to provide 1,000 low-income units, 4,200 middle-income units, and 2,800 high-income units. This second plan still received the criticism of the spokesmen from the low-income residents in the area. As a result, the number of low-income units was increased to 2,500.

In Case 15, Wellington-Harrington, the city first formulated a renewal plan without any citizen participation. This plan was violently attacked at a public hearing. Consequently, a second plan, involving less relocation than the



first, was drawn up.

Case 14, South End, is difficult to evaluate on this basis. There were two plans: the first was formulated by the city and a community-wide elite; the second was drawn up following participation between the city and neighborhood groups and the people directly. The first plan envisaged clearance of about 35 per cent of the area, and the construction of approximately 2,500 units of low-income housing. This housing would be standard low-income public housing; it would be of the high-rise variety and would be concentrated in one area. The second plan would reduce the amount of clearance by ten per cent. However, only 800 new units of public housing would be built; this housing would be integrated with the other housing in the area. Great emphasis would be placed on relocating people in the existing housing stock (yet it is unlikely that most of those dislocated can be relocated within the area).

3. In three other cases (Case 2, West Village; Case 6, Cambridge; and Case 9, Grammercy Park), citizens successfully opposed renewal attempts or other planning activities which would have dislocated large numbers of people.

In Case 2, West Village, the residents successfully opposed a city plan which would have dislocated 1,700 people--less than half of whom were middle class; following this dislocation middle income apartments would have been erected.





In Case 6, Cambridge, the residents and an advocate planning group opposed an expressway which would have demolished 1,300 homes.

In Case 9, Grammercy Park, the residents opposed a slum clearance project which would have displaced 5,000 people--most of them poor--and, in its place, built middle-income housing.

4. In seven cases (Case 3, Cadman Plaza; Case 11, WSURA; Case 13, Charlestown; Case 14, South End; Case 15, Wellington-Harrington; and Case 17, Melford-Frawley Circle; and Case 20, West Oakland), either the citizens proposed an alternate plan, or their participation resulted in the adoption of a renewal plan. These plans (besides reducing the amount of dislocation as in the previous cases) served the needs, wants or customs of the neighborhood far better than did the city plan.

In Case 3, Cadman Plaza, the city proposed a plan to demolish a significant proportion of Brooklyn Heights and replace it with mammoth high-rises. The residents argued that these high-rises would destroy the character of Brooklyn Heights, which was composed of small, well kept-up, old homes. They also argued that the clearance project would tear down 75 buildings of architectural or historical significance.

In response, the residents and an advocate planner



formulated a plan which, although it increased the number of living units in the area, envisaged the preservation of most of the houses of historical or architectural significance, and thus less drastically changed the character of the neighborhood.

In Case 11, WSURA, Father Browne, after the issue concerning the amount of low-income housing to be built had been settled, opposed the city on the issue of the quality of the low-income housing. He fought for low-income housing which would blend in with the surrounding neighborhoods--and thus opposed high-rise projects. He was partially successful when, in 1965, the city built at least one nine-story, 70-unit apartment which belnded in with the surrounding neighborhood.

In Case 13, Charlestown, the city had to "up the ante" to guarantee community support for the rehabilitation plans because vigorous opposition to renewal existed--offset by only a shakey coalition of supporters. Partially for this reason, the renewal plan included demolition of the "El" and the introduction into Charlestown of new schools, playgrounds, shopping facilities and a community college.

In Case 14, South End, two plans were drawn up. The first was made by the city and community-wide elite, while the second was formulated after going directly to the people and neighborhood groups. Some aspects of both plans



will be compared.

The first plan envisaged the extension of the main street of the adjacent downtown business district into the South End; all the business, cultural and recreational facilities of the South End would be concentrated around this commonway. The neighborhood residents and groups opposed this commonway because they believed that it would become a hangout for criminals; further, by rendering crosstown traffic more difficult, it would reduce shopping and visits to friends. The second plan also called for centralization of neighborhood facilities; however, this would be accomplished by building up the South End's traditional main street through the following measures: adding new cultural and business facilities, up-grading the present commercial facilities, and beautifying the street.

The first plan also involved the reduction of through-traffic by funnelling it around the area, and the reduction of internal traffic by closing off many east-west streets. The neighborhood residents' opposition to these changes was based on their belief that the changes might further isolate them from their neighbors. The second plan also funnelled through-traffic around the area, and tried to reduce internal traffic. But it accomplished these goals in a far less drastic manner than the first plan. Furthermore, whereas the first plan would have broken up the Syrian community--the most significant ethnic group in the South End--the second



plan left it intact.

In Case 15, Wellington-Harrington, the first plan, formulated without citizen participation, called for a series of high-rise apartments. The second plan, which was drawn up with the residents, envisaged two- and three-family homes in the same area.

In Case 17, Melbank-Frawley Circle, the United Residents of Melbank-Frawley Circle Association--a predominantly Puerto Rican group--hired an advocate planner and, with him, formulated an alternative to the city's plan. The plan reflected the cultural, economic and social fabric of El Barrio. Also, the plan's goals included the "rejuvenation of the old public housing site, and its integration with the adjoining urban fabric." This aim would be accomplished partially by building some middle class housing in the area; hence, when the families had to move from the existing public housing, they could remain within the area.

The plan also contained provisions for such community facilities as health care and job training centers, shops and office space; it was hoped that these facilities would make the community self-sustaining.

In Case 20, West Oakland, the suggestions made by a neighborhood group reflected some of the immediate and long-term needs and wants of the neighborhood. These suggestions





included the establishment of a clinic, a supermarket with fair prices, a child-care center for working mothers, and a park where the people are located.

5. Three other cases (Case 1, Northwood Acres; Case 4, The Hill; and Case 5, North Cambridge) have been presented in which the residents prevented the introduction of some undesirable object into the neighborhood.

In Case 1, Northwood Acres, the residents prevented the placement of a tank farm, which might have been a fire hazard, into their neighborhood.

In Case 4, The Hill, the residents prevented the establishment of temporary metal housing--discarded by New York City--in their neighborhood.

In Case 5, North Cambridge, the residents successfully opposed the establishment of a trucking terminal.

The evidence which does not support Hypothesis 4 will be presented next.

1. In three cases (Case 12, Washington Park; Case 24, Mt. Royal; and Case 14, South End), the explicit aim of some or all of the citizen participation was to rid the area of certain groups.

In Case 12, Washington Park, the middle class Negroes had campaigned for an urban renewal program which would rid



their area of poor Negroes. In this case, the middle class Negroes were supported by the working class Negroes. After approximately ten years, they finally obtained agreement from the city to instigate an urban renewal effort for the area. During this time, there were no groups acting in behalf of the poor Negroes, and no attempt was made to include them in the renewal negotiations. (In fact, if such an attempt had been made, a violent reaction by the middle class Negroes would have occurred.) Furthermore, during the negotiations, whenever the city raised the issue of lower-income housing for those who were to be displaced, the residents refused to discuss the matter.

Also, when the city presented the residents with three alternate plans--this was their standard operating procedure--the residents shocked the city by choosing the plan which required the largest amount of clearance (60 per cent). When the city pushed plans involving only 40 per cent clearance, the residents were unhappy but they accepted the proposal. The residents also successfully opposed the inclusion of a woman's welfare institution in the plan.

In Case 24, Mt. Royal, the middle class residents attempted to halt and reverse both the deterioration of their neighborhood and the influx of poor whites and Negroes into the area. They utilized several methods to attain this goal: code enforcement; pressure on the city to institute an urban renewal program; the purchase of buildings by the residents



and their subsequent rental or resale to families which were acceptable to the present homeowners; a screening process employed to prevent "undesirables" of either race from entering Mt. Royal.

In Case 14, South End, the middle class professionals attempted to obtain more housing and land use which would cater to their interests and, in the process, displace lower-income groups.

2. In one case, Case 22, Hyde Park-Kenwood, the rehabilitation resulted in much dislocation of working class Negroes. The residents of the area expressed their concern over this fact. However, when "the chips were down" and they had to either support the rehabilitation, including the dislocation, or oppose it entirely, they backed the rehabilitation. Thus their concern regarding the maintenance of Hyde Park-Kenwood as a desirable place for middle class intellectuals to live took precedence over their concern regarding the removal of working class Negroes and whites from Hyde Park-Kenwood.

3. In Cooper Square, Case 8, the alternate plan proposed by the residents provided for the relocation of the present inhabitants in the neighborhood except the alcoholics on the Bowery. (However, some concern was expressed regarding their relocation elsewhere.) The residents in the South End, Case 14, were also unconcerned about the skid row



inhabitants of their area. These cases may well illustrate that no group favors the inclusion of such problem groups in their neighborhoods if another alternative is available.

The cases analyzed in this thesis demonstrate that citizen participation is not a panacea for all the problems associated with urban renewal and city planning. Citizen participation does, however, involve recognition of the fact that planning and renewal problems are problems which lend themselves to a political rather than a technical solution. Consequently, the alternate solutions to a given problem, and the values in which it is premised, comprise the proper subject matter for a public debate. Paul Davidoff, the intellectual grandfather of advocate planning, felt that this is all that citizen participation in planning and renewal could or would do.<sup>11</sup>

Once these activities are recognized as political, they become subject to all the advantages and disadvantages of interest group politics as it is now practiced in the United States. Interest group politics does allow groups to fight for their interests. Unfortunately, however, the poor and uneducated--i.e., the least well-organized groups--will also be the groups least able to fight for their interests. However, the poor have been precisely the group which has been harmed most by planning imposed from above. Further, as a result of the civil rights movement and black





militancy of the last decade, a significant proportion of the American poor are now either capable of being organized in planning and renewal controversies or have spokesmen and organizations who will defend their interests. The problem of the unorganized "poor whites" still, however, remains.

But if those critics within city planning departments who attack citizen participation on these grounds are seriously concerned over the plight of the poor, they should advocate the use of community development workers and advocate planners to organize these people and articulate their needs, rather than the maintenance or restoration of planning from above.



## FOOTNOTES, CHAPTER VII

<sup>1</sup>Davies, Neighborhood Groups and Urban Renewal, p. 208.

<sup>2</sup>Raymond E. Owen, "The Political Dynamics of Urban Poverty: A Study of a Black Community Organization" (paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, New York, September 1969.)

<sup>3</sup>Walker, "A Critique. . . .", p. 290.

<sup>4</sup>John R. Seeley, "The Slum: Its Nature, Use, and Users", American Institute of Planners Journal, XXV (February, 1959), 7-14. Seeley stated that he had found that slum dwellers were divided into four basic types: (1) the "permanent necessitarians", (2) the "temporary necessitarians", (3) the "permanent opportunists", and (4) the "temporary opportunists". Only among the "permanent necessitarians" did Seeley find individuals who were incapable of any initiative or effort on their own behalf.

<sup>5</sup>Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee, Voting, pp. 3-8.

<sup>6</sup>Schattschneider, The Semisovereign People, p. 110.

<sup>7</sup>Walker, "A Critique. . . .", p. 291.

<sup>8</sup>Keyes, The Rehabilitation Planning Game, p. 212.

<sup>9</sup>James Q. Wilson and Edward C. Banfield, "Public-Regardingness as a Value Premise in Voting Behavior", American Political Science Review, LVIII (December, 1964), 876-887.

<sup>10</sup>Anderson, The Federal Bulldozer; Greer, Urban Renewal and American Cities; Gans, The Urban Villager.

<sup>11</sup>Davidoff, "Advocacy and Pluralism in Planning", pp. 331-338.



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